Wild CEO — The Journey: The Investigation

📊 Day 58 Datawrapper Chart 1 — The Pump (Feb-Apr 2024) · Day 58 Datawrapper Chart 2 — The Pump & Dump Full Trajectory

📑 The Four Grounds, in the Order We Want the Court to Read Them

The four grounds are stacked deliberately. They give the High Court four different paths to reach the same conclusion — annulment — depending on how much it wants to engage with the underlying merits.

Ground Argument Type A Lack of certified interpreter at the 17 April hearing Procedural D Bypass of the High Court’s own remittal of 5 March Institutional B No material basis for compulsory dissolution Substantive C Conflict of interest — removal of the trustee Subsidiary

Ground A is the easiest off-ramp. The facts are uncontested. I was placed under oath without a certified interpreter. ECHR Article 6(3)(e). Section 149 of the Administration of Justice Act. EU Directive 2010/64/EU. The European Court of Human Rights has established a clear positive obligation on national courts in Cuscani v. UK (2002) and Hermi v. Italy (2006).

Ground D is the smoking gun. The High Court ordered re-adjudication on 5 March. 68 days later, no re-adjudication has occurred. Two alternative procedures have reached the same outcome. The Eastern High Court has to defend its own authority.

Ground B is the substantive defect. As of 17 April 2026, the company had a board (Cision 06-26, unanimous EGM resolution) and an address (approved by the Danish Business Authority’s own caseworker under case #137907, 26 March 2026). Section 225 of the Companies Act was inapplicable.

Ground C is the subsidiary ask. Teis Gullitz-Wormslev has five active cases against him personally. Removing him is the proper structural remedy.

⚖️ Ground A — The Interpreter

I am a Romanian citizen. CNP 1820831351579. Resident in Voluntari, Ilfov, Romania. Romanian native speaker. English fluent. Danish functional, not legal-grade.

On 17 April 2026 at 11:00 AM, the Maritime and Commercial Court placed me under oath under Section 305 of the Administration of Justice Act. The examination proceeded in Danish. There was no certified interpreter.

The only “translation” was performed by Albert Mungo Madsen — an attorney from Kromann Reumert, the same law firm as the trustee Teis Gullitz-Wormslev, and himself the subject of a separate police complaint in the same case complex.

Four days later, I wrote to Børsen journalist Leonora Beck, who had personally attended the hearing:

“This is the appeal we have made yesterday. It’s outrageous! I was put under oath, with no translator .... you where there @Leonora Beck you should see now the reality.”
— Email to Leonora Beck (Børsen), 21 April 2026, 14:11:03 CET (Exhibit 27)

Three other Børsen journalists — Kasper Ohmeyer, Simon Kirketerp, and Johan Christensen — were copied. Each can be called as witness under Section 168 of the Administration of Justice Act.

PROOF ONE
Contemporaneous documentary evidence. Sent 4 days after the hearing. Independent journalist. Three more journalists on CC. Res ipsa loquitur.

This is what makes Ground A unbeatable.

🎯 Ground D — The Smoking Gun

The argument is mathematically simple:

On 5 March 2026, the Eastern High Court ordered the Maritime and Commercial Court to re-adjudicate the original bankruptcy petition.
68 days have passed. The Maritime and Commercial Court has never re-adjudicated the case.
Instead, it invented two alternative procedures (forced dissolution + new bankruptcy) to reach the same outcome — Teis Gullitz-Wormslev as trustee — without ever addressing the High Court’s order.

The Legal Framework

Five separate legal sources prohibit what the lower court has done:

Source Principle Rpl. § 396(2) A remittal from the High Court is binding on the first instance. Rpl. § 235(1) Lis pendens prohibits parallel proceedings on the same subject-matter. ECHR Article 6(1) Right to fair trial includes effective implementation of appellate decisions. Grundloven § 3 Separation of powers requires lower court compliance with higher court rulings. Res judicata Final decisions cannot be circumvented by alternative procedures on the same matter.

The Strasbourg Authority

The European Court of Human Rights, in Bochan v. Ukraine (No. 2), Grand Chamber, 5 February 2015, held:

“It would be inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants — proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious — without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions. Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the trial for the purposes of Article 6.“

Non-execution of an appellate decision is a violation of Article 6. Here we have something worse than non-execution: replacement of the appellate decision with alternative procedures designed to reach the same outcome the appellate decision had struck down.

PROOF TWO
The lower court has never scheduled a hearing on the remitted case. 68 days. Two parallel procedures invented in the meantime, both leading to the same outcome with the same trustee. This is institutional defiance, not procedural delay.

🤲 The Three Things Teis Did

A trustee’s mandate under Konkurslov § 113 is to preserve the estate. During his 59-day unlawful trusteeship between 6 January and 5 March 2026, Teis did the opposite — three times.

1. Bankrupted Sanako Oy — a profitable subsidiary with active contracts in Poland and Finland. Filed at Turun käräjäoikeus on 5 February 2026.

2. Issued zero company announcements via Cision in 59 days as trustee of a Nasdaq Copenhagen-listed issuer. MAR Article 17 violation — confirmed by the Danish FSA in writing on 27 April 2026 and again on 12 May 2026.

3. Cancelled the 22 January 2026 EGM that would have ratified the IRIS Capital equity line of up to 15 million shares (~EUR 15 million) and the new board.

All three actions taken while the appeal was pending. He knew the bankruptcy might be annulled. He acted as if it would not be.

PROOF THREE
Under Finnish company law (Osakeyhtiölaki 624/2006), a wholly-owned Oy’s voluntary bankruptcy filing requires shareholder authorization. The sole shareholder of Sanako Oy was Shape Robotics A/S. Between 6 January and 5 March 2026, the only person legally able to exercise Shape Robotics A/S’s shareholder rights was the kurator under Konkurslov § 110. The kurator was Teis Gullitz-Wormslev himself.
§Sanako bankruptcy\xRightarrow§110Teis authorized it\xRightarrowannulmentTeis had no authority to authorize anything

📊 Scoreboard

Battle Outcome Status First appeal (K 3337/25-F) Bankruptcy annulled, 3-0 unanimous ✓ WON DFSA Topholm complaint (25-026420) Carnegie analyst reprimanded for MAR Art. 20(1) ✓ WON MAR Article 17 supervisory file Active at DFSA, confirmed in writing 12 May 2026 ⚙️ OPEN Police complaint (0100-83986-10362-26) Active investigation, Copenhagen NSK ⚙️ OPEN Bar Council disciplinary case (2026-1127) Pending review ⚙️ OPEN Forced dissolution (17 April) Appealed in B-281-26 ⚖️ APPEAL FILED TODAY New bankruptcy (11 May) Appealed in B-281-26 (supplement) ⚖️ APPEAL FILED TODAY Ground D — institutional bypass New ground, filed today 🎯 THE KILLER ARGUMENT

🔜 What Happens Next

Danish bankruptcy appeals are statutorily prioritised under Konkursloven § 248 — uden ugrundet ophold, without unfounded delay. My Danish counsel tells me to expect a ruling within days of the 13 May deadline.

The first appeal (K 3337/25-F) took 58 days. The second (B-281-26) will be faster, because the chamber already knows the case, the legal issues are familiar, and the institutional question raised by Ground D is too sharp to leave unresolved.

Date Event 13 May 2026 (today) Bemærkninger 2 + Ground D Supplement filed ~14–18 May 2026 Eastern High Court 4th Division reads ~18–25 May 2026 Ruling expected

✊ Why I Write This

I am not a lawyer. I am an engineer. I built a Nasdaq-listed company from 0.8M to 302M DKK in revenue. I watched it being destroyed by a court process I once believed in.

I write this because the alternative is silence. And silence is what the architects of this story are counting on.

The 4,800 shareholders of Shape Robotics did not consent to losing their investment because of a salary dispute that should have gone to the Employees’ Guarantee Fund. The 70 employees did not consent to losing their jobs because of an attorney’s interest in being appointed trustee. The Danish public did not consent to having its judicial system used as a private debt collection tool.

This document — and the 70 pages of formal legal pleadings filed today at the Eastern High Court — is what consent looks like when it has been violated. It is the record. It is the truth, in the words of the people who lived it.

If the Eastern High Court rules in our favour, the company is restored. If not, the case goes to Højesteret, then to Strasbourg, then to history.

Either way, the story does not end here.

🔚 Closing

“Three judges, no dissent. Our victory was sublime.”
“The law is a mathematical structure.”
“This is not a process. This is a circumvention.”
“Common sense, not common law.”
“Will bring justice back to Denmark. We’ll change the law for you.”

Q.E.D.

Mark-Robert Abraham Founder · Former CEO · Shareholder Shape Robotics A/S (now Phase Education A/S) CVR 38322656 · ISIN DK0061273125 Nasdaq Copenhagen: SHAPE (suspended)

Voluntari, Ilfov, Romania — 13 May 2026

Attached: [EPISODE_67_FULL_WITH_APPEAL.pdf] — 99 pages, Part One narrative + Part Two complete appeal documentation as filed today with the Eastern High Court (Bemærkninger nr. 2 in Danish, Comments No. 2 in English, Ground D Supplement bilingual).

#GameOver #ShapeRobotics #PhaseEducation #WildCEO #NasdaqCopenhagen #ECHR #Article6 #LisPendens #DanishLaw #B281_2026 #KromannReumert #TeisGullitzWormslev #InstitutionalBypass #GroundD #RuleOfLaw #4800Shareholders

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GAME OVER | Day 62: Why They All Want Us Dead

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sun, 10 May 2026 16:24:03 GMT

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  TL;DR — THE BILL                                               │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                 │
│  Shape Robotics didn't fail. It was killed.                     │
│  Every party who killed it has a financial reason               │
│  to keep it dead.                                               │
│                                                                 │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────              │
│                                                                 │
│  CARNEGIE INVESTMENT BANK ........  DKK   235M –  1,368M        │
│  AERBIO GROUP A/S (clawback) .....  DKK    21M –    493M        │
│  BUNDGAARD-BENDIXEN NETWORK ......  DKK    32M –    435M        │
│  SHAPE BOARD / D&O ...............  DKK    21M –    101M        │
│  EIFO / LENDERS ..................  DKK     0M –     80M        │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────              │
│  TOTAL SYSTEM EXPOSURE ...........  DKK   309M –  2,477M        │
│                                     EUR    42M –    333M        │
│                                                                 │
│  MOST LIKELY (medium scenario) ...  DKK 783M = EUR 105M         │
│                                                                 │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────              │
│                                                                 │
│  Previous estimate DKK 60–250M = creditor RECOVERY              │
│  Real number = defendant EXPOSURE                               │
│  Difference: 3–10× higher                                       │
│                                                                 │
│  Includes EU MAR Article 30 fines up to 15% of                  │
│  Carnegie's EUR 400M turnover = DKK 450M ceiling                │
│  on a single line item.                                         │
│                                                                 │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────              │
│                                                                 │
│  WHY THEY BUILT THE BANKRUPTCY:                                 │
│  Not because we failed.                                         │
│  Because we'd survive.                                          │
│  And the bill they'd face is system-scale.                      │
│                                                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Standing disclaimers: I am Mark-Robert Abraham, founder and former CEO of Shape Robotics A/S (CVR 38322656), Romanian citizen writing in personal capacity. This is a journalistic compilation of facts that are independently verifiable in Danish public records (CVR.dk, VP Securities, Cision, Sø- og Handelsretten). Every name appearing here is a public actor. Final legal filings remain the prerogative of Mazanti-Andersen (Philip A. Borreschmidt). Court hearing tomorrow, 11 May 2026 at 09:30, Sø- og Handelsretten.

Where we are after 3 episodes

Day 58 showed you how the pump started — Carnegie’s “back of envelope” research note dated 5 March 2024 from analyst Lars Topholm, projecting Shape from DKK 35 to DKK 131 (a 274% target) at the precise moment Bundgaard was preparing to subscribe to a directed placement.

