┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TL;DR — THE BILL │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ Shape Robotics didn't fail. It was killed. │
│ Every party who killed it has a financial reason │
│ to keep it dead. │
│ │
│ ───────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ CARNEGIE INVESTMENT BANK ........ DKK 235M – 1,368M │
│ AERBIO GROUP A/S (clawback) ..... DKK 21M – 493M │
│ BUNDGAARD-BENDIXEN NETWORK ...... DKK 32M – 435M │
│ SHAPE BOARD / D&O ............... DKK 21M – 101M │
│ EIFO / LENDERS .................. DKK 0M – 80M │
│ ───────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ TOTAL SYSTEM EXPOSURE ........... DKK 309M – 2,477M │
│ EUR 42M – 333M │
│ │
│ MOST LIKELY (medium scenario) ... DKK 783M = EUR 105M │
│ │
│ ───────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ Previous estimate DKK 60–250M = creditor RECOVERY │
│ Real number = defendant EXPOSURE │
│ Difference: 3–10× higher │
│ │
│ Includes EU MAR Article 30 fines up to 15% of │
│ Carnegie's EUR 400M turnover = DKK 450M ceiling │
│ on a single line item. │
│ │
│ ───────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ WHY THEY BUILT THE BANKRUPTCY: │
│ Not because we failed. │
│ Because we'd survive. │
│ And the bill they'd face is system-scale. │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Standing disclaimers: I am Mark-Robert Abraham, founder and former CEO of Shape Robotics A/S (CVR 38322656), Romanian citizen writing in personal capacity. This is a journalistic compilation of facts that are independently verifiable in Danish public records (CVR.dk, VP Securities, Cision, Sø- og Handelsretten). Every name appearing here is a public actor. Final legal filings remain the prerogative of Mazanti-Andersen (Philip A. Borreschmidt). Court hearing tomorrow, 11 May 2026 at 09:30, Sø- og Handelsretten.
Where we are after 3 episodes
Day 58 showed you how the pump started — Carnegie’s “back of envelope” research note dated 5 March 2024 from analyst Lars Topholm, projecting Shape from DKK 35 to DKK 131 (a 274% target) at the precise moment Bundgaard was preparing to subscribe to a directed placement.
Day 59 showed you the real reason — the 4-year pre-existing partnership between Bundgaard and Aerbio CEO Kaspar Kristiansen via Pleje- og Seniorboliger ApS (CVR 41200081), founded 27 February 2020, 50/50 ownership. This pre-dated everything.
Days 60–61 showed you the repeat extraction and the money trail — 8+ accounts, 700,000+ shares dumped between April and June 2024, DKK 21M+ extracted, redeployed into a vehicle (DBB BidCo ApS, founded 1 May 2024 during the dump, renamed Aerbio Group A/S on 11 September 2024), where Bundgaard locked 33.08% UBO on 18 October 2024 and Topholm sits as Chairman since 2021 — three years before the Shape pump began.
Today is the conclusion: why every party in this story has a financial incentive to keep Shape bankrupt — and why the recovery threat is what built the bankruptcy in the first place.
The Bomb — Three Charts That Tell The Story
📊 The Pump & Dump Timeline — what happened, day by day
The price journey from DKK 35 (placement) → DKK 52 (peak, 18 March 2024) → DKK 5.03 (suspension, 6 January 2026). Annotated with every coordination email, every directed placement, every dump wave.
⚖️ The Asymmetry — who won, who lost
Two bars. One small (insiders +DKK 26.5M). One huge (retail −DKK 811M). Ratio 31:1. Normal market volatility is symmetric. When a stock falls 79%, everyone loses proportionally. Manipulation is asymmetric. Informed parties extract value from uninformed parties. This ratio is not interpretation. It’s mathematical proof.
💸 The Money Flow — where it went
Shape Robotics retail → 8+ dumping accounts → DBB BidCo ApS (1 May 2024) → Aerbio Group A/S (EUR 200M+ valuation, Series A target Q4 2024). The same network that dumped Shape now owns 33% of a biotech valued at six times what they extracted.
The Liability — Four Charts That Show The Bill
The previous figure I cited — DKK 60–250M — was an underestimate. That number measured creditor recovery after settlement. The number that matters tomorrow is defendant exposure before settlement, and it is roughly an order of magnitude larger.
