GAME OVER | The Chairman's Secret: Two Bankruptcies, One Pattern
Same chairman. Same state agency. Same bank. Same collapse. A Wild CEO Special Investigation.
I inherited a disaster. Now I know why.
On May 1, 2024, I became CEO of Shape Robotics AS. I did not know it at the time, but I was inheriting a company wired to explode. The fuse had been lit eighteen months before I walked in the door — by the very people who hired me.
This is the story I have been piecing together for months. It involves a state agency, a bank, a law firm caught in Denmark’s biggest corruption scandal, and a chairman who had already done this before.
What I Walked Into
When I took over as CEO, the company was listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen Main Market. The uplisting had happened in November 2023 — six months before I arrived. I was not part of that process. I did not sign the prospectus. I was not on the board. I was brought in to run operations, grow the business, and execute.
The board that hired me was led by Chairman Jeppe Frandsen. The previous CEO, André Fehrn, had resigned the day before I started. The EIFO credit guarantee — the backbone of the company’s Danske Bank credit facility — was presented to me as a stable, structural part of the financial architecture. Nobody told me it was already dead.
The EIFO Problem — From My Perspective
In June 2024 — one month after I became CEO — EIFO notified the company that its guarantees would not be renewed. The reason: the company had been admitted to the Nasdaq Main Market. Under EU Regulation 651/2014 (GBER), state-backed investment funds are generally prohibited from financing companies listed on a main regulated market.
I did not authorize the uplisting. I did not review the GBER implications. I was not CEO when the decision was made. But suddenly, the credit facility that funded the entire Danish operation was collapsing — and it was my problem.
I spent the next eighteen months trying to fix it. I negotiated with EIFO. I explored the digital transformation exemption under GBER Article 21(6). I worked with the board to find replacement financing — convertible loans, ABG Sundal Collier, Durham Capital, AC Partners. I presented budget after budget with the convertible structure included. I did everything a CEO is supposed to do.
But something was wrong. EIFO was not cooperating. Not aggressively refusing — just not engaging. Discussions would start and stall. Proposals would be acknowledged but never actioned. The September 2024 email from Jeppe to the board — “we have a chance to continue the partnership with EIFO if we establish an operational subsidiary” — went nowhere. The subsidiary was never established. The follow-up meeting with EIFO never materialized.
I could not understand why. EIFO had every reason to work with us — the company was growing, DKK 302 million in revenue, operations in five countries. The GBER exemption for digital transformation companies was legitimate. Finland’s Finnvera — operating under the exact same EU framework — approved financing for our subsidiary Sanako Oy. The legal path existed.
So why would EIFO not walk it with us? Now I know.
The Chairman’s Secret
Jeppe Frandsen was not just the Chairman of Shape Robotics. Before Shape, he was Chairman of another Danish company — one that had a remarkably similar financial structure.
Paralenz Group ApS (CVR 37377074). An underwater camera company founded in 2016. Jeppe Frandsen became Chairman on 22 May 2019 — confirmed by the official CVR registry at Virk.dk, by his own CV filed with Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG, and by the audited annual reports.
Paralenz had the same financial DNA as Shape Robotics:
Chairman: Jeppe Frandsen → Jeppe Frandsen
State funding: Vækstfonden (now EIFO), DKK 10M loan → EIFO credit guarantee
Bank: Danske Bank → Danske Bank
Outcome: Bankruptcy, Oct 2022 → Bankruptcy, Jan 2026 (annulled)
State losses: DKK 25M+ → Under dispute
Bank recovery: Zero → Under dispute
In 2021, Paralenz raised DKK 25 million in new financing. Of that, DKK 10 million was a direct loan from Vækstfonden — the Danish state investment fund that later merged into EIFO. The going-concern note in the 2020/21 audited annual report stated that with the new capital, the Group’s liquidity was secured until September 2022. That note was signed by the board. Including Jeppe Frandsen.