Day 59 showed you the real reason — the 4-year pre-existing partnership between Bundgaard and Aerbio CEO Kaspar Kristiansen via Pleje- og Seniorboliger ApS (CVR 41200081), founded 27 February 2020, 50/50 ownership. This pre-dated everything.

Days 60–61 showed you the repeat extraction and the money trail — 8+ accounts, 700,000+ shares dumped between April and June 2024, DKK 21M+ extracted, redeployed into a vehicle (DBB BidCo ApS, founded 1 May 2024 during the dump, renamed Aerbio Group A/S on 11 September 2024), where Bundgaard locked 33.08% UBO on 18 October 2024 and Topholm sits as Chairman since 2021 — three years before the Shape pump began.

Today is the conclusion: why every party in this story has a financial incentive to keep Shape bankrupt — and why the recovery threat is what built the bankruptcy in the first place.

The Bomb — Three Charts That Tell The Story

📊 The Pump & Dump Timeline — what happened, day by day

The price journey from DKK 35 (placement) → DKK 52 (peak, 18 March 2024) → DKK 5.03 (suspension, 6 January 2026). Annotated with every coordination email, every directed placement, every dump wave.

⚖️ The Asymmetry — who won, who lost

Two bars. One small (insiders +DKK 26.5M). One huge (retail −DKK 811M). Ratio 31:1. Normal market volatility is symmetric. When a stock falls 79%, everyone loses proportionally. Manipulation is asymmetric. Informed parties extract value from uninformed parties. This ratio is not interpretation. It’s mathematical proof.

💸 The Money Flow — where it went

Shape Robotics retail → 8+ dumping accounts → DBB BidCo ApS (1 May 2024) → Aerbio Group A/S (EUR 200M+ valuation, Series A target Q4 2024). The same network that dumped Shape now owns 33% of a biotech valued at six times what they extracted.

The Liability — Four Charts That Show The Bill

The previous figure I cited — DKK 60–250M — was an underestimate. That number measured creditor recovery after settlement. The number that matters tomorrow is defendant exposure before settlement, and it is roughly an order of magnitude larger.

📊 Old estimate vs new analysis

The forensic report’s DKK 60–250M was net of apportionment, settlement discounts, litigation cost, and time value of money. Real defendant exposure runs DKK 309M (conservative, claims floor) to DKK 2,477M (aggressive maximum, including EU MAR Article 30 fines at 15% of Carnegie’s turnover and full Aerbio constructive trust). Most likely scenario: DKK 783M = EUR 105M.

⚖️ Liability by defendant category

Five defendants. Five exposure profiles. Carnegie alone aggressive = DKK 1,368M. Aerbio veil-piercing = DKK 493M. The Bundgaard-Bendixen network = DKK 435M. Shape Board D&O = DKK 101M. EIFO contributory negligence = DKK 80M. Each line is independently actionable and several are joint-and-several across defendants.

🏦 Carnegie’s liability — five claim heads

Five independent claim heads: direct civil damages (proximate causation of shareholder loss), bankruptcy causation (Selskabsloven §361 + EU MAR), disgorgement of fees and Topholm-related profits, EU MAR Article 30 fines (up to 15% of Carnegie’s EUR 400M turnover = DKK 450M maximum), and Romanian moral damages for 4,700 EU-resident shareholders. Carnegie can lose four of five and still owe DKK 235M.

💰 Creditor coverage — the chart that explains everything

Total Shape Robotics creditor claims are estimated at DKK 250M. In the liquidation scenario, creditors recover roughly 15% — DKK 37M — and shareholders recover zero. In the medium recovery scenario, defendants pay DKK 300M settlement → creditors recover 100% AND there is a DKK 50M surplus that flows pro-rata to the 4,700 retail shareholders. In the aggressive scenario, the surplus is DKK 550M — roughly DKK 117,000 per affected shareholder. That’s the math the establishment is fighting against. Recovery doesn’t just save creditors. It returns money to retail. That is the bill that cannot be allowed to be sent.

Now — the four parties that need Shape dead

1. Carnegie Investment Bank AB

Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 235M–1,368M (EUR 32M–184M).

This number is materially higher than my earlier published figure of DKK 50–200M. The earlier figure was a recovery estimate — what the estate might collect after settlement and apportionment. Defendant exposure — what’s owed before negotiation — is what’s stated above.

The components:

Direct civil damages (proximate causation of shareholder loss): DKK 195M–438M. Carnegie is the deepest pocket and the originator of the manipulation cascade. Apportionment shares for institutional defendants in Nordic securities litigation typically run 40–60% of attributable harm. With DKK 487M–730M of manipulation-attributable shareholder loss (60–90% of the DKK 811M total), Carnegie’s share alone is DKK 195M–438M.
Bankruptcy causation damages (Selskabsloven §361 + EU MAR): DKK 30M–250M. The going-concern value Shape lost — book value DKK 100M minimum, pre-pump enterprise value DKK 500M maximum.
Disgorgement of fees and profits: DKK 5M–30M. Placement underwriting (5–7% of DKK 35.4M) plus Aerbio Series A advisory (estimated EUR 2–3M = DKK 15–22M) plus Topholm-related firm bonuses.
Regulatory fines — this is the big one: DKK 5M–450M. Finanstilsynet maximum per breach is DKK 700,000, but that’s domestic. EU MAR Article 30 enables fines up to 15% of legal entity turnover. Carnegie’s 2024 revenue was approximately SEK 4.5 billion ≈ EUR 400M. 15% of that is EUR 60M = DKK 450M maximum theoretical. Even a moderate EU regulatory finding in the EUR 5–15M range yields DKK 37–112M.
Romanian moral damages (4,700 shareholders in 17 countries enable EU-wide collection): DKK 0–200M. Daune morale under Romanian civil law allows recovery for foreign-resident shareholders.

Carnegie has already been formally reprimanded by Finanstilsynet on 7 April 2026 (Cision Announcement 10-26) for MAR Article 20(1) violation. The reprimand is the floor, not the ceiling. Civil litigation, EU regulatory action, and disgorgement remain entirely in front of them.

Reference cases for scale:

Goldman Sachs Abacus 2010 (similar conflict-of-interest research): USD 550M settlement
Morgan Stanley Facebook IPO 2012: USD 80M total settlements
Credit Suisse Mozambique 2021: USD 475M settlement
Danske Bank money laundering 2023: USD 2.06B (Danish bank scale precedent)

Carnegie’s exposure is on the small end of these precedents only because the harm pool is smaller — but the liability ratio per dollar of harm is fully comparable.

Why Shape staying dead matters to Carnegie: A reconstructed Shape is an active claimant with three- to five-year litigation runway. A liquidated Shape has a tvangsopløsning likvidator (Teis Gullitz-Wormslev) whose statutory mandate is wind-down efficiency, not multi-jurisdiction commercial litigation against a top-three Nordic investment bank.

2. The Shape Board

Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 21.4M (Topdanmark D&O Policy 642-16131773 cap), plus uninsured personal exposure beyond.

Five directors are exposed under Selskabsloven §361 (director liability for breach of duty):

Director Specific failure Jeppe Frandsen (Chairman) Received Bundgaard’s 5 March 2024 email forward (”Lars gave permission”) and took no compliance action; received Topholm’s 24 April 2024 “concerned shareholder” email during the dump phase and facilitated Carnegie’s advisory pitch instead of investigating; did not disclose his own Paralenz bankruptcy (October 2022, EIFO −DKK 25M+) in Shape’s 2023 Listing Prospectus, an apparent violation of Reg 2017/1129 Lindgreen, Rootzén, Holst Hansen, Ikov Board-level failures to investigate red flags (Topholm’s Akind position as EdTech competitor, Holst Hansen’s MatematikFessor founding as EdTech competitor, the 49% price spike in 12 days without surveillance review)

Why Shape staying dead matters to the Board: A reconstructed Shape with proper governance triggers an immediate D&O claim review. A liquidated Shape’s likvidator may decline to pursue D&O claims if recovery is uncertain — directors walk free. The statute of limitations clock for Selskabsloven §361 claims continues to tick.

Frandsen’s appointment as CEO of Canon Milestone on 1 December 2025 — five weeks before Shape’s bankruptcy decree — is a fact you can verify on CVR.dk. Make of it what you will.

3. The Bundgaard-Bendixen network

Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 32M–435M.

Disgorgement of trading profits (DKK 26.5M baseline → DKK 130M including Aerbio paper gains) + EU MAR Article 30 fines stacking across 8+ network actors at €5M each (DKK 300M maximum aggregate) + Section 30 / Kapitalmarkedsloven §40 disclosure penalties + criminal property confiscation under Straffeloven §75-77.

VP Securities Holding-history files (downloaded by Shape Robotics’ general counsel from investor.vp.dk and preserved in the company OneDrive — these are official Danish government securities registry records, not speculation) prove the following:

VP ID Account Net shares dumped 1288650 Martin Bundgaard personal −191,250 Account 130440017669250 Sundvænget Invest ApS (Bundgaard 100%) −198,002 (peak position 4 March 2024) (omnibus) Bundgaard via nominee −332,755 (estimated from arithmetic) 4522571 TANDLÆGE Mathias Rud Jacobsen AP −159,659 4527396 ORAEI MANAGEMENT ApS −91,074 4309875 SOLIDO ApS (100% subsidiary of Bendixen’s Fredericiagade Holding) −89,400 1285973 Søren Bendixen personal −70,492 4528674 ABREN ApS −72,823 3025053578 Lars Topholm (Carnegie Head of Research) −3,500 (undisclosed throughout 5 March → 26 April 2024)

795,586 shares ÷ 14,054,517 pre-cap-raise share count = 5.66%. Above the Section 30 / Kapitalmarkedsloven §40 disclosure threshold. Bundgaard never filed. That’s a standalone violation — penalty up to DKK 700,000 fine plus suspension of voting rights (§44).

The two-wave extraction (this is new): VP Securities data shows Sundvænget Invest dumped 121,707 shares between 19 and 21 March 2024 — at the all-time high of DKK 52, five weeks before the official “concerned shareholder” emails. Then the position was rebuilt to 140,000 by 17 April. Then dumped again starting 24 April.

Wave 1 (hidden, at peak prices):
  19 Mar 2024: −22,001 shares
  20 Mar 2024: −74,885 shares  ← BIGGEST SINGLE-DAY DUMP at peak DKK 52
  21 Mar 2024: −24,821 shares
  Total Wave 1: 121,707 shares dumped within 24-72 hours of ATH

Wave 2 (official dump phase):
  24 Apr – 30 Apr 2024: −139,235 shares
  Account closed 30 April 2024.

Sell at peak. Buy back lower. Sell again. MAR Article 12(1)(a) market manipulation when combined with insider information — which is documented in the email chain.

Why Shape staying dead matters to this network: A reconstructed Shape’s reconstruction administrator (Mazanti-Andersen) has a fiduciary duty to creditors to pursue insider trading claims. A liquidated Shape’s likvidator may settle quickly for a fraction. Recovery against this network alone could exceed DKK 100M before considering punitive multipliers.

4. Aerbio Group A/S — the vector nobody mapped

Exposure if Shape recovers: DKK 21M–493M (clawback / constructive trust).

This is the line item that makes the previous DKK 250M ceiling look small.

The dump proceeds from Shape did not vanish. They went into DBB BidCo ApS (founded 1 May 2024, during the dump), capitalized with the extracted DKK 21M+, then renamed Aerbio Group A/S on 11 September 2024. Bundgaard locked his 33.08% UBO position on 18 October 2024 via Sundvænget Invest ApS.

Aerbio Group A/S targeted a EUR 50M Series A at an implied EUR 200M+ valuation in Q4 2024.

Bundgaard’s 33.08% stake at EUR 200M valuation = DKK 493M.

Two legal vehicles enable clawback:

Romanian civil law acțiune pauliană (Pauline action): voidable transfer to defraud creditors. Mark Abraham as Romanian citizen + Shape estate as Romanian-affected entity have standing.
Danish Konkursloven §74: clawback of transfers in fraud of creditors, including indirect transfers through related parties.