📊 Old estimate vs new analysis
The forensic report’s DKK 60–250M was net of apportionment, settlement discounts, litigation cost, and time value of money. Real defendant exposure runs DKK 309M (conservative, claims floor) to DKK 2,477M (aggressive maximum, including EU MAR Article 30 fines at 15% of Carnegie’s turnover and full Aerbio constructive trust). Most likely scenario: DKK 783M = EUR 105M.
⚖️ Liability by defendant category
Five defendants. Five exposure profiles. Carnegie alone aggressive = DKK 1,368M. Aerbio veil-piercing = DKK 493M. The Bundgaard-Bendixen network = DKK 435M. Shape Board D&O = DKK 101M. EIFO contributory negligence = DKK 80M. Each line is independently actionable and several are joint-and-several across defendants.
🏦 Carnegie’s liability — five claim heads
Five independent claim heads: direct civil damages (proximate causation of shareholder loss), bankruptcy causation (Selskabsloven §361 + EU MAR), disgorgement of fees and Topholm-related profits, EU MAR Article 30 fines (up to 15% of Carnegie’s EUR 400M turnover = DKK 450M maximum), and Romanian moral damages for 4,700 EU-resident shareholders. Carnegie can lose four of five and still owe DKK 235M.
💰 Creditor coverage — the chart that explains everything
Total Shape Robotics creditor claims are estimated at DKK 250M. In the liquidation scenario, creditors recover roughly 15% — DKK 37M — and shareholders recover zero. In the medium recovery scenario, defendants pay DKK 300M settlement → creditors recover 100% AND there is a DKK 50M surplus that flows pro-rata to the 4,700 retail shareholders. In the aggressive scenario, the surplus is DKK 550M — roughly DKK 117,000 per affected shareholder. That’s the math the establishment is fighting against. Recovery doesn’t just save creditors. It returns money to retail. That is the bill that cannot be allowed to be sent.
Now — the four parties that need Shape dead
1. Carnegie Investment Bank AB
Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 235M–1,368M (EUR 32M–184M).
This number is materially higher than my earlier published figure of DKK 50–200M. The earlier figure was a recovery estimate — what the estate might collect after settlement and apportionment. Defendant exposure — what’s owed before negotiation — is what’s stated above.
The components:
Direct civil damages (proximate causation of shareholder loss): DKK 195M–438M. Carnegie is the deepest pocket and the originator of the manipulation cascade. Apportionment shares for institutional defendants in Nordic securities litigation typically run 40–60% of attributable harm. With DKK 487M–730M of manipulation-attributable shareholder loss (60–90% of the DKK 811M total), Carnegie’s share alone is DKK 195M–438M.
Bankruptcy causation damages (Selskabsloven §361 + EU MAR): DKK 30M–250M. The going-concern value Shape lost — book value DKK 100M minimum, pre-pump enterprise value DKK 500M maximum.
Disgorgement of fees and profits: DKK 5M–30M. Placement underwriting (5–7% of DKK 35.4M) plus Aerbio Series A advisory (estimated EUR 2–3M = DKK 15–22M) plus Topholm-related firm bonuses.
Regulatory fines — this is the big one: DKK 5M–450M. Finanstilsynet maximum per breach is DKK 700,000, but that’s domestic. EU MAR Article 30 enables fines up to 15% of legal entity turnover. Carnegie’s 2024 revenue was approximately SEK 4.5 billion ≈ EUR 400M. 15% of that is EUR 60M = DKK 450M maximum theoretical. Even a moderate EU regulatory finding in the EUR 5–15M range yields DKK 37–112M.
Romanian moral damages (4,700 shareholders in 17 countries enable EU-wide collection): DKK 0–200M. Daune morale under Romanian civil law allows recovery for foreign-resident shareholders.
Carnegie has already been formally reprimanded by Finanstilsynet on 7 April 2026 (Cision Announcement 10-26) for MAR Article 20(1) violation. The reprimand is the floor, not the ceiling. Civil litigation, EU regulatory action, and disgorgement remain entirely in front of them.