The company went bankrupt on 5 October 2022. One month after the runway expired. Danske Bank recovered nothing. Vækstfonden lost its DKK 10 million and then some. Total state losses from Paralenz exceeded DKK 25 million.
Now Read It Again Slowly
Jeppe Frandsen was Chairman of a company where EIFO (Vækstfonden) lost DKK 25 million. Danske Bank recovered zero. The company went bankrupt under his chairmanship. The going-concern warning he signed turned out to be the countdown to collapse.
Then, thirteen months later, the same Jeppe Frandsen became Chairman of Shape Robotics — a company whose entire credit facility depended on EIFO guarantees, serviced through Danske Bank.
The same state agency. The same bank. The same chairman. And nobody told me. Nobody told the shareholders. Nobody told Finanstilsynet — or if they did, nobody acted on it.
Why EIFO Would Not Work With Us
This is the part that haunts me. I spent eighteen months wondering why EIFO would not engage meaningfully with Shape Robotics. I brought proposals. I cited the GBER digital transformation exemption. I showed them Finland’s Finnvera had done exactly what we were asking under the same EU framework.
But imagine you are EIFO. Imagine you lost DKK 25 million on a company called Paralenz — chaired by Jeppe Frandsen. Imagine that same Jeppe Frandsen is now the Chairman of another company standing in front of you, asking for continued support. Would you cooperate?
I would not either.
The tragedy is that the company was not Jeppe’s company. It was the shareholders’ company. It was the teachers’ and students’ company. It was a company with real revenue, real products, real impact in 40 countries. But the man sitting in the chairman’s seat had a history that made EIFO’s decision — consciously or unconsciously — almost inevitable.
And I — the CEO who was supposed to fix it — was never told why the room was cold.
The Disclosure Failure
Under the EU Prospectus Regulation, companies are required to disclose director-associated bankruptcies within the preceding five years in listing prospectuses. Shape Robotics’ listing prospectus was published in November 2023 for the uplisting to Nasdaq Main Market. Jeppe Frandsen was named as Chairman. Paralenz went bankrupt in October 2022. Thirteen months before the prospectus. Well within the five-year disclosure window.
Was this disclosed? I have reviewed the available materials. I have found no evidence that the Paralenz bankruptcy was disclosed to shareholders, to Finanstilsynet, or in the listing prospectus.
If it was not — and I invite anyone with access to the full prospectus to verify — this represents a material non-disclosure that may have affected Finanstilsynet’s approval of the listing, investors’ assessment of the board’s competence, and EIFO’s willingness to maintain the credit guarantee.
The Horten Connection
One more thread. The trustee appointed for the Paralenz bankruptcy was Christina Andersen from Horten — one of Denmark’s largest law firms.
In May 2024, TV2 Denmark broadcast “Den Sorte Svane” (The Black Swan) — an investigative documentary by Sundance-winning filmmaker Mads Brügger. The series revealed that Nicolai Dyhr, a partner in Horten’s insolvency department, had been secretly filmed advising criminals on how to commit fraud through bankruptcy proceedings. Over 2.3 million Danes watched it — the second most-viewed program in Danish history.
Horten fired Dyhr and three other employees. The entire insolvency department was reset. Sixteen or more bankruptcy cases were reopened. Nine professional violations were charged by Advokatrådet.
Christina Andersen worked in the same insolvency department during the same period. I make no accusation against Christina Andersen personally. But when the firm handling your chairman’s previous bankruptcy has its insolvency department dismantled for corruption — it is a fact worth documenting.
The Flight
Jeppe Frandsen resigned from the Shape Robotics board in April 2025 — confirmed by his own Heidelberg CV. The Company Announcement was published on 8 July 2025: “Board Update: Jeppe Frandsen Steps Down.”
By 1 December 2025, he had become acting CEO of Milestone Systems — a Canon subsidiary with thousands of employees. A prestigious appointment. A safe landing.