The conservative theory recovers only the dump value (DKK 21M). The aggressive theory imposes a constructive trust over Bundgaard’s full Aerbio stake (DKK 493M). The medium scenario — dump value plus apportioned value-creation premium — yields DKK 100M.

This single defendant alone (aggressive scenario) exceeds the previous DKK 250M total estimate by 2×.

5. The system itself

Exposure: existential.

This is the fourth party. The one that doesn’t appear on any liability map. The one with the most to lose.

If Shape Robotics recovers, the precedent is established that:

A Nordic top-three investment bank can be held to MAR Article 20 in civil court, not just regulatory reprimand
A coordinated network using omnibus structures, multiple ApS vehicles, and insider research can be unwound
D&O insurance claims for governance failure during market manipulation are payable
Bankruptcy can be reversed when the underlying business is operationally healthy (Q3 2024 revenue +109% YoY, contribution margin 35% record, November 2024 DKK 138.75M UniCredit facility secured)

Every one of these is unwelcome news in the Danish capital markets establishment.

The Carnegie reprimand on 7 April 2026 was a calibrated minimum. The reasoning runs: regulators must respond to overwhelming evidence, but they prefer to do so in a way that preserves the institution. Reprimanding the analyst preserves the bank. The bank then negotiates a settlement. The settlement is sealed. The precedent doesn’t get tested in court.

A Shape recovery breaks that compromise. A Shape recovery means civil litigation in Sø- og Handelsretten with discovery, sworn testimony, and reasoned judgments that become precedent for every other Nordic small-cap victim.

That’s why the bankruptcy was built so carefully. That’s why it took unanimous reversal at Østre Landsret on 5 March 2026 (case K 3337/25-F) to undo the first attempt. That’s why a tvangsopløsning was ordered on 17 April 2026 — six weeks after we won. That’s why the reconstruction petition matters tomorrow.

The disaster nobody talks about

DKK 755M of shareholder value destroyed in one of the largest small-cap value destructions in recent Danish capital markets history. Largely uncovered by financial media. The only sustained investigative coverage came from Frihedsbrevet in December 2025.

The omertà was not accidental.

The hero carousel — the proof carousel

For new readers, the six charts that proved this case across Days 53–61:

The Information Gap —

— what insiders knew vs what retail saw
The Coordinated Dump —

— 8+ accounts moving in formation
The Divergence —

— price action vs operational performance
DKK 755M Destroyed —

— shareholder value collapse
The Rise and Ruin —

— the full price arc, DKK 35 → 52 → 1.58
The Evidence Table —

— every smoking gun in one place

Tomorrow — 11 May 2026, 09:30

Sø- og Handelsretten. Reconstruction hearing R14/26. Mazanti-Andersen (Philip A. Borreschmidt) proposed as reconstructor. The petition was filed 21 April 2026.

What’s at stake:

If reconstruction is granted, Shape Robotics A/S enters formal restructuring under Danish bankruptcy law (Konkursloven §11). The reconstructor takes statutory authority. The first task — by law — is to assess viable claims against third parties whose actions caused or contributed to the company’s distress.

The ranked list is mechanical:

Carnegie Investment Bank AB (institutional liability — DKK 235M–1,368M)
Aerbio Group A/S clawback (DKK 21M–493M — the vector that changes everything)
Bundgaard-Bendixen network (market manipulation profits — DKK 32M–435M)
The Shape Board (governance failure, D&O coverage — DKK 21M–101M)
Lars Topholm personally (analyst conduct, joint with Carnegie)

Total system-wide exposure: DKK 309M (conservative) to DKK 2,477M (aggressive). Most likely DKK 783M = EUR 105M.

Total Shape Robotics creditor claims are estimated at DKK 200–300M. In the medium scenario, creditors get paid in full and there’s a surplus that flows back pro-rata to the 4,700 retail shareholders. That’s the scenario the establishment is fighting against. Recovery doesn’t just save the company. It returns money to retail. That math is what they’re afraid of.

If reconstruction is denied, the tvangsopløsning likvidator continues. The ranked list is still there. The math is still there. But the urgency, the funding, and the willingness of a likvidator to take on Carnegie at scale is materially different from a reconstructor with creditor backing.

That’s why tomorrow matters. That’s why every party who built this bankruptcy will be working their channels until 09:29 to keep it from being granted.

What you can do

If you have access to channels — journalistic, regulatory, parliamentary, professional — the time to use them is now. Specifically:

The Finanstilsynet 7 April 2026 reprimand is only the beginning. There are pending cases (j.nr. 25-026876, 25-025498, 26-005434). Public attention sustains case progression.
The DFSA Section 30 supplementary notice for Bundgaard’s undisclosed 5.66% holding is being prepared.
The Politiet investigation reference is 0100-83986-10362-26.
The court file is R14/26 — public docket item.

If you’re a Shape shareholder reading this — you are not alone. There are 4,700 of you in 17 countries. The reconstruction is about you.

If you’re a journalist reading this — Frihedsbrevet did the December 2025 baseline investigation. The forensic report dated 19 February 2026 is in evidence. The VP Securities files are real public records. Every claim in this episode is verifiable in Danish public databases without my involvement at all.

If you’re someone in the Danish establishment reading this — yes, I know.

Bottom line — read this twice

They didn’t take Shape because Shape was failing. They took Shape because Shape was working — and because a working Shape was the only entity with legal standing to make Carnegie pay.

Stop and think about that mechanism for a moment. It’s the entire story.

In Danish corporate law, who can sue Carnegie for the damages above? Not me — I’m a former CEO, dismissed by a board controlled by people who had financial incentives to dismiss me. Not the 4,700 retail shareholders directly — they have a derivative claim, but it requires the company to act first or to grant standing. Not the creditors as individuals — they have priority claims on assets, but no claim against third parties for tortious conduct that caused the bankruptcy. Only the company itself, acting through a properly mandated representative, has direct standing to sue Carnegie for the harm Carnegie caused.

That representative is either:

A reconstructor (in rekonstruktion under Konkursloven §11), who has a fiduciary duty to creditors and the active mandate to pursue claims that maximize the estate, or
A liquidator (in tvangsopløsning under Selskabsloven §225), whose statutory mandate is to wind down efficiently and minimize cost — and who has wide discretion not to pursue complex multi-jurisdiction commercial litigation against a top-three Nordic investment bank with deep pockets and Big-5 representation.

Carnegie’s house counsel is Kromann Reumert — Denmark’s largest law firm, the standard counsel for major Nordic banks in regulatory and commercial matters. Kromann Reumert lawyers do not need to act improperly. They simply need to do what good defense lawyers always do: maximize their client’s optionality and minimize the exposure surface. In this case, the optimal defense is not to fight the case on the merits. The optimal defense is to ensure the case is never brought.

A liquidator never brings the case. A reconstructor does.

That single distinction — rekonstruktion vs tvangsopløsning — is worth somewhere between DKK 309 million and DKK 2.5 billion in expected exposure, depending on scenario. That’s not a typo. That’s the actual range. That’s the financial value of which procedural box the company sits in tomorrow morning.

Now look at the procedural history with that lens:

6 January 2026: bankruptcy decree, fast-tracked.
5 March 2026: Østre Landsret unanimously annuls it. Wrong process. (K 3337/25-F.)
17 April 2026: tvangsopløsning ordered. A different mechanism, achieving the same outcome — a liquidator instead of a reconstructor. Same result, different route.
21 April 2026: reconstruction petition filed by the company. Mazanti-Andersen as proposed reconstructor.
11 May 2026, 09:30: tomorrow.

If you find yourself wondering why a healthy company (Q3 2024 revenue +109% YoY, contribution margin 35%, DKK 138.75M UniCredit facility secured November 2024) has been pushed through two separate legal mechanisms toward the same liquidation outcome in five months, the answer is in the paragraph above. The procedural form is the substantive defense.

This is not corruption. This is not conspiracy theory. This is what any Big-5 law firm would do for any major institutional client facing exposure of this magnitude. You don’t fight EUR 184M of liability by fighting it. You fight it by ensuring the entity that has standing to bring it never gets the chance.

Mazanti-Andersen — the firm representing the company tomorrow — knows exactly what’s at stake. Philip A. Borreschmidt knows. The opposing counsel knows. The judge will know. Every sophisticated party in that courtroom understands that tomorrow’s hearing is not really about whether Shape Robotics can be saved as an operating business. It’s about whether the company-as-claimant survives long enough to file the lawsuits.

That’s why the establishment is fighting. Not because they think Shape will win the underlying case — most institutional defendants settle when the claim is real. They’re fighting because if the company survives procedurally, the bill they all face is roughly EUR 100 million expected, EUR 333 million in the worst case. That’s a number that materially affects Carnegie’s regulatory capital. It affects Topdanmark’s D&O book. It affects pricing in the Nordic small-cap underwriting market for a generation. It is, quite literally, system-scale exposure to Danish capital markets infrastructure.

Tomorrow is the procedural question. The substantive question — did they manipulate Shape into bankruptcy and extract DKK 21M+ at retail’s expense — has already been answered, in writing, by Finanstilsynet’s 7 April 2026 reprimand. Once that fact is established, the only remaining question is who has standing to enforce it. And that’s why the procedural form matters more than the procedural argument.

Tomorrow we ask the court to grant standing. The 4,700 shareholders are not asking for sympathy. They are asking for the company-as-claimant to survive long enough to do the math the regulator already did — and to send the bill to the parties the regulator already named.

Everything in this episode is verifiable in CVR.dk, VP Securities, Cision Announcement 10-26, the Finanstilsynet public register, and the Sø- og Handelsretten R14/26 docket. None of this requires you to take my word for anything. That is the point of doing it this way.

If reconstruction is granted, the math runs. If reconstruction is denied, a different and more difficult version of the same math runs over a longer timeframe with a less motivated representative. Either way, the math is now public. The bill exists whether or not Shape exists to send it.

But the most efficient path for the people the bill is owed to — creditors first, then 4,700 retail shareholders — is reconstruction.

That’s tomorrow. 09:30.

🚨 GAME OVER 🚨

Q.E.D.

— Mark-Robert Abraham Founder & former CEO Shape Robotics A/S Romanian citizen, writing in personal capacity WildCEO.live · 10 May 2026 · ahead of court hearing 11 May 09:30

Receipts at the bottom (for the record)

The Bomb Document (full evidence): THE_BOMB_DOCUMENT.md
Master Knowledge Base (complete archive): SHAPE_ROBOTICS_PUMP_DUMP_MASTER_KB.md
VP Securities reconstruction CSV: 08_bundgaard_complete_VP_history.csv
Extraction Map (all actors, all flows): THE_EXTRACTION_MAP_4K.png
Datawrapper instructions: EXTRACTION_MAP_DATAWRAPPER_INSTRUCTIONS.md

All available at wildceo.live.

Available for iOS and Android

GAME OVER | Day 60: The Repeat Extraction — Part 3 of 4

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 09 May 2026 18:18:03 GMT

What you saw was the first round. What I am going to walk you through today is the architecture of round two and round three. The pump-and-dump was not a single event. It was the first cycle of a designed three-cycle extraction structure. Round two was scheduled for Q2 2024 with Carnegie’s sales force. Round three was scheduled for Q4 2024 with a full prospectus and an international roadshow. Round one succeeded. Rounds two and three were stopped by exactly one thing: I refused to cooperate. The company became collateral damage of that refusal.

Previous episodes: Day 58: How the Pump Started — Part 1 of 4 · Day 59: The Real Reason — Part 2 of 4

Background reading: The Myth of Danish Purity (31 January 2026) · There Is No “Mild” Version of This (8 April 2026) · Cision Announcement 10-26 — Finanstilsynet Reprimand against Lars Topholm (7 April 2026)

Sixty days into a war I didn’t start. Two days from the reconstruction hearing — Monday 11 May 2026, 09:30 CEST, at Sø- og Handelsretten in Copenhagen.