Reference cases for scale:
Goldman Sachs Abacus 2010 (similar conflict-of-interest research): USD 550M settlement
Morgan Stanley Facebook IPO 2012: USD 80M total settlements
Credit Suisse Mozambique 2021: USD 475M settlement
Danske Bank money laundering 2023: USD 2.06B (Danish bank scale precedent)
Carnegie’s exposure is on the small end of these precedents only because the harm pool is smaller — but the liability ratio per dollar of harm is fully comparable.
Why Shape staying dead matters to Carnegie: A reconstructed Shape is an active claimant with three- to five-year litigation runway. A liquidated Shape has a tvangsopløsning likvidator (Teis Gullitz-Wormslev) whose statutory mandate is wind-down efficiency, not multi-jurisdiction commercial litigation against a top-three Nordic investment bank.
2. The Shape Board
Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 21.4M (Topdanmark D&O Policy 642-16131773 cap), plus uninsured personal exposure beyond.
Five directors are exposed under Selskabsloven §361 (director liability for breach of duty):
Director Specific failure Jeppe Frandsen (Chairman) Received Bundgaard’s 5 March 2024 email forward (”Lars gave permission”) and took no compliance action; received Topholm’s 24 April 2024 “concerned shareholder” email during the dump phase and facilitated Carnegie’s advisory pitch instead of investigating; did not disclose his own Paralenz bankruptcy (October 2022, EIFO −DKK 25M+) in Shape’s 2023 Listing Prospectus, an apparent violation of Reg 2017/1129 Lindgreen, Rootzén, Holst Hansen, Ikov Board-level failures to investigate red flags (Topholm’s Akind position as EdTech competitor, Holst Hansen’s MatematikFessor founding as EdTech competitor, the 49% price spike in 12 days without surveillance review)
Why Shape staying dead matters to the Board: A reconstructed Shape with proper governance triggers an immediate D&O claim review. A liquidated Shape’s likvidator may decline to pursue D&O claims if recovery is uncertain — directors walk free. The statute of limitations clock for Selskabsloven §361 claims continues to tick.
Frandsen’s appointment as CEO of Canon Milestone on 1 December 2025 — five weeks before Shape’s bankruptcy decree — is a fact you can verify on CVR.dk. Make of it what you will.
3. The Bundgaard-Bendixen network
Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 32M–435M.
Disgorgement of trading profits (DKK 26.5M baseline → DKK 130M including Aerbio paper gains) + EU MAR Article 30 fines stacking across 8+ network actors at €5M each (DKK 300M maximum aggregate) + Section 30 / Kapitalmarkedsloven §40 disclosure penalties + criminal property confiscation under Straffeloven §75-77.
VP Securities Holding-history files (downloaded by Shape Robotics’ general counsel from investor.vp.dk and preserved in the company OneDrive — these are official Danish government securities registry records, not speculation) prove the following:
VP ID Account Net shares dumped 1288650 Martin Bundgaard personal −191,250 Account 130440017669250 Sundvænget Invest ApS (Bundgaard 100%) −198,002 (peak position 4 March 2024) (omnibus) Bundgaard via nominee −332,755 (estimated from arithmetic) 4522571 TANDLÆGE Mathias Rud Jacobsen AP −159,659 4527396 ORAEI MANAGEMENT ApS −91,074 4309875 SOLIDO ApS (100% subsidiary of Bendixen’s Fredericiagade Holding) −89,400 1285973 Søren Bendixen personal −70,492 4528674 ABREN ApS −72,823 3025053578 Lars Topholm (Carnegie Head of Research) −3,500 (undisclosed throughout 5 March → 26 April 2024)
795,586 shares ÷ 14,054,517 pre-cap-raise share count = 5.66%. Above the Section 30 / Kapitalmarkedsloven §40 disclosure threshold. Bundgaard never filed. That’s a standalone violation — penalty up to DKK 700,000 fine plus suspension of voting rights (§44).
The two-wave extraction (this is new): VP Securities data shows Sundvænget Invest dumped 121,707 shares between 19 and 21 March 2024 — at the all-time high of DKK 52, five weeks before the official “concerned shareholder” emails. Then the position was rebuilt to 140,000 by 17 April. Then dumped again starting 24 April.
