Today I shifted format. Portrait mode. Mobile-friendly. One topic. Because a friend asked me last week: "Mark, what actually happened with the pump and dump?" — and I realized that after 58 days of writing about Teis, the trustee, the bankruptcy, the reconstruction, very few people actually understand the event that started everything. So this week we are going back to March 2024, step by step, with documents on screen and verified prices on charts. This is Part 1: the Pump. +48.6% in seven trading days. Peak DKK 52.00 on 18 March 2024 — confirmed all-time high.
Previous episodes: Day 57: The Paywall Question · Day 56: The Board Folder · Day 55: Friday Q&A — Jørgen and the Documents · Day 54: How the Note Became Liquid
Fifty-eight days into a war I didn’t start. Six days until the court hearing on 11 May at 09:30 at Sø- og Handelsretten.
I want to do something different this week.
For 58 days I have written about Teis Gullitz-Wormslev. About the unlawful bankruptcy of 6 January 2026. About the trustee period. About the reconstruction on 11 May. All of it true. All of it documented.
But last week a friend asked me a question that stopped me in my tracks. He said: “Mark, I follow your dispatches. I understand the bankruptcy was unlawful. I understand the reconstruction. But what actually happened before all of that? What was the pump and dump everyone keeps mentioning?”
He was right to ask. Most people on the Nordnet thread do not actually know what happened in March 2024. They know the share price fell. They know there was something with Carnegie. They know the name Lars Topholm gets thrown around. But the actual mechanics — who did what, when, with what tool, for whose benefit — have never been laid out cleanly in one place.
So today and over the next few days, four episodes back to back. Part 1: the Pump. Part 2: the Dump (the people who profited). Part 3: the cover-up by Finans.dk. Part 4: how it connects directly to the bankruptcy of January 2026.
This is Part 1.
🎯 What is a pump and dump — in plain English
A pump and dump is a market manipulation scheme with two phases. The name describes the action.
Phase 1 — The Pump. A party with influence over price-sensitive information artificially inflates the share price. Could be through a positive analyst report. Could be through rumors. Could be through coordinated buying. The point is: the price goes up not because the company has fundamentally changed, but because someone is engineering the perception that something good is about to happen.
Phase 2 — The Dump. Once the price has been inflated, the same party — or coordinated parties — sell their position at the elevated price. Retail investors who bought during the pump are left holding the bag when the price collapses afterwards.
The distinguishing feature of a real pump and dump is information asymmetry. The party doing the pumping has information that the buying retail investors don’t have — usually that the same party is about to sell. It’s not a prediction. It’s a script.
This is what happened to Shape Robotics in March-April 2024. And the man at the center of it was Carnegie’s most senior equity analyst.
🏛️ The 2023 backdrop — uplisting to Main Market
Some context first. In late 2023 Shape Robotics did an uplisting from First North to the Main Market of Nasdaq Copenhagen. In hindsight, I think this was a strategic mistake by the management at the time — but that’s a separate conversation we will have in a future one-to-many session.
Two important consequences of the uplisting:
✓ EIFO support became contested. The Danish state’s export and investment fund had supported Shape Robotics on First North. The bureaucratic interpretation that emerged after the uplisting was that EIFO shouldn’t continue supporting Nasdaq-listed companies. That set the stage for EIFO’s eventual withdrawal in June 2024.
✓ The uplisting was technical — not an IPO. We made a prospectus. We moved up to the Main Market. But we did not issue new shares to the public at the uplisting. The board had authorization to issue shares, but didn’t use it at uplisting. With the benefit of retrospect, that authorization should probably have been used. We will come back to this.
By early 2024 Shape Robotics was on the Main Market, with an ambitious budget for FY 2024, a strong PNRR pipeline in Romania, the Polish Bechtle contract well underway, and a fresh acquisition (Scriware) being integrated.
In March 2024, Shape Robotics did execute a directed share issue — raising approximately DKK 35 million at DKK 35 per share. This is the share placement that becomes critical to the pump-and-dump story.
📄 The “Back of the Envelope” — 5 March 2024
On 5 March 2024, twenty days before he ever contacted me, Lars Topholm — Managing Director and Head of Research at Carnegie Investment Bank — circulated a document internally and to selected market participants.
The document is titled, in his own words, a “back of the envelope” analysis of Shape Robotics. The phrasing is deliberate. “Back of the envelope” in financial industry English means a quick rough calculation, not a formal research note. By labeling it that way, Topholm was claiming the document was casual — too informal to require the disclosure obligations that apply to formal Carnegie research.