I want to start today with the framing, because it matters. For 59 days I have walked you through what the pump was, who did it, why they did it, and how they did it. The Finanstilsynet reprimand of 7 April 2026 (Cision 10-26) confirms the regulatory anchor: Lars Topholm violated MAR Article 20(1) by circulating an investment recommendation without disclosure. The Bundgaard family — including Sundvænget Invest A/S — and Søren Bendixen coordinated their selling between 24 April and 4 June 2024. The price went from DKK 35 on 11 March to DKK 52 on 18 March (verified TradingView ATH) — that is +48.6% in seven trading days — and then was sold down to DKK 22-25 by August.

That story is true. It is the what.

What I want to walk you through today is the why it kept going. Because the pump-and-dump of March-June 2024 was not a one-off event. It was the first cycle of an architecture. Pump. Dump. Pivot. Repeat. Two further extraction events were planned, scheduled, and structurally documented for the rest of 2024 — and they were stopped by exactly one thing.

Me.

🎯 The first piece of direct evidence — 5 March 2024, 19:48 CET

Let me start with a piece of evidence I want every single one of you to read carefully. Until today, the case has been built primarily on circumstantial evidence — broker disclosures, CVR records, trading data, reverse-engineered timelines. The Finanstilsynet reprimand provided the regulatory finding. But the question that lawyers and journalists kept asking me was: can you prove that Bundgaard, Bendixen, and Sundvænget Invest actually received Topholm’s “back of envelope” before they bought into the placement?

I can. And so can the prosecutor when this hits criminal court.

On 5 March 2024 at 16:09 CET, Lars Topholm sent the “back of envelope” to Martin Bundgaard at his Sundvænget Invest email address — martinsundvaengetinvest@gmail.com. That same email later went to the Carnegie sales desk under the subject line “Shape Robotics: Micro cap idea (sales pitch - no coverage)” — Topholm’s own words. Sales pitch. No coverage.

Three hours and thirty-nine minutes later — at 19:48 CET that same day — Martin Bundgaard forwarded the document directly to:

✓ André Fehrn — andre@shaperobotics.com — Shape Robotics’ CEO at the time
✓ Jeppe Frandsen — jeppefrandsen@outlook.dk — Shape Robotics’ Chairman of the Board

I am going to quote what Bundgaard wrote in that forward verbatim, because it is the most important paragraph in this entire case:

“Kære André & Jeppe
Carnegie lavede i dag et salgspitch på Shape. Et salgspitch udgives ikke direkte til kunder, men sendes rundt til firmaets sælgere - Worldwide. Modtog skrivet kl 16 i dag, mens jeg sad i møde. Har netop talt med Lars, som har givet mig lov til at sende jer vedlagte til orientering. Som jeg forstod det var der rigtig fin interesse fra deres London-kontor, og jeg er ikke i tvivl om det var dette skriv der var årsag til at Shape aktien sluttede så flot som det var tilfældet…..
Måske står I indenfor de næste par dage med en unik mulighed for at fuldtegne jeres emission. Ordenlige svar på Topholms spg fra i går, vil nok ikke mindske den pludseligt opståede institutionelle interesse.
Ræk ud, hvis jeg kan hjælpe jer - Jeg er tilgængelig fra kl 8.30 - 11.00 i morgen
Go aften
Martin”

In English:

“Dear André & Jeppe
Carnegie did a sales pitch on Shape today. A sales pitch is not issued directly to clients but sent around to the firm’s salespeople — Worldwide. Received the document at 16:00 today while I was in a meeting. I just spoke with Lars, who has given me permission to send you the attached for your information. As I understood it, there was very nice interest from their London office, and I have no doubt it was this document that was the reason Shape stock closed as nicely as was the case…..
Maybe within the next few days you stand with a unique opportunity to fully subscribe your share issue. Sensible answers to Topholm’s questions from yesterday will probably not reduce the suddenly emerged institutional interest.
Reach out if I can help you — I am available from 8:30 to 11:00 tomorrow.
Good evening,
Martin”

Read that. Slowly.

🔎 What this document proves — line by line

Three things, every single one of them devastating.

🔑 One: Topholm explicitly authorized the distribution to Shape’s CEO and Chairman. Not implicit. Not assumed. “Har netop talt med Lars, som har givet mig lov til at sende jer vedlagte til orientering.” — “I just spoke with Lars, who has given me permission to send you the attached.” Topholm — Carnegie’s Head of Research — knew his “back of envelope” was being deployed simultaneously through (a) the Carnegie internal sales desk, (b) the Carnegie London office, and (c) Bundgaard’s investor-network channel directly into the issuer’s own management. He authorized that triple-track distribution. He coordinated it. He signed it.
🔑 Two: Bundgaard described the document, in his own words, as a sales pitch. “Carnegie lavede i dag et salgspitch på Shape.” Not research. Not analysis. Salgspitch. Sales pitch. Topholm’s own subject line confirms it: “Micro cap idea (sales pitch - no coverage).” That is the textbook definition of an unauthorized investment recommendation under MAR Article 3 — exactly the violation the DFSA found in their reprimand of 7 April 2026.
🔑 Three: Bundgaard told Shape’s CEO and Chairman that the pump created a unique window to “fully subscribe” the share issue. “Måske står I indenfor de næste par dage med en unik mulighed for at fuldtegne jeres emission.” This is not analyst commentary. This is direct guidance on how to monetize a coordinated price move during a pending capital raise. The 11 March 2024 placement at DKK 35 was 6 days away when Bundgaard wrote this. The pump created institutional buying interest — Bundgaard says so explicitly — and Bundgaard explained to Mark and Jeppe that the “suddenly emerged institutional interest” gave them a “unique opportunity” to fuldtegne — to fully subscribe — the issue.

The “back of envelope” was not analyst output. It was a coordinated market-moving instrument, deployed simultaneously across three channels by three actors — Topholm at Carnegie, Bundgaard in the investor network, and the issuer’s own executives — all in the same six-hour window.

📨 The cover-up began the next morning

The next thing in my inbox is dated 6 March 2024 at 06:36 CET — early next morning.

It is a one-line forward from André Fehrn to me. Mark Abraham. The incoming CEO. He was passing the Bundgaard chain on to me, and his accompanying note says:

“Slip this to your investors / Goldring.” “Take out Lars’ name maybe”

That is the entire message. Two lines.

Read the second one again.

“Take out Lars’ name maybe”

The CEO, on the morning after the pump, instructing the incoming CEO to take Lars Topholm’s name off a document before forwarding it to investors.

There is only one reason a CEO writes that sentence. The CEO knew the document’s sourcing was problematic. The CEO knew that distributing an analyst note authored by a Carnegie analyst — to investors — with the analyst’s name attached — was exposing something that needed to be hidden.

The cover-up began at 06:36 CET on 6 March 2024. Twenty-three hours and forty-eight minutes after the pump.

🏛️ The 9 April 2024 Carnegie Proposal

This is the part I have already walked through in the livestream of 8 April 2026, but it sits at the structural heart of today’s episode and it deserves to be shown again — because this is where the pivot happens. From round one (the 11 March placement and the dump that followed) to round two (Q2 2024) and round three (Q4 2024).

Five weeks after the 5 March pump, on 9 April 2024 at 20:58 CET, Christian Baarsøe — Managing Director at Carnegie — sent a formal proposal to me, to André Fehrn, to Moises Pacheco, and to Jeppe Frandsen, with Jens Plenov (Head of ECM at Carnegie) on copy.

Subject line: “Shape Robotics x Carnegie - Proposal.”

The operative paragraphs, verbatim from my inbox:

“We propose to enter into a 3-year framework agreement, where Carnegie acts as Sole Global Coordinator in connection with equity issues in the company. In the short term, we suggest to address two potential issues during 2024:
• The first issue is envisaged to take place in Q2 2024 following the AGM’s approval of an authorization to issue new shares. To execute on this first smaller issue of shares, we intend to arrange a sales force briefing, where management educates Carnegie’s global sales force on the investment case.
• The second issue is envisaged to take place in Q4 2024 documented with a prospectus, providing flexibility in terms of size. To execute on this larger issue of shares, thorough work on the investment case, business plan, communication and guidance would need to be carried out; also pre-deal roadshows targeting both Nordic and international institutional investors are advisable.
As a testimony to Carnegie’s interest in working with Shape Robotics under such framework agreement, Lars Topholm is committed to initiating commissioned research free of charge (other than the transaction-based fees that relate to equity issues).”

Read the bolded sentence again.

“Lars Topholm is committed to initiating commissioned research free of charge (other than the transaction-based fees that relate to equity issues).”

This is the same Lars Topholm who, 35 days earlier, had circulated the “back of envelope” without authorization. The Finanstilsynet would later determine — on 7 April 2026 — that this same kind of analytical output, distributed without disclosure, constituted a violation of MAR Article 20.

Carnegie’s 9 April proposal was the structural answer to that problem. Convert the unauthorized “back of envelope” into authorized “commissioned research.” Make it official. Sign a 3-year framework. Pay for it not directly — to keep it clean — but indirectly, through transaction fees on the very equity issues the research would help sell.

That is what I want you to internalize. The architecture was designed so that Topholm would write favorable research → that research would drive demand for share issues → those issues would generate transaction fees for Carnegie → those fees would compensate Topholm. The same person creating demand for the shares would be paid out of the proceeds of selling them. Conflict of interest is too soft a word. Conflict of interest by design.

🔁 What “pump → dump → pivot → repeat” actually means in practice

I want to pause here because I think there’s a piece of this that is hard to grasp on first listen, and it is the most important piece.

When a public company issues new shares, the people who control the timing know in advance. They sell at the peak before the issue, knowing they will be able to buy back cheaper into the issue. Then they ride the next pump up to the next peak. Sell again. Buy again. Sell again.

In the Shape Robotics case, the structure had three planned cycles in 2024:

Cycle 1 — March 2024: The 5 March 2024 “back of envelope” pumps the price from DKK 36 to DKK 52 (+48.6% in 7 trading days). On 11 March, Shape Robotics issues new shares at DKK 35 in a directed placement. Topholm, Bundgaard, Bendixen, and Sundvænget Invest A/S all participate in that placement. Then between 24 April and 4 June, the network coordinately sells ~532,000 shares at DKK 42-45. ✓ Round one extracted ~DKK 21 million.
Cycle 2 — Q2 2024: Per the Carnegie proposal of 9 April, a “smaller issue” was envisaged following the AGM authorization. Carnegie’s global sales force would receive a management briefing. Topholm’s “commissioned research” would frame the case. The pump-by-research → issue-into-pump → exit-into-dump structure of cycle 1 would be repeated, this time with full Carnegie official infrastructure behind it.
Cycle 3 — Q4 2024: The big one. Full prospectus. International roadshow. Pre-deal marketing across Nordic and international institutional investors. Topholm’s research as the fundamental anchor. This is where the real extraction was meant to happen.

The same crew that had just dumped DKK 21 million out of cycle 1 would have used Carnegie’s official channels — under the cover of “Sole Global Coordinator framework” — to do it again at greater scale, twice more in the same calendar year.

This is not a hypothesis. It is what the 9 April 2024 proposal literally proposes in writing.

📑 The 14 May 2024 sales-desk agenda — the cover-up in real time

While the dump was running between 24 April and 4 June, Topholm was simultaneously preparing the materials for cycle 2.

On 14 May 2024 at 14:25 CET — 21 days into the active coordinated dump period — Topholm sent me and Wiktor Budziosz, our CFO, a complete twelve-section presentation script for our presentation to the Carnegie Sales Desk.

The agenda Topholm wrote:

✓ Show the robot. Make people smile. ✓ Brief overview slide ✓ Market section (2-3 slides) ✓ Market access (2-3 slides) ✓ Products (1-2 slides) ✓ Business model (2-4 slides) ✓ Numbers (2-3 slides) — including 2027 ambition ✓ Summary slide ✓ End slide with names, “with a smiley face :o)”

I want to point out what is on this list that should never have been on this list. Numbers. 2027 ambition. Business model. Forward-looking guidance.