Wave 1 (hidden, at peak prices):
19 Mar 2024: −22,001 shares
20 Mar 2024: −74,885 shares ← BIGGEST SINGLE-DAY DUMP at peak DKK 52
21 Mar 2024: −24,821 shares
Total Wave 1: 121,707 shares dumped within 24-72 hours of ATH
Wave 2 (official dump phase):
24 Apr – 30 Apr 2024: −139,235 shares
Account closed 30 April 2024.
Sell at peak. Buy back lower. Sell again. MAR Article 12(1)(a) market manipulation when combined with insider information — which is documented in the email chain.
Why Shape staying dead matters to this network: A reconstructed Shape’s reconstruction administrator (Mazanti-Andersen) has a fiduciary duty to creditors to pursue insider trading claims. A liquidated Shape’s likvidator may settle quickly for a fraction. Recovery against this network alone could exceed DKK 100M before considering punitive multipliers.
4. Aerbio Group A/S — the vector nobody mapped
Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 21M–493M (clawback / constructive trust).
This is the line item that makes the previous DKK 250M ceiling look small.
The dump proceeds from Shape did not vanish. They went into DBB BidCo ApS (founded 1 May 2024, during the dump), capitalized with the extracted DKK 21M+, then renamed Aerbio Group A/S on 11 September 2024. Bundgaard locked his 33.08% UBO position on 18 October 2024 via Sundvænget Invest ApS.
Aerbio Group A/S targeted a EUR 50M Series A at an implied EUR 200M+ valuation in Q4 2024.
Bundgaard’s 33.08% stake at EUR 200M valuation = DKK 493M.
Two legal vehicles enable clawback:
Romanian civil law acțiune pauliană (Pauline action): voidable transfer to defraud creditors. Mark Abraham as Romanian citizen + Shape estate as Romanian-affected entity have standing.
Danish Konkursloven §74: clawback of transfers in fraud of creditors, including indirect transfers through related parties.
The conservative theory recovers only the dump value (DKK 21M). The aggressive theory imposes a constructive trust over Bundgaard’s full Aerbio stake (DKK 493M). The medium scenario — dump value plus apportioned value-creation premium — yields DKK 100M.
This single defendant alone (aggressive scenario) exceeds the previous DKK 250M total estimate by 2×.
5. The system itself
Exposure: existential.
This is the fourth party. The one that doesn’t appear on any liability map. The one with the most to lose.
If Shape Robotics recovers, the precedent is established that:
A Nordic top-three investment bank can be held to MAR Article 20 in civil court, not just regulatory reprimand
A coordinated network using omnibus structures, multiple ApS vehicles, and insider research can be unwound
D&O insurance claims for governance failure during market manipulation are payable
Bankruptcy can be reversed when the underlying business is operationally healthy (Q3 2024 revenue +109% YoY, contribution margin 35% record, November 2024 DKK 138.75M UniCredit facility secured)
Every one of these is unwelcome news in the Danish capital markets establishment.
The Carnegie reprimand on 7 April 2026 was a calibrated minimum. The reasoning runs: regulators must respond to overwhelming evidence, but they prefer to do so in a way that preserves the institution. Reprimanding the analyst preserves the bank. The bank then negotiates a settlement. The settlement is sealed. The precedent doesn’t get tested in court.
A Shape recovery breaks that compromise. A Shape recovery means civil litigation in Sø- og Handelsretten with discovery, sworn testimony, and reasoned judgments that become precedent for every other Nordic small-cap victim.
That’s why the bankruptcy was built so carefully. That’s why it took unanimous reversal at Østre Landsret on 5 March 2026 (case K 3337/25-F) to undo the first attempt. That’s why a tvangsopløsning was ordered on 17 April 2026 — six weeks after we won. That’s why the reconstruction petition matters tomorrow.
The disaster nobody talks about
DKK 755M of shareholder value destroyed in one of the largest small-cap value destructions in recent Danish capital markets history. Largely uncovered by financial media. The only sustained investigative coverage came from Frihedsbrevet in December 2025.
The omertà was not accidental.
The hero carousel — the proof carousel
For new readers, the six charts that proved this case across Days 53–61:
The Information Gap —
— what insiders knew vs what retail saw
The Coordinated Dump —
— 8+ accounts moving in formation
The Divergence —
— price action vs operational performance
DKK 755M Destroyed —
— shareholder value collapse
The Rise and Ruin —
— the full price arc, DKK 35 → 52 → 1.58
The Evidence Table —
— every smoking gun in one place
Tomorrow — 11 May 2026, 09:30
Sø- og Handelsretten. Reconstruction hearing R14/26. Mazanti-Andersen (Philip A. Borreschmidt) proposed as reconstructor. The petition was filed 21 April 2026.