Here is the relevant opening paragraph, verbatim:
“I have done a back of the envelope on Shape Robotics, a Danish microcap with market cap at DKK 500 million. Given the company has just announced a very ambitious growth plan targeting at least DKK 1 billion in revenue by 2027 with a 12-15% EBITDA margin, which itself was a double from 2022, it might not be a microcap for much longer. So for 2024, it has guided revenue of at least DKK 300 million — at least 75% growth.”
So far this reads like context. But then comes the modeling. Topholm includes graphs labeled as “Carnegie Research / Company data”:
Revenue Development 2017–2027 — projecting growth trajectory through 2027
Guidance vs. Actual — showing Shape’s track record of beating prior guidance
Share Price @ 12% EBITDA — a price target table at one EBITDA assumption
Share Price @ 15% EBITDA — a price target table at a higher EBITDA assumption
Main Figures 2022–2027e — full P&L projection
Trade Receivables vs Revenue — working capital trajectory
These are not back-of-the-envelope graphs. These are full-fledged Carnegie research outputs, generated using Carnegie’s proprietary research tools — algorithms and models the bank has built over years for serving its institutional clients. A casual analyst writing on the back of an envelope does not have access to those tools. The Head of Research at Carnegie does.
Below are the actual graphs from Topholm’s document, reconstructed in Datawrapper:
These are the fundamental analysis tables Topholm used to justify the 3-4x upside projection. Below — in two new charts — is what actually happened to the share price during and after the distribution of his “back of the envelope” to selected market participants.
The fundamental tables make a case. Project Shape’s stated 2027 ambition (DKK 1 billion revenue, 12-15% EBITDA margin) into a share price using standard EBITDA multiples, and you get a theoretical share price three to four times higher than the market price at the time.
The document closes with this line — verbatim:
“This isn’t an official research, just the back of the envelope. So risks to the numbers stated above may be significant. However, given the share price today that stands at DKK 36, I thought it was relevant to share because if these calculations make sense, Shape Robotics could become much less of a microcap in future.”
⚡ Why this is investment advice — not “back of the envelope”
The document does three things that, together, transform it from informal commentary into regulated investment advice under EU Market Abuse Regulation:
❶ It uses Carnegie research tools and graphs clearly labeled as such — establishing institutional authority.
❷ It includes price target tables at specific EBITDA assumptions — the structural form of an investment recommendation.
❸ It is distributed to investors who are then expected to act on it — including, as we now know, parties with whom Topholm had pre-existing financial relationships.
Under MAR Article 20 (and the underlying Regulation (EU) 596/2014), an investment recommendation that uses an institution’s analytical resources triggers disclosure obligations — including the obligation to disclose any personal interest the analyst holds in the security being analyzed.
Lars Topholm at the time he circulated this document held shares in Shape Robotics personally. He did not disclose this. The Danish FSA later confirmed this was a violation of MAR Article 20.
That confirmation — by Finanstilsynet, on the public record — is the foundation on which everything else in this story rests. The pump was not a theory. It was a regulated finding.
📞 The first call — 25 March 2024
Twenty days after Topholm circulated his “back of the envelope” — on 25 March 2024 — he contacted me directly for the first time.
The message, verbatim from my inbox:
“Nice to connect. I’m a shareholder too. Can we do an introductory call at your convenience? No rush. — Lars Topholm”
I had no idea who he was. I was preparing to take over as CEO from André Fehrn, who had decided to step down. As part of the natural handover I was reviewing emails and noticing senior contacts the company had developed. Topholm popped up.
We had a one-on-one call on 26 March 2024. He presented himself as Carnegie’s Head of Research — Denmark’s most prestigious equity analyst, with a long track record at the largest investment bank in the Nordics. He said he had been a shareholder of Shape Robotics for a while. He wanted to discuss the company’s strategy and prospects.
The conversation was civilized. I treated him as a senior market professional doing routine analyst due diligence. I did not know that twenty days earlier he had already circulated his “back of the envelope” projecting 3-4x upside, while holding shares. I would only learn about that document much later — in late June 2024, from the chairman Jeppe Frantzen, after the damage was done.
That asymmetry of information — me not knowing what he had been doing externally with material projections about my company — is the structural defect of the entire scheme. The CEO of the company that is being analyzed was the only person in the room who didn’t know that an analyst report had been circulated.