This is non-public material, internal-only material, that Topholm — sitting on 3,500 undisclosed Shape Robotics shares — was helping to package into a pitch for a sales force whose job was to push the next equity issue to retail and institutional investors. Without an NDA. No non-disclosure was ever signed between Carnegie’s research function and Shape Robotics. There was no Chinese wall in place. The structure of investment banking is supposed to keep research and sales rigidly separated. In our case, the analyst was writing the sales pitch.

And the people in his network — Bundgaard, Bendixen, Sundvænget Invest — were exiting their previous positions during the exact same window.

There is a phrase for this in the criminal law of every Western jurisdiction: insider trading combined with market manipulation. In Denmark, MAR Article 12 (manipulation) and MAR Article 14 (insider dealing) both apply. In Romania, where I am a citizen, Codul Penal art. 47 covers conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting in market crimes. The acts described above sit at the intersection of all four provisions.

🛑 The reason cycles 2 and 3 didn’t happen

Here is what nobody else has said out loud about this case yet, and I want to say it plainly today.

Cycles 2 and 3 did not collapse on their own. The share price did not “naturally” deteriorate to a point where the Q4 2024 issue became impossible. I refused to cooperate.

By summer 2024, I had begun to understand what was actually happening. I had recordings of Topholm — recordings I have already published — in which he admitted that he and his network were continuing to be involved in the company’s price formation. I had visibility into the dump timing through CVR records. I had context that I did not have on 6 March when André wrote me “take out Lars’ name maybe.”

And I made a decision. I made it after consulting with Michael Voss, who held the largest shareholder position outside the dump network. I made it after weighing what would happen to the company if I went along with what Topholm and his crew wanted. I made it on the basis of a simple principle that anybody who has run a public company will recognize: you cannot be the CEO of a company that is being used as a vending machine for someone else’s coordinated extraction.

I refused to support a Q2 2024 issue done through Carnegie. I refused to engage in the Q4 2024 prospectus process. I refused to sign the framework agreement.

The consequence was immediate and predictable. They pulled the plug.

I want every shareholder reading this to understand what that meant in practice. The Topholm-Bundgaard-Bendixen network was, between mid-2023 and mid-2024, the single largest pool of institutional support for the Shape Robotics share. When they stopped supporting the share — when they stopped warming the price into each issue and instead applied sustained sell pressure — the share began an asymmetric decline. By autumn 2024 it had cracked through DKK 22. By December 2024 it was at DKK 20. By Q1 2025 it was DKK 14. By 23 December 2025 it printed an ATL of DKK 1.58.

The price collapse was not the natural consequence of business performance. The business never had a year of negative operational results between 2024 and 2025. Revenue grew. International expansion continued. The Polish PNRR pipeline expanded. The Sanako acquisition closed. The price collapse was the consequence of a network that controlled a substantial share of the float withdrawing all support and applying coordinated pressure — as a punishment for refusing to participate in cycles 2 and 3.

That is not a metaphor. That is what actually happened.

🎯 The board’s failure — and mine

I want to be honest here, because I owe it to the people reading. The board around me — Jeppe Frandsen, the directors of the time — they did not want to participate in the Topholm scheme. To their credit. But they also did not want to publicly oppose it. They wanted to ignore it. They wanted to pretend it was not happening.

That third option — the option of cowardice — is what allowed the network to keep operating with reduced visibility. It is what allowed the share price to continue degrading without an explicit defensive posture from the issuer. And ultimately it is what set up the conditions that led to the bankruptcy decree of 6 January 2026.

I share part of that fault. I deferred to a board that did not want to publicly engage. I should have been louder. Earlier. Clearer. I should have published this case in 2024, not waited 24 months. I have apologized for that publicly already and I do so again here.

But the architecture itself — the pump-and-dump scheme, the Carnegie framework, the network, the cycles — was not built by me, was not chosen by me, and was not avoidable by any single executive’s decision. It was designed by people whose business is exactly this. Pandora was an earlier example. Other companies have been examples since. Shape Robotics was a textbook target because we were small, our share count was manageable, our growth trajectory was good enough to be a credible “story stock,” and we did not have the institutional defense structure of larger Nordic listings.

We were the product.

🏛️ Why none of this contradicts the 7 April 2026 reprimand — it strengthens it

Some readers may ask: if all of this is true, why did Finanstilsynet only issue a reprimand against Topholm and not pursue the broader scheme?

The answer is procedural, not substantive. The DFSA’s reprimand was based on a single discrete violation — MAR Article 20(1), the disclosure failure on the 5 March 2024 “back of envelope.” That is the narrowest and most legally clean count. It is what they could prove on a fast track. The broader pattern — MAR Article 12 manipulation, MAR Article 14 insider dealing, the 9 April Carnegie framework, the cycles — those require a deeper investigation that is now beginning under j.nr. 26-005434, currently active.

The reprimand of 7 April 2026 is the first regulatory finding. It is not the last. The shareholders’ formal complaint of 27 April 2026 (Jørgen Andreas Berg, lead complainant), the Politi case under file 0100-83986-10362-26, and the recovery action against Carnegie Investment Bank and Topholm personally — all of these proceed on the broader pattern.

And the Bundgaard email of 5 March 2024 19:48 CET — published here for the first time — is the document that converts the broader pattern from circumstantial into direct.

🎯 Why this matters for 11 May at 09:30

In two days, Sø- og Handelsretten will decide whether Mazanti-Andersen — Philip Borreschmidt as the proposed reconstructor — is appointed.

The current liquidator, Teis Gullitz-Wormslev of Kromann Reumert, has stated publicly that he wishes the company to go bankrupt. He said so yesterday. That is not coordination. That is structural alignment with parties who do not want the recovery action against Carnegie to proceed.

If reconstruction succeeds:

✓ The trading suspension on Nasdaq Copenhagen can be lifted ✓ The IRIS equity facility (EUR 16M) becomes drawable ✓ EIFO and Danske Bank obligations are serviced in full ✓ The Polish PNRR pipeline (~EUR 40M Bechtle contract path) resumes ✓ The recovery action proceeds on its proper foundation, with the company itself as the plaintiff

If reconstruction fails:

✕ The current liquidator — who has stated his preference for bankruptcy — remains in place ✕ The company’s ability to pursue the recovery action becomes structurally compromised ✕ ~4,700 retail shareholders take a total loss while the architects walk away ✕ The architecture of the case becomes much harder to dismantle through civil proceedings

Monday is not the final day. Both sides will appeal. The matter will reach Østre Landsret regardless. But Monday is the first day on which the question gets answered: does this company get the chance to recover from those who staged its destruction, or does it get buried first?

🎯 The ask — same as it has been

I am traveling to Copenhagen tomorrow. The hearing is at 09:30 on Monday at Sø- og Handelsretten. For anyone who can be in Copenhagen on Monday: please come. We will meet at the Scandic Palace Hotel at 08:30 for coffee before the hearing. It is open to the public. Showing up matters.

For anyone who cannot be in Copenhagen but wants to support: subscribe to the Substack at substack.wildceo.live. The Bundgaard email and the supporting Carnegie chain are being added to the vault tonight for full subscriber access. Forward this episode to anybody who cares about Nordic markets, EU MAR enforcement, or what happens when listed-company governance fails at scale.

For anyone who is a journalist: the case file is documented. The emails are real. The dates are verifiable. Reach out and I will walk you through the evidence.

For anyone who is a Shape Robotics shareholder: Jørgen Andreas Berg leads the shareholders’ petition. He has 20+ co-signatories representing 541,745 shares. His email is joergen.andreas.berg@gmail.com. Sign it.

🔚 Closing — and what comes tomorrow

Tomorrow, Day 61, is Part 4 of this series: The Connection. It traces how the pump-and-dump of March-June 2024 directly caused the bankruptcy decree of January 2026 — through EIFO’s withdrawal of financing on 8 July 2024, through the failure of cycle 3 in autumn 2024, through the cascade of overdue payables in 2025, through Treyd’s konkursbegæring of 25 November 2025, through the hearing scheduled in the Christmas window when Galst’s office was closed, through the bankruptcy decree of 6 January 2026 and the trading suspension at DKK 5.03 that same morning.

Same case. Same architecture. One causal chain, end to end.

Day 60 establishes the architecture of the second extraction.

Day 61 connects that architecture to the bankruptcy.

11 May at 09:30 is when the court answers whether the company that survived round one — the company you and I, retail shareholders together, are still trying to defend — gets to recover from those who staged round two.

We did not start this fight. We are going to finish it.

Q.E.D.

Mark-Robert Abraham · Founder and former CEO, Shape Robotics A/S · 9 May 2026 · Day 60

Lead complainant on the shareholders’ petition: Jørgen Andreas Berg · joergen.andreas.berg@gmail.com

🔐 Vault access: wildceo.live/vault — subscribe at substack.wildceo.live. The 5 March Bundgaard email and the full Carnegie correspondence April-August 2024 are being added to the vault tonight.

📄 Public regulatory record: Cision Announcement 10-26 — Finanstilsynet Reprimand against Lars Topholm (7 April 2026)

📚 Part 4 of this series — “The Connection” — drops tomorrow, 10 May 2026, from Copenhagen.

🏷️ #ShapeRobotics #PhaseEducation #NasdaqCopenhagen #SHAPE #PumpAndDump #LarsTopholm #Carnegie #DNBCarnegie #ChristianBaarsoe #JensPlenov #JeppeFrandsen #FrameworkAgreement #SoleGlobalCoordinator #CommissionedResearch #MAR #MARArticle12 #MARArticle14 #MARArticle20 #Finanstilsynet #DFSA #DanishFSA #BackOfTheEnvelope #InsiderTrading #MarketManipulation #MartinBundgaard #SundvaengetInvest #SorenBendixen #Sundvaenget #Reconstruction #MazantiAndersen #Independence #JorgenAndreasBerg #SoOgHandelsretten #OstreLandsret #RepeatExtraction #CarnegieEmails #PartThree #WildCEO #GameOver #Day60 #TheRepeatExtraction

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GAME OVER | Day 59: The Real Reason — Part 2 of 4

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Fri, 08 May 2026 17:57:02 GMT

Previous episodes: Day 58: How the Pump Started — Part 1 of 4 · Day 57: The Paywall Question · Day 56: The Board Folder · Day 55: Friday Q&A

Background reading: The Myth of Danish Purity (31 January 2026) · Shape Robotics Bankruptcy Annulled — Carnegie, Lars Topholm (7 March 2026)

Fifty-nine days into a war I didn’t start. Three days until the court hearing on 11 May at 09:30 at Sø- og Handelsretten.

I owe you an apology. I missed two daily livestreams. I needed the weekend to recuperate. Today I came back, opened the stream, said hello to Bo and Louise, and then walked through the part of the pump-and-dump story that I want to tell publicly — the part that explains why it happened.

Yesterday in Part 1 I showed you the mechanics: the 5 March 2024 “back of the envelope” by Lars Topholm of Carnegie, the +48.6% pump in 7 trading days, the verified DKK 52.00 all-time high on 18 March 2024, the coordinated sales of approximately 532,000 shares between 24 April and 4 June 2024. I gave you the public arithmetic.

Today I want to do something different. I am going to walk you through what is verifiable in the public record about the architecture of this scheme, what remains contested testimony, and where I have to draw the line between the two.

This is the discipline the case requires now. Not less force — more precision.