What’s at stake:
If reconstruction is granted, Shape Robotics A/S enters formal restructuring under Danish bankruptcy law (Konkursloven §11). The reconstructor takes statutory authority. The first task — by law — is to assess viable claims against third parties whose actions caused or contributed to the company’s distress.
The ranked list is mechanical:
Carnegie Investment Bank AB (institutional liability — DKK 235M–1,368M)
Aerbio Group A/S clawback (DKK 21M–493M — the vector that changes everything)
Bundgaard-Bendixen network (market manipulation profits — DKK 32M–435M)
The Shape Board (governance failure, D&O coverage — DKK 21M–101M)
Lars Topholm personally (analyst conduct, joint with Carnegie)
Total system-wide exposure: DKK 309M (conservative) to DKK 2,477M (aggressive). Most likely DKK 783M = EUR 105M.
Total Shape Robotics creditor claims are estimated at DKK 200–300M. In the medium scenario, creditors get paid in full and there’s a surplus that flows back pro-rata to the 4,700 retail shareholders. That’s the scenario the establishment is fighting against. Recovery doesn’t just save the company. It returns money to retail. That math is what they’re afraid of.
If reconstruction is denied, the tvangsopløsning likvidator continues. The ranked list is still there. The math is still there. But the urgency, the funding, and the willingness of a likvidator to take on Carnegie at scale is materially different from a reconstructor with creditor backing.
That’s why tomorrow matters. That’s why every party who built this bankruptcy will be working their channels until 09:29 to keep it from being granted.
What you can do
If you have access to channels — journalistic, regulatory, parliamentary, professional — the time to use them is now. Specifically:
The Finanstilsynet 7 April 2026 reprimand is only the beginning. There are pending cases (j.nr. 25-026876, 25-025498, 26-005434). Public attention sustains case progression.
The DFSA Section 30 supplementary notice for Bundgaard’s undisclosed 5.66% holding is being prepared.
The Politiet investigation reference is 0100-83986-10362-26.
The court file is R14/26 — public docket item.
If you’re a Shape shareholder reading this — you are not alone. There are 4,700 of you in 17 countries. The reconstruction is about you.
If you’re a journalist reading this — Frihedsbrevet did the December 2025 baseline investigation. The forensic report dated 19 February 2026 is in evidence. The VP Securities files are real public records. Every claim in this episode is verifiable in Danish public databases without my involvement at all.
If you’re someone in the Danish establishment reading this — yes, I know.
Bottom line — read this twice
They didn’t take Shape because Shape was failing. They took Shape because Shape was working — and because a working Shape was the only entity with legal standing to make Carnegie pay.
Stop and think about that mechanism for a moment. It’s the entire story.
In Danish corporate law, who can sue Carnegie for the damages above? Not me — I’m a former CEO, dismissed by a board controlled by people who had financial incentives to dismiss me. Not the 4,700 retail shareholders directly — they have a derivative claim, but it requires the company to act first or to grant standing. Not the creditors as individuals — they have priority claims on assets, but no claim against third parties for tortious conduct that caused the bankruptcy. Only the company itself, acting through a properly mandated representative, has direct standing to sue Carnegie for the harm Carnegie caused.
That representative is either:
A reconstructor (in rekonstruktion under Konkursloven §11), who has a fiduciary duty to creditors and the active mandate to pursue claims that maximize the estate, or
A liquidator (in tvangsopløsning under Selskabsloven §225), whose statutory mandate is to wind down efficiently and minimize cost — and who has wide discretion not to pursue complex multi-jurisdiction commercial litigation against a top-three Nordic investment bank with deep pockets and Big-5 representation.
Carnegie’s house counsel is Kromann Reumert — Denmark’s largest law firm, the standard counsel for major Nordic banks in regulatory and commercial matters. Kromann Reumert lawyers do not need to act improperly. They simply need to do what good defense lawyers always do: maximize their client’s optionality and minimize the exposure surface. In this case, the optimal defense is not to fight the case on the merits. The optimal defense is to ensure the case is never brought.