Shape Robotics was drowning. The EIFO guarantee had collapsed. Danske Bank was demanding repayment. The board was disintegrating — every member resigned between July and November 2025. I was left alone with DKK 302 million in revenue, operations in five countries, 4,800 shareholders, and zero support.
The man who created the EIFO problem was already in his next corner office.
What This Changes
This is not about revenge. This is about acc
ountability.
Under Selskabsloven § 361, every board member who participated in the uplisting decision bears personal liability for negligence. The duty of care (tilsynspligt) is not a suggestion. It is a legal obligation. The Supreme Court has confirmed in U 2019.1907 H (Capinordic) that the Business Judgment Rule protects only decisions made on an informed basis. A board that approves a structural change without investigating its consequences gets no protection.
The board did not check whether the uplisting would trigger EIFO’s withdrawal. They did not consult EIFO before the decision. They did not obtain a legal opinion on GBER implications. Had they sent one letter — one email — the conflict would have been identified before irreversible harm occurred.
And the chairman who should have flagged the EIFO risk had every reason to hide it — because his last company had already cost EIFO DKK 25 million.
The D&O insurance claim against Topdanmark Forsikring AS (Policy 642-16131773, DKK 21,404,220) has been initiated. All five former board members have been notified. The deadline is 6 April 2026.
The other board members will point at Jeppe. Under Danish law, that does not save them. Solidary liability means every director who voted is responsible. They all sat in the room. None of them checked.
The Questions
1. Did EIFO know that the Chairman of Shape Robotics had previously presided over a company where EIFO lost DKK 25 million?
2. Did Danske Bank perform any background check before extending credit facilities to a company chaired by the same person who presided over their previous loss?
3. Was the Paralenz bankruptcy disclosed in the Shape Robotics listing prospectus?
4. Did Finanstilsynet review Jeppe Frandsen’s directorship history before approving the prospectus?
5. Did Jeppe Frandsen inform the Shape Robotics board about the Paralenz experience — and specifically about EIFO’s losses?
6. If EIFO’s reluctance to cooperate with Shape Robotics was influenced by Jeppe Frandsen’s history — who bears responsibility for the DKK 302 million company that was destroyed?
Two companies. Same chairman. Same state agency. Same bank. Same collapse.
I inherited a disaster. Now I know it was built before I arrived — by a man who had built one before.
The question is not whether this was negligence. The question is whether anyone will be held accountable.
Mark-Robert Abraham
CEO, Shape Robotics AS
CVR 38322656
Vesterbrogade 74, 1620 Copenhagen V
substack.wildceo.live
SOURCES
1. Paralenz Group ApS, CVR 37377074 — virk.dk
2. Jeppe Frandsen CV, Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG Supervisory Board — heidelberg.com
3. Paralenz Sales ApS Annual Report 2020/21 (going-concern note) — datacvr.virk.dk
4. Paralenz bankruptcy notice, Horten (Christina Andersen as trustee) — auktioner.dk
5. Den Sorte Svane, TV2 Denmark, May 2024 (Mads Brügger) — tv2.dk
6. Horten restructuring after Black Swan, CPH Post, November 2024 — cphpost.dk
7. Shape Robotics Listing Prospectus, Company Announcement 39-23, November 2023 — shaperobotics.com
8. EIFO Company Announcement 29-25, December 2025 (guarantee withdrawal) — eifo.dk
9. U 2019.1907 H (Capinordic), Danish Supreme Court, Business Judgment Rule — domstol.dk
10. Milestone Systems management announcement, December 1, 2025 — milestonesys.com
11. Jeppe Frandsen board email, 29 September 2024
12. EU Regulation 651/2014 (GBER), Article 21(6) — eur-lex.europa.eu
#ShapeRobotics #SHAPE #NasdaqCopenhagen #EIFO #DanskeBank #Paralenz #JeppeFrandsen #CorporateGovernance #BoardLiability #InvestorProtection #Denmark #Horten #DenSorteSvane #Finanstilsynet #GBER