🎯 Three names you need to remember

✓ Michael Voss (full registered name: Michael Voss-Jensen). Founder and director of Fundamental Fondsmæglerselskab A/S since 1992 — one of Denmark’s most respected independent stock-picking boutiques. Citywire AAA-rated. Approximately DKK 2.3–2.5 billion in AUM. Soft-closed to new investors several years ago because Fundamental’s growing size made it harder to take meaningful positions in small-cap names. Fundamental Invest was Shape Robotics’ largest institutional shareholder from late 2022 onward — combined Voss + foundation holdings exceeded 20% of the company at one point. Sources: fundamental.dk · Cision Announcement, 22 November 2022 · Citywire profile.
✓ Lars Topholm — Managing Director and Head of Research at DNB Carnegie Investment Bank. Joined Carnegie in May 2004 as analyst, became Head of Research in May 2012. Career path before Carnegie: Alfred Berg / ABN Amro 1993–1999, BI Venture / BankInvest 1999–2001, Nordea 2002–2004. Concurrently: Chairman of Aerbio (formerly Deep Branch Biotechnology), registered 15 August 2024 per the Danish business registry. Sources: LinkedIn · Lasso CVR record.
✓ Martin Bundgaard — Long-time Danish stockbroker and financial journalist (Penge & Privatøkonomi, Børsens Nyhedsmagasin, Økonomisk Ugebrev). Director of NOVA FINANCE ApS 1978–1993. Director and 100% owner of Sundvænget Invest ApS since 1999. 33.08% beneficial owner of Aerbio Group A/S via Sundvænget Invest, per the Danish business registry. Director of Aerbio Group from 1 May 2024 until 15 August 2024 — when Topholm replaced him in the chair. Sources: ownr.dk public profile · Paqle profile.

There is a fourth player — Søren Bendixen, a private investor in Shape Robotics and in Aerbio (via Fredericiagade Holding ApS). To avoid confusion: this is not the Søren Bendixen who works as DR’s Africa correspondent. Different person, same name.

📊 What the verified record actually says about the architecture

I want to lay out the dates that are confirmed by primary sources — Cision filings, Danish business registry (CVR / Lasso / ownr.dk), Aerbio’s own press materials, regulatory decisions. No speculation. Pure chronology.

✓ November 2022: Voss / Fundamental Invest publicly announces a DKK 26 million+ investment in Shape Robotics. Combined private + foundation holdings approach and exceed 20% of the company in subsequent placements. Source: Cision, 22 November 2022.
✓ December 2022: Lars Topholm purchases 3,500 Shape Robotics shares personally. He does not disclose this shareholding when he later distributes investment commentary on the company. Source: Cision Announcement 10-26, 7 April 2026.
✓ 5 March 2024: Topholm circulates the “back of the envelope” note inside and outside Carnegie. The note projects three-to-four-times upside on Shape Robotics based on the company’s own published financial targets.
✓ 11 March 2024: Shape Robotics announces a directed share placement at DKK 35.00 per share, raising DKK 35.4 million. The placement is oversubscribed. Topholm, Bundgaard, Bendixen, and Sundvænget Invest are among the participating investors.
✓ 18 March 2024: Shape Robotics reaches DKK 52.00 — its all-time high. Seven trading days after the placement. +48.6% from the placement price. TradingView OMXCOP:SHAPE confirms.
✓ 24 April – 4 June 2024: The same network — Topholm personally, Bundgaard, Bendixen, Sundvænget Invest — coordinately sells approximately 532,000 shares at DKK 42–45 per share. Approximately DKK 21 million extracted in cumulative profits. The detailed transaction analysis is in The Myth of Danish Purity.
✓ 1 May 2024: “DBB BidCo ApS” is incorporated — Bundgaard’s vehicle, with Kaspar Kristiansen and the Deep Branch Biotechnology core team. The vehicle executes a management buyout of Deep Branch Biotechnology Ltd (UK). Sources: ownr.dk, Lasso CVR records.
✓ August 2024: DBB BidCo is rebranded as Aerbio. Public launch announced 28 August 2024. Pilot facility goes live at Brightlands Chemelot Campus (NL). Source: Food Navigator, 28 August 2024.
✓ 15 August 2024: Lars Topholm formally registered as Chairman of Aerbio Group ApS in the Danish business registry. Bundgaard ceases as director the same day. Source: Lasso CVR record.
✓ September 2024: Aerbio Series A overview deck dated 25 September 2024 targets EUR 50 million by Q4 2024.
✓ 2024–2025: Aerbio raises an oversubscribed multi-million-euro bridge loan, with Chr. Olesen Group (Mads C. Olesen) joining as a new investor. Topholm and Olesen quoted in Aerbio’s own press release. Source: aer.bio/press-release.
✓ October 2025: Aerbio resumes the EUR 50 million Series A round formally. Source: Mainsights, 7 October 2025.
✓ 24 December 2025: Voss / Fundamental Fondsmæglerselskab discloses joint reduction of holdings in Shape Robotics to below 5%. Note the date — twenty months after the Topholm/Bundgaard/Bendixen network exited at peak prices. Voss did not exit at peak. Voss exited late, after the Finans.dk press campaign and after Shape’s price collapse was already substantially complete. Source: TradeDesk / Cision flagging notice.
✓ 7 April 2026: Finanstilsynet issues a formal reprimand against Lars Topholm for breach of MAR Article 20(1) — for distributing an investment recommendation while holding shares without disclosing the shareholding. Source: Cision Announcement 10-26.

That is the verified chronology. Each line above has a primary source. No allegations. No inference. Pure record.

🏢 The architectural overlap — Aerbio, capitalized in the same window

Here is what jumps out when you align those dates side by side.

SHAPE ROBOTICS              AERBIO

Mar 5  2024  Topholm "back of envelope"
Mar 11 2024  Shape placement @ DKK 35
             (Topholm, Bundgaard, Bendixen,
              Sundvænget participate)
Mar 18 2024  Shape ATH DKK 52.00
Apr 24 2024  Coordinated sales begin
May  1 2024                            ← DBB BidCo incorporated
             Coordinated sales continue   (Bundgaard's vehicle)
             ~DKK 21M extracted
Jun  4 2024  Coordinated sales end
Aug 15 2024                            ← Topholm registered as
                                         Aerbio Chairman
Aug 28 2024                            ← Aerbio launches publicly
Sep 25 2024                            ← Aerbio Series A deck
                                         targets EUR 50M
2024-25                                ← Aerbio bridge raised
                                         (oversubscribed; Chr. Olesen)
Oct  7 2025                            ← Aerbio EUR 50M Series A
                                         formally resumes

This is the structural overlap. Investors who participated in the Shape Robotics directed placement at DKK 35 in March 2024 — and who exited the position at DKK 42–45 between April and June 2024 — were the same investors capitalising the Deep Branch / Aerbio buyout in the same window.

The Shape Robotics share liquidity, in other words, did not just transfer wealth from retail buyers to private investors. It did so in the precise window when those private investors were funding a private biotech buyout where the same Carnegie analyst would shortly become Chairman.

That overlap is not personal interpretation. The dates are in the Danish business registry. The shareholding records are in Aerbio’s own filings. The architecture is publicly auditable.

📑 The Finanstilsynet finding — 7 April 2026

Everything I describe above is structural. The regulatory anchor is specific.

On 7 April 2026, Cision Announcement 10-26 confirmed that Finanstilsynet had issued a formal reprimand against Lars Topholm for breach of MAR Article 20(1).

The Authority’s published findings are direct:

✓ Lars Topholm prepared and distributed an investment recommendation in March 2024 ✓ The recommendation contained calculations of theoretical price upside (”three-four times higher”) ✓ At the time, Topholm personally held 3,500 Shape Robotics shares, purchased in December 2022 ✓ Topholm did not disclose his shareholding when distributing the recommendation ✓ The “back of the envelope” framing is legally irrelevant ✓ The absence of a measurable price effect is legally irrelevant

The format he used to claim it was “informal” does not save the recommendation from being subject to MAR Article 20. The bank that employed him was Carnegie. The publicly listed company on which he was opining was Shape Robotics.

The Company has filed a D&O claim with Topdanmark and is initiating recovery proceedings against Carnegie Investment Bank and Topholm following the EGM on 14 April 2026. The path from the regulatory finding to the recovery action is structurally complete.

The 7 April 2026 reprimand is the foundation on which everything else in this story is now built. The pump was not a theory. The undisclosed shareholding was not a theory. They are now regulatory facts on the public record.

⚖️ Voss is not part of the network — and this matters

Some readers have asked me directly: “Was Michael Voss part of the pump-and-dump network?”

The answer requires precision. Voss was Shape Robotics’ largest institutional shareholder. He invested through Fundamental from late 2022. He participated in subsequent placements as a long-only conviction position. He did not exit at peak in April–June 2024 with the Topholm/Bundgaard/Bendixen network. He did not exit at all until 24 December 2025 — twenty months later, when Fundamental flagged below 5% after the Finans.dk press campaign and the price collapse were already substantially complete.

Voss was, on the chronology, more plausibly a victim of the pump-and-dump than a beneficiary — someone whose long-only position was depleted by a market manipulation he had no part in. The Finanstilsynet reprimand of 7 April 2026 names Topholm. It does not name Voss. The 532,000-share coordinated exit window — April to June 2024 — does not include him.

If at some point I have suggested otherwise on a livestream — and there are passages in the unedited transcripts where I have speculated about personal histories I cannot verify from the public record — I want to be careful about what I say in the published, structured record. The verified record places Voss outside the perimeter of the regulatory finding. That distinction matters, both for accuracy and for what the recovery action looks like from here.

🤝 Where I cannot go further — the limits of what I can say

I want to draw a line here that I think the case requires now.

There are personal histories among these men — long-running professional relationships in a small Danish finance market where many of the senior figures have known each other for decades — that I have heard about over the past two years from various participants. I cannot publicly verify those relationships from open sources, and I will not turn private testimony into published claims of fact in this dispatch.

What I can say from the public record:

✓ The MAR Article 20(1) violation by Topholm is a regulatory fact as of 7 April 2026 ✓ The Aerbio capital raise overlapped with the Shape pump-and-dump window — structural fact documented in CVR, Aerbio’s own filings, and food-industry trade press ✓ Bundgaard’s 33.08% beneficial ownership of Aerbio Group via Sundvænget Invest is registry fact ✓ Topholm’s August 2024 chairmanship of Aerbio is registry fact

What I cannot say from the public record alone — and therefore will not say here as established fact:

✕ That any specific personal grievance motivated the scheme between specific individuals ✕ That Voss was the “designated victim” — chronologically he was hurt by it, but motive cannot be inferred from harm alone ✕ That any specific past employment relationship existed between Voss and the Topholm/Bundgaard/Bendixen network beyond the publicly documented Danish finance market

I will leave those points where they belong — in the regulatory and civil proceedings that will examine evidence under proper standards, not in a Substack dispatch from a private citizen.

That is not weakness. That is what discipline looks like at Day 59.

🎯 Why retail investors are systemically defenseless

When a directed placement is done at DKK 35 in March 2024, and the share price reaches DKK 52 within seven trading days, retail investors see only the price action. They see the rally and they assume something has fundamentally changed about the company. They buy into the rally. They become the exit liquidity for the placement participants.

The information asymmetry is total. The mechanism is invisible. The consequence is direct.

🎯 This is why disclosure laws exist. MAR Article 20 exists precisely because financial professionals have access to information and analytical tools that retail investors don’t have. When those professionals fail to disclose their own positions while distributing investment recommendations, the entire information architecture of the public markets collapses for retail.
The 7 April 2026 reprimand is Finanstilsynet saying: yes, that collapse happened, and yes, this is the actor responsible.

That is what happened to Shape Robotics. And to approximately 4,700 retail shareholders in 17 countries. And to Michael Voss / Fundamental Invest, whose long-only conviction position was depleted by the same scheme that was extracting from retail.

📈 What’s coming in Parts 3 and 4

Part 3 — tomorrow: The Cover-up. How Finans.dk responded to my Substack investigation. The leaked sealed Romanian documents, the character-assassination playbook, the auditor resignation timed to the same day as the Finans.dk fraud article on 18 December 2025. The “Pandora pump-and-dump 2018” precedent involving the same analyst at Carnegie.
Part 4 — day after: The Connection. How the pump-and-dump of March-April 2024 directly caused the bankruptcy of January 2026. The DKK 205 million in shareholder value destroyed. The 97% drawdown from peak. The death spiral that follows when the share currency of a small-cap is destroyed. Why EIFO withdrew. Why Treyd filed bankruptcy. Why everything that has happened since 6 January 2026 traces back to the email of 5 March 2024.