A liquidator never brings the case. A reconstructor does.
That single distinction — rekonstruktion vs tvangsopløsning — is worth somewhere between DKK 309 million and DKK 2.5 billion in expected exposure, depending on scenario. That’s not a typo. That’s the actual range. That’s the financial value of which procedural box the company sits in tomorrow morning.
Now look at the procedural history with that lens:
6 January 2026: bankruptcy decree, fast-tracked.
5 March 2026: Østre Landsret unanimously annuls it. Wrong process. (K 3337/25-F.)
17 April 2026: tvangsopløsning ordered. A different mechanism, achieving the same outcome — a liquidator instead of a reconstructor. Same result, different route.
21 April 2026: reconstruction petition filed by the company. Mazanti-Andersen as proposed reconstructor.
11 May 2026, 09:30: tomorrow.
If you find yourself wondering why a healthy company (Q3 2024 revenue +109% YoY, contribution margin 35%, DKK 138.75M UniCredit facility secured November 2024) has been pushed through two separate legal mechanisms toward the same liquidation outcome in five months, the answer is in the paragraph above. The procedural form is the substantive defense.
This is not corruption. This is not conspiracy theory. This is what any Big-5 law firm would do for any major institutional client facing exposure of this magnitude. You don’t fight EUR 184M of liability by fighting it. You fight it by ensuring the entity that has standing to bring it never gets the chance.
Mazanti-Andersen — the firm representing the company tomorrow — knows exactly what’s at stake. Philip A. Borreschmidt knows. The opposing counsel knows. The judge will know. Every sophisticated party in that courtroom understands that tomorrow’s hearing is not really about whether Shape Robotics can be saved as an operating business. It’s about whether the company-as-claimant survives long enough to file the lawsuits.
That’s why the establishment is fighting. Not because they think Shape will win the underlying case — most institutional defendants settle when the claim is real. They’re fighting because if the company survives procedurally, the bill they all face is roughly EUR 100 million expected, EUR 333 million in the worst case. That’s a number that materially affects Carnegie’s regulatory capital. It affects Topdanmark’s D&O book. It affects pricing in the Nordic small-cap underwriting market for a generation. It is, quite literally, system-scale exposure to Danish capital markets infrastructure.
Tomorrow is the procedural question. The substantive question — did they manipulate Shape into bankruptcy and extract DKK 21M+ at retail’s expense — has already been answered, in writing, by Finanstilsynet’s 7 April 2026 reprimand. Once that fact is established, the only remaining question is who has standing to enforce it. And that’s why the procedural form matters more than the procedural argument.
Tomorrow we ask the court to grant standing. The 4,700 shareholders are not asking for sympathy. They are asking for the company-as-claimant to survive long enough to do the math the regulator already did — and to send the bill to the parties the regulator already named.
Everything in this episode is verifiable in CVR.dk, VP Securities, Cision Announcement 10-26, the Finanstilsynet public register, and the Sø- og Handelsretten R14/26 docket. None of this requires you to take my word for anything. That is the point of doing it this way.
If reconstruction is granted, the math runs. If reconstruction is denied, a different and more difficult version of the same math runs over a longer timeframe with a less motivated representative. Either way, the math is now public. The bill exists whether or not Shape exists to send it.
But the most efficient path for the people the bill is owed to — creditors first, then 4,700 retail shareholders — is reconstruction.
That’s tomorrow. 09:30.
🚨 GAME OVER 🚨
Q.E.D.
— Mark-Robert Abraham Founder & former CEO Shape Robotics A/S Romanian citizen, writing in personal capacity WildCEO.live · 10 May 2026 · ahead of court hearing 11 May 09:30
Receipts at the bottom (for the record)
The Bomb Document (full evidence):
THE_BOMB_DOCUMENT.mdMaster Knowledge Base (complete archive):
SHAPE_ROBOTICS_PUMP_DUMP_MASTER_KB.mdVP Securities reconstruction CSV:
08_bundgaard_complete_VP_history.csvExtraction Map (all actors, all flows):
THE_EXTRACTION_MAP_4K.pngDatawrapper instructions:
EXTRACTION_MAP_DATAWRAPPER_INSTRUCTIONS.md
All available at wildceo.live.