📈 What happened to the price — verified data
Here are the public, verifiable data points. All numbers can be cross-checked on TradingView (OMXCOP:SHAPE) and Cision company announcements.
✓ Pre-pump baseline (early February 2024): ~DKK 33 per share. Stable trading band.
✓ 5 March 2024: Topholm circulates “back of the envelope” internally. Price ~DKK 35.5.
✓ 11 March 2024 (Cision Announcement 9-24): Private placement initiated at DKK 35 per share. Subscription indications received for DKK 40+ million against DKK 35.4 million target — placement oversubscribed. Total: 1,011,653 new shares issued at DKK 35 = DKK 35,407,750 gross proceeds.
✓ 18 March 2024 — PEAK: DKK 52.00 per share. This is the all-time high of SHAPE on OMXCOP, confirmed publicly on TradingView. Seven trading days after placement. +48.6% from placement price.
✓ 22 March 2024: New placement shares admitted to trading. Total shares outstanding: 15,066,170.
✓ 25-26 March 2024: Lars Topholm contacts me directly for the first time. By this date, the pump has already happened.
✓ 24 April – 4 June 2024: Coordinated sale of approximately 532,000 shares by Topholm/Bundgaard/Bendixen network. Price drops from low-40s to low-20s range over 6 weeks.
📊 Chart 1 — The Pump (Feb-Apr 2024) — interactive Datawrapper
A 48.6% repricing in seven trading days, with no material new disclosure from the company between 11-18 March other than the placement itself (which completed at DKK 35, not DKK 52). The company itself did not communicate any guidance upgrade, any new contract, any acquisition, any operational news that would justify a 48.6% repricing.
What changed between 5 March and 18 March 2024 was not the company’s fundamentals. What changed was the information that selected investors had received from Topholm’s “back of the envelope,” via Carnegie’s distribution channels — including the projection that DKK 52 might just be the start, with 3-4x upside still to come.
That is the textbook structure of a pump.
📉 Where it ended — the 21-month drawdown
📊 Chart 2 — The Pump & Dump (Feb 2024 → Jan 2026) — interactive Datawrapper
The peak of DKK 52.00 on 18 March 2024 was the last time Shape Robotics shares traded above the placement price.
✓ End of June 2024: ~DKK 18 (after coordinated sales conclude)
✓ End of 2024: ~DKK 22-23 (brief recovery)
✓ September 2025: ~DKK 6
✓ 23 December 2025 — ATL: DKK 1.58. All-time low confirmed on TradingView.
✓ 6 January 2026: Last trading day at DKK 5.03, then suspended indefinitely following the unlawful bankruptcy decree.
🔑 Drawdown from peak: 96.96% in 21 months.
An ATH of DKK 52.00 → ATL of DKK 1.58 = -97% drawdown.
Retail investors who bought into the placement at DKK 35 — relying on the same “back of the envelope” projecting 3-4x upside — saw their position cut by 95.5% before trading was suspended.
🕴️ The connections — Aerbio, Bundgaard, Bendixen
Here is the part that turns this from a regulatory infraction into a coordinated scheme.
Lars Topholm is the Chairman of Aerbio, a Danish biotech company in the carbon-offset space. Aerbio raised capital from a small circle of investors. Two of the most prominent investors in Aerbio are:
✓ Martin Bundgaard — Danish private investor, owner of holding companies that participate in placements like the March 2024 Shape Robotics directed issue.
✓ Søren Bendixen — Danish private investor, similarly active in directed placements via personal investment vehicles.
Both Bundgaard and Bendixen — through their direct holdings and via vehicles like Sundvænget — participated in the March 2024 Shape Robotics share issue at DKK 35 per share. Together with associated parties, the network acquired approximately EUR 3.5 million worth of shares in the placement.
Then, between 24 April and 4 June 2024, the same network — Topholm, Bundgaard, Bendixen, and Sundvænget — coordinated the sale of approximately 532,000 shares at peak prices, extracting approximately DKK 21 million in cumulative profits.
Average gains: 50-85% per investor on the Shape Robotics position, in roughly 60 days.
🔑 The structural pattern:
The Chairman of Aerbio (Topholm) circulates a “back of the envelope” projecting 3-4x upside on Shape Robotics, while holding shares.
Two major Aerbio investors (Bundgaard, Bendixen) buy into the Shape Robotics directed issue at DKK 35.
The price pumps to DKK 55-56 over six weeks.