After Part 4, on 11 May, we go to court. Mazanti-Andersen is proposed as reconstructor. The reconstruction begins. The post-bankruptcy prospectus follows. The recovery action against Carnegie and Topholm proceeds.

This is no longer about whether something happened. The regulator has confirmed it. This is about how recovery is structured. That is what 11 May is about.

🔚 Closing — apologies and acknowledgements

I want to close on three apologies.

To Michael Voss — and to Fundamental’s investors: I have on occasion conflated the timeline of your exit with the network that the Finanstilsynet reprimand actually concerns. The verified record is clear: Voss / Fundamental was Shape Robotics’ largest institutional shareholder for three years and held the position through the pump, the dump, and most of the subsequent collapse. The 24 December 2025 flagging notice is two paragraphs in a Cision archive, but it is a structurally important fact. Voss did not exit with the network. He was hurt by the network. I should have been clearer about this earlier.
To my retail shareholders: I should have escalated harder in 2024. I deferred to a board process that was reluctant to confront a Carnegie analyst publicly. The disclosure was delayed by a full year. That delay cost you. I am sorry.
To Jeppe Frantzen: Reasonable people can disagree about whether a small-cap board should have escalated in 2024 versus 2025. I disagreed with you then. Looking back, the cost-benefit of public escalation is harder to assess than I made it sound at the time. The board members who came under collateral pressure in 2025 were real people with real careers. I can hold both: that you were probably wrong about the timing, and that the decision was harder than my retrospective certainty suggests.

The reconstruction on 11 May is the procedural step that allows everything else to follow. The recovery action against Carnegie and Topholm proceeds. The schools’ subscriptions are honoured. The platform is preserved.

11 May. 09:30. Sø- og Handelsretten. Independent reconstructor. Q.E.D.

Mark-Robert Abraham · Founder and former CEO, Shape Robotics A/S · 8 May 2026 · Day 59

Lead complainant on the shareholders’ petition: Jørgen Andreas Berg · joergen.andreas.berg@gmail.com

🔐 Vault access: wildceo.live/vault — subscribe at substack.wildceo.live and use the same email to log in.

📄 Public record: Cision Announcement 10-26 — Finanstilsynet Reprimand against Lars Topholm (7 April 2026)

📄 Aerbio Group beneficial-ownership records: Lasso CVR record on Topholm chairmanship · ownr.dk profile on Bundgaard

📄 Fundamental Invest (Voss): About page on fundamental.dk · Citywire AAA-rated showcase

📊 Day 58 Datawrapper Chart 1 — The Pump (Feb-Apr 2024) · Day 58 Datawrapper Chart 2 — The Pump & Dump Full Trajectory

📚 Part 3 of this series — “The Cover-up” — drops tomorrow, Friday 9 May 2026.

🏷️ #ShapeRobotics #PhaseEducation #NasdaqCopenhagen #SHAPE #PumpAndDump #LarsTopholm #Carnegie #DNBCarnegie #MichaelVoss #FundamentalInvest #FundamentalFondsmaegler #MartinBundgaard #SundvængetInvest #SørenBendixen #FredericiagadeHolding #Aerbio #DeepBranch #ChrOlesenGroup #MAR #MARArticle20 #Finanstilsynet #DFSA #DanishFSA #BackOfTheEnvelope #InsiderTrading #MarketManipulation #Reconstruction #MazantiAndersen #Independence #JørgenAndreasBerg #SøOgHandelsretten #ØstreLandsret #FinansDK #PartTwo #WildCEO #GameOver #Day59 #TheRealReason

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There Is No “Mild” Version of This

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Wed, 08 Apr 2026 14:39:47 GMT

On 8 April 2026, Finans.dk published its account of the Finanstilsynet decision against Lars Topholm.

The framing was surgical. The reprimand was “den mildeste sanktion” — the mildest sanction. The note had “no price effect.” Topholm’s shares were worth “omkring 130.000 kr.” The case was closed. And then — almost as an afterthought — Finans pivoted to listing Mark Abraham’s lawsuits against Finans itself, Carnegie, Topholm, the board, Nasdaq, the trustee, and Kromann Reumert. The implication: a minor infraction, blown out of proportion by a litigious Romanian CEO.

This framing is a lie of architecture. Every fact Finans quoted is accurate. Every conclusion it guided you toward is false.

Let me show you why. With the actual document. With actual numbers. With actual charts. And with the actual chain of events that took Shape Robotics from a DKK 35 million capital raise to a DKK 1.58 share price — a 97% destruction of value that began with the note Lars Topholm now calls “back of the envelope.”

First: look at the actual document

I have the note. Four pages. Let me tell you what it contains.

Topholm calls it “a back-of-the-envelope” analysis. The Finanstilsynet calls it an investment recommendation. Even Finans.dk, in its own article, acknowledges the regulator’s classification. Here is what the document actually contains:

Page 1: A revenue projection chart showing Shape Robotics growing from DKK 171M (2023) to over DKK 1,000M by 2027. Source label at the bottom: “Source: Carnegie Research; company data.” Not “Lars’s personal notes.” Carnegie Research.

Page 2: Two complete valuation tables. The first models a theoretical share price range of DKK 46.7 to DKK 105.1 at a 12% EBITDA margin, using EV/EBITDA multiples of 10x–20x, discounted at an IRR of 15%. The second models DKK 58.4 to DKK 131.3 at a 15% EBITDA margin. These are not scribbles. These are structured DCF-adjacent valuations with explicit assumptions about net debt (NIBD/EBITDA = 2x), share count (14 million), and discount rates.

Page 3: A full projected P&L from 2022 to 2027, including: revenue forecasts to DKK 1,023M, gross margin declining from 28% to 24%, EBITDA margin expanding from 5.9% to 13.9%, EBIT projections, net financials, pre-tax profit, tax at 25%, net profit projections, EPS projections from DKK 0.18 to DKK 4.44, and a PEG ratio calculation suggesting a P/E of 30x — implying a share price of DKK 133. He also includes a detailed trade receivables analysis with quarterly data from Q1 2021 to Q3 2023. Source: “Carnegie Research.”

Page 4: Signed: “Lars Topholm, Head of Research, Carnegie Investment Bank.” Full contact details: Overgaden neden Vandet 9B, DK-1414 Copenhagen K. Telephone, direct line, mobile, fax. www.carnegie.dk. Filial af Carnegie Investment Bank AB (publ), Sverige. CVR No 35541267. Reg. No 516406-0138. Standard Carnegie disclaimer footer about confidentiality and privileged material.

Let me say that again.

The document that Topholm calls “back of the envelope” is signed with his full title and Carnegie’s full corporate identity, CVR number, and legal entity registration. It contains revenue projections to DKK 1 billion, two valuation matrices with six EV/EBITDA scenarios each, a complete five-year P&L, EPS estimates, PEG ratio analysis, and quarterly receivables tracking.

This is not a napkin sketch. This is a Carnegie Research product. Branded, signed, distributed to the sales team and external investors. The regulator agreed. Finans.dk agreed. The only person still calling it “back of the envelope” is the man who wrote it — because calling it what it actually is would make what he did next look exactly like what it is.

Second: follow the money from the note to the bankruptcy

Here is the chain of causation that Finans.dk’s article did not trace:

December 2022. Topholm buys 3,500 shares in Shape Robotics. Discloses this to no one.

5 March 2024. Topholm distributes the note. Opening line: “Looking for a micro cap idea where there is a theoretical argument for a 3-4x higher share price over the coming years?” Distributed to Carnegie’s internal sales team and to external investors.

11 March 2024. Shape Robotics raises DKK 35.4 million at DKK 35/share. Subscription indications exceed DKK 40 million. The raise succeeds — in a micro-cap where one analyst’s word is the entire market.

18 March 2024. Stock peaks at DKK 52. One week after placement at 35. A 49% premium. The note projected DKK 46.7–131.3 as “theoretical” value. DKK 52 lands right in the middle of his lower scenario.

15–16 April 2024. According to Mark Abraham’s documented account, Topholm attends private advisory meetings. Obtains non-public information: cash flows, Poland pipeline (€35M in government contracts), capital structure.

16–24 April 2024. Carnegie’s sales team — Topholm’s department — promotes Shape Robotics to institutional investors. Abraham cites a transcript: “We would have primed some of the key guys and that would have been Lars doing that.”

24 April 2024. Topholm emails the Chairman: “I allow myself to turn as a concerned shareholder and nothing else.” CC’s Martin Bundgaard — his self-described “best friend” — who holds 318,311 shares with no company role.

26 April 2024. Topholm sells all 3,500 shares. Same day, Sundvænget (network investment vehicle) sells 94,927 shares.

24 April – 4 June 2024. Network exits entirely. ~532,000 shares. ~DKK 21 million extracted at DKK 42–45.

6 June 2024. Carnegie withdraws. Two days after the last associated party finishes selling.

11 July 2024. Abraham records Topholm at breakfast: “I consider myself an insider. I can’t talk to anyone.” And: “Martin is my best friend. I speak to him anytime.”

June 2024 – Nov 2025. Without Carnegie’s support, the stock drifts. EIFO pulls loan guarantees. Liquidity evaporates. The capital structure, stressed by the post-raise hangover, begins to crack.

27 November 2025. Shape Robotics files a formal market manipulation complaint with Nasdaq.

28 November 2025. The DocuSign that triggers bankruptcy proceedings.

December 2025 – January 2026. Finans.dk publishes 17+ articles. Stock collapses to DKK 1.58.

6 January 2026. Bankruptcy decreed through defective service of process. Trustee writes DKK 199M in assets to zero. 70 jobs eliminated across five countries.

5 March 2026. Eastern High Court unanimously annuls the bankruptcy.

7 April 2026. Finanstilsynet confirms the Article 20(1) violation.

From the DKK 52 peak to DKK 1.58: a 97% destruction of shareholder value. DKK 205 million lost by 4,800 investors. And it started — not metaphorically, but factually, traceably, documentably — with a branded Carnegie Research note whose author held undisclosed shares.

Third: look at who held what — and what Finans didn’t tell you

Finans reported that Topholm’s shares were worth “omkring 130.000 kr.”

That is like reporting that the driver of a getaway car had €50 in his pocket while ignoring the €3 million in the trunk.

The DKK 130,000 is Topholm’s personal holding — 3,500 shares. Here is the full picture, as documented by Abraham from VP Securities records:

Martin Bundgaard — Topholm’s “best friend,” on tape — held 318,311 shares. At DKK 42: ~DKK 13.4 million.

Sundvænget — the network’s investment vehicle — held ~140,000 shares. At DKK 42: ~DKK 5.9 million.

Søren Bendixen — held ~70,000 shares. At DKK 42: ~DKK 2.9 million.

Total network position: ~532,000 shares. Total estimated extraction: ~DKK 22 million.

Finans reported DKK 130,000. The actual figure was approximately 170 times larger.

And then there is Fredericiagade Holding ApS — Søren Bendixen’s holding company, public in the Danish Business Registry. Profits: DKK 357,000 in 2022. DKK 37.2 million in 2024. A 10,320% increase during the exact period of the scheme. If Bendixen’s Shape exit was ~DKK 3 million, where did the other DKK 34 million come from?

“The mildest sanction” — or the maximum the system produces?

Finans calls the reprimand “den mildeste sanktion.” Let me reframe this with the regulator’s own enforcement data.

In 2023, Finanstilsynet opened 260 market abuse cases. Of 55 disclosure cases: 2 reprimands. Zero fines. Zero criminal referrals.

A reprimand is not the mildest sanction. A reprimand is the harshest outcome the system routinely produces for disclosure violations. The system does not fine analysts. It does not prosecute them. It does not name them. In the entire history of Danish regulation, the number of sell-side analysts fined for Article 20(1) violations is, as far as available records show, zero.

By comparison: a retail investor got 60 days’ imprisonment for nine wash trades in one month. The #1 analyst in the Nordics distributes an undisclosed-conflict recommendation preceding a DKK 35M capital raise and a 97% collapse: a reprimand.