The same network coordinately sells at the peak, extracting DKK 21 million from retail buyers who bought into the rally.
This is not a coincidence. This is the script.
📰 The character assassination — and the Bundgaard family
The final piece of this Part 1 is something most readers will find surprising. Once I started publishing the pump-and-dump investigation on Substack in late 2025, a coordinated media counter-strike began against me personally — not against any of the actors in the pump-and-dump.
The lead organ in that counter-strike is Finans.dk, where the financial journalism on Shape Robotics has been particularly aggressive — including the December 2025 fraud allegation that triggered the auditor Beierholm’s resignation on the same day.
The senior editor at Finans handling the financial coverage is Morten Bundgaard.
Martin Bundgaard — the investor who profited approximately 85% from the Shape Robotics pump — is Morten Bundgaard’s relative.
The character-assassination campaign in Finans, which surfaced sealed court documents from a 2017 Romanian whistleblower case completely unrelated to Shape Robotics, only makes sense in this light. Someone with a vested interest in burying the pump-and-dump story had access to the Danish business press and used it.
This will be the focus of Part 3 of this series. For Part 1, just register the pattern: the people who profited from the pump are connected, by family, to the people now running the editorial counter-strike.
🎯 What’s coming in Parts 2, 3, 4
Part 2 — Tomorrow: The Dump. Who exactly sold what, when, at what price. The 532,000 shares between 24 April and 4 June 2024. The coordinated exit. Sundvænget’s 94,927-share dump on a single day. Topholm’s personal sale on the same day his network’s vehicle dumped. The DKK 21 million extracted from retail.
Part 3 — Day after: The Cover-up. How Finans.dk responded to my Substack investigation. The leaked sealed Romanian documents (publication date timed exactly one day before my scheduled trustee testimony). The character assassination playbook. The “Pandora pump-and-dump 2018” precedent involving the same Topholm.
Part 4 — Day after that: The Connection. How the pump-and-dump of March-April 2024 directly caused the bankruptcy of January 2026. The DKK 205 million in shareholder value destroyed. The 79% share price collapse from peak. The death spiral that follows when the share currency of a small-cap is destroyed. Why EIFO withdrew. Why Treyd filed bankruptcy. Why everything that has happened since 6 January 2026 traces back to one document on 5 March 2024.
That is the arc. Four episodes. Four disclosures. Four pieces of evidence already on the public record.
🔚 Closing
What happened to Shape Robotics in March-April 2024 was not bad luck. It was not market volatility. It was not even ordinary insider trading.
It was a pump and dump engineered by Denmark’s most prestigious equity analyst, using his bank’s proprietary research tools, distributed to a coordinated network of investors who bought into the directed share issue and sold into the rally — extracting approximately DKK 21 million from retail investors in roughly 60 days.
Finanstilsynet has confirmed the regulatory violation. The DFSA’s finding is on the public record.
Everything that has happened to Shape Robotics since — the auditor resignation, the EIFO withdrawal, the Treyd bankruptcy petition, the unlawful bankruptcy decree of 6 January 2026, the trustee period, the tvangsopløsning, the current liquidator’s hostile actions — all of it traces back to the share-currency destruction caused by the pump and dump of 2024.
Reconstruction on 11 May is not just about saving Shape Robotics. It is about establishing publicly that retail investors on Nasdaq Nordic cannot be treated this way without consequence. That a coordinated extraction scheme run by a Carnegie analyst against a Danish microcap will be exposed, prosecuted, and the proceeds recovered.
Theft in broad daylight by smart people in Patagonia vests, who believe they can extract from retail and disappear into respectability.
Not this time.
We did not start this fight. We are going to finish it.
Q.E.D.
Mark-Robert Abraham · Founder and former CEO, Shape Robotics A/S · 5 May 2026 · Day 58
Lead complainant on the shareholders’ petition: Jørgen Andreas Berg · joergen.andreas.berg@gmail.com
🔐 Vault access: wildceo.live/vault — subscribe at substack.wildceo.live and use the same email to log in.
🤖 Wild CEO AI agent — trained on the full case archive — at wildceo.live.
📊 The Datawrapper graphs reconstruct the analytical content of the 5 March 2024 “back of the envelope” document. The original document is part of the Finanstilsynet case file and has been confirmed by the DFSA as constituting investment advice subject to MAR Article 20 disclosure obligations.
📚 Part 2 of this series — “The Dump” — drops tomorrow.
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