When Finans tells you the punishment is mild, what they are actually telling you is that the system is mild. And a system where the Head of Research at Carnegie receives the same sanction as a blogger who forgot a disclaimer is not protecting investors. It is protecting insiders.

“No price effect” — the most dishonest phrase in the article

Finans reported the note “ikke havde en kursmæssig effekt.” The regulator explicitly stated this was legally irrelevant — the violation is the non-disclosure itself.

But beyond the legal point, the factual claim is absurd.

The note projects DKK 46.7–131.3 as theoretical value. It is distributed to Carnegie’s sales team and external investors in early March 2024. One week later, Shape Robotics raises DKK 35.4 million. The stock hits DKK 52.

If the note from the #1-ranked analyst in the Nordics — distributed through Carnegie’s institutional channels during a live capital raise — had “no price effect,” then his nine consecutive Extel rankings are a fraud. You cannot be the most influential analyst in Scandinavia and simultaneously have no influence.

“He sold when the price was falling” — a 400% profit reframed as a loss

Finans wrote: “Han solgte sine aktier i april 2024. På det tidspunkt var kursen faldet.”

Topholm bought in December 2022 at prices below DKK 10. He sold on 26 April 2024 at ~DKK 42–45. That is a 400–500% return. The stock had pulled back 15% from the DKK 52 all-time high. It was not falling — it was at the highest sustained level in the company’s history.

Framing this as “kursen var faldet” — the price had fallen — makes it sound like he was cutting losses. He was cashing out a four-to-five-fold profit. While his bank was still telling retail investors to buy.

What the note reveals about intent

This is where the document becomes the evidence.

The note opens: “Looking for a micro cap idea where there is a theoretical argument for a 3-4x higher share price?”

This sentence is not analysis. It is a pitch. It is designed to make the reader lean forward. And it was written by a man who, at that moment, held undisclosed shares in the company he was pitching.

The note then builds the case for that 3-4x upside using: revenue projections to DKK 1,023M by 2027, two valuation matrices covering six EV/EBITDA scenarios each, a complete P&L model, EPS estimates of DKK 4.44 (from DKK 0.18), and a PEG-ratio cross-check suggesting DKK 133.

The note is signed with Carnegie’s full corporate identity. Every table says “Source: Carnegie Research.”

And then the disclaimer on page 4: “Take it for what it is. This isn’t official research just a back-of-the-envelope so risk to the numbers stated above may be significant.”

This disclaimer is the forensic signature. A 33-year veteran, the Head of Research at Carnegie, who has signed off on thousands of compliant research reports, chooses to label this one as “unofficial” — while branding it with Carnegie’s name, distributing it through Carnegie’s channels, and signing it with Carnegie’s contact details and CVR number.

Why would the #1 analyst in the Nordics produce a document that looks exactly like a research note, functions exactly like a research note, is branded exactly like a research note — but label it “unofficial”?

Because if it is official research, Carnegie’s compliance framework kicks in. Personal holdings must be disclosed. The note must go through compliance review. The conflict of interest must be flagged.

If it is “just a back-of-the-envelope” — well, maybe the rules don’t apply.

The disclaimer is not a defence. The disclaimer is the smoking gun. It is the #1 analyst’s attempt to build plausible deniability into a document he designed to move money — while hiding the fact that the first money it would move was his own.

The three explanations — and why “mild” isn’t one of them

He’s incompetent. The #1-ranked analyst in the Nordics for nine years doesn’t know the first rule of compliance: disclose when you own the stock. If this is true, every Extel ranking is a fraud. Every institutional mandate based on Carnegie research was misplaced. Every compliance framework he supervised was supervised by a man who doesn’t understand compliance.

He’s expired. He knew the rules once but stopped caring. The simultaneous Aerbio chairmanship (seeking €50M from the same investor pool), the personal trading in covered stocks, the “unofficial” disclaimer on a branded Carnegie note — a man who has been told he is the best for a decade stops hearing the word “no.”

He’s corrupt. The non-disclosure was deliberate. The “back of the envelope” label was cover. The timing — note → capital raise → peak → confidential meetings → network sells → Carnegie withdraws → collapse — was a sequence, not a coincidence. The DKK 22 million extracted by his network at the peak was the objective, not a side effect.

It doesn’t matter which explanation you choose. Every one of them means the same thing: Carnegie’s compliance systems either failed or were never designed to work. The Danish regulatory system either cannot detect this or does not want to. And 4,800 shareholders paid for both failures with DKK 205 million.

The question every Carnegie client should ask — and the one Finans didn’t

Lars Topholm covered Novozymes, Chr. Hansen, NKT, Nilfisk for 20+ years. His research moved billions. The regulator just confirmed he violated disclosure rules on Shape Robotics.

Was Shape Robotics the only time?

People do not develop new character traits at the apex of their career. They reveal the character they have always had.

And the question Finans.dk did not ask — while listing Abraham’s lawsuits as if the volume of complaints discredits the complainant rather than reveals the scale of the problem — while failing to disclose that Shape Robotics is suing Finans.dk’s own parent company for EUR 14 million:

If you considered yourself an insider — your words, on tape, at Villa Copenhagen — why did you sell?

The reprimand is not the story. The reprimand is the receipt. It is the government-stamped proof that the man at the centre of a DKK 205 million destruction was operating outside the law from the beginning.

You do not get to call it mild. You do not get to call it closed. And you do not get to frame the man who uncovered it as the problem.

Q.E.D.

Sources

Mark Abraham — CEO, Shape Robotics A/S · Creator, Phase Education · Born in Romania

#ShapeRobotics · #WildCEO · #GameOver · #LarsTopholm · #Carnegie · #PumpAndDump

GAME OVER | The Chairman's Secret: Two Bankruptcies, One Pattern

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 09:18:51 GMT

I inherited a disaster. Now I know why.

On May 1, 2024, I became CEO of Shape Robotics AS. I did not know it at the time, but I was inheriting a company wired to explode. The fuse had been lit eighteen months before I walked in the door — by the very people who hired me.

This is the story I have been piecing together for months. It involves a state agency, a bank, a law firm caught in Denmark’s biggest corruption scandal, and a chairman who had already done this before.

What I Walked Into

When I took over as CEO, the company was listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen Main Market. The uplisting had happened in November 2023 — six months before I arrived. I was not part of that process. I did not sign the prospectus. I was not on the board. I was brought in to run operations, grow the business, and execute.

The board that hired me was led by Chairman Jeppe Frandsen. The previous CEO, André Fehrn, had resigned the day before I started. The EIFO credit guarantee — the backbone of the company’s Danske Bank credit facility — was presented to me as a stable, structural part of the financial architecture. Nobody told me it was already dead.

The EIFO Problem — From My Perspective

In June 2024 — one month after I became CEO — EIFO notified the company that its guarantees would not be renewed. The reason: the company had been admitted to the Nasdaq Main Market. Under EU Regulation 651/2014 (GBER), state-backed investment funds are generally prohibited from financing companies listed on a main regulated market.

I did not authorize the uplisting. I did not review the GBER implications. I was not CEO when the decision was made. But suddenly, the credit facility that funded the entire Danish operation was collapsing — and it was my problem.

I spent the next eighteen months trying to fix it. I negotiated with EIFO. I explored the digital transformation exemption under GBER Article 21(6). I worked with the board to find replacement financing — convertible loans, ABG Sundal Collier, Durham Capital, AC Partners. I presented budget after budget with the convertible structure included. I did everything a CEO is supposed to do.

But something was wrong. EIFO was not cooperating. Not aggressively refusing — just not engaging. Discussions would start and stall. Proposals would be acknowledged but never actioned. The September 2024 email from Jeppe to the board — “we have a chance to continue the partnership with EIFO if we establish an operational subsidiary” — went nowhere. The subsidiary was never established. The follow-up meeting with EIFO never materialized.

I could not understand why. EIFO had every reason to work with us — the company was growing, DKK 302 million in revenue, operations in five countries. The GBER exemption for digital transformation companies was legitimate. Finland’s Finnvera — operating under the exact same EU framework — approved financing for our subsidiary Sanako Oy. The legal path existed.

So why would EIFO not walk it with us? Now I know.

The Chairman’s Secret

Jeppe Frandsen was not just the Chairman of Shape Robotics. Before Shape, he was Chairman of another Danish company — one that had a remarkably similar financial structure.

Paralenz Group ApS (CVR 37377074). An underwater camera company founded in 2016. Jeppe Frandsen became Chairman on 22 May 2019 — confirmed by the official CVR registry at Virk.dk, by his own CV filed with Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG, and by the audited annual reports.

Paralenz had the same financial DNA as Shape Robotics:

Chairman: Jeppe Frandsen → Jeppe Frandsen

State funding: Vækstfonden (now EIFO), DKK 10M loan → EIFO credit guarantee

Bank: Danske Bank → Danske Bank

Outcome: Bankruptcy, Oct 2022 → Bankruptcy, Jan 2026 (annulled)

State losses: DKK 25M+ → Under dispute

Bank recovery: Zero → Under dispute

In 2021, Paralenz raised DKK 25 million in new financing. Of that, DKK 10 million was a direct loan from Vækstfonden — the Danish state investment fund that later merged into EIFO. The going-concern note in the 2020/21 audited annual report stated that with the new capital, the Group’s liquidity was secured until September 2022. That note was signed by the board. Including Jeppe Frandsen.

The company went bankrupt on 5 October 2022. One month after the runway expired. Danske Bank recovered nothing. Vækstfonden lost its DKK 10 million and then some. Total state losses from Paralenz exceeded DKK 25 million.

Now Read It Again Slowly

Jeppe Frandsen was Chairman of a company where EIFO (Vækstfonden) lost DKK 25 million. Danske Bank recovered zero. The company went bankrupt under his chairmanship. The going-concern warning he signed turned out to be the countdown to collapse.

Then, thirteen months later, the same Jeppe Frandsen became Chairman of Shape Robotics — a company whose entire credit facility depended on EIFO guarantees, serviced through Danske Bank.

The same state agency. The same bank. The same chairman. And nobody told me. Nobody told the shareholders. Nobody told Finanstilsynet — or if they did, nobody acted on it.

Why EIFO Would Not Work With Us

This is the part that haunts me. I spent eighteen months wondering why EIFO would not engage meaningfully with Shape Robotics. I brought proposals. I cited the GBER digital transformation exemption. I showed them Finland’s Finnvera had done exactly what we were asking under the same EU framework.

But imagine you are EIFO. Imagine you lost DKK 25 million on a company called Paralenz — chaired by Jeppe Frandsen. Imagine that same Jeppe Frandsen is now the Chairman of another company standing in front of you, asking for continued support. Would you cooperate?

I would not either.

The tragedy is that the company was not Jeppe’s company. It was the shareholders’ company. It was the teachers’ and students’ company. It was a company with real revenue, real products, real impact in 40 countries. But the man sitting in the chairman’s seat had a history that made EIFO’s decision — consciously or unconsciously — almost inevitable.

And I — the CEO who was supposed to fix it — was never told why the room was cold.

The Disclosure Failure

Under the EU Prospectus Regulation, companies are required to disclose director-associated bankruptcies within the preceding five years in listing prospectuses. Shape Robotics’ listing prospectus was published in November 2023 for the uplisting to Nasdaq Main Market. Jeppe Frandsen was named as Chairman. Paralenz went bankrupt in October 2022. Thirteen months before the prospectus. Well within the five-year disclosure window.

Was this disclosed? I have reviewed the available materials. I have found no evidence that the Paralenz bankruptcy was disclosed to shareholders, to Finanstilsynet, or in the listing prospectus.

If it was not — and I invite anyone with access to the full prospectus to verify — this represents a material non-disclosure that may have affected Finanstilsynet’s approval of the listing, investors’ assessment of the board’s competence, and EIFO’s willingness to maintain the credit guarantee.

The Horten Connection

One more thread. The trustee appointed for the Paralenz bankruptcy was Christina Andersen from Horten — one of Denmark’s largest law firms.

In May 2024, TV2 Denmark broadcast “Den Sorte Svane” (The Black Swan) — an investigative documentary by Sundance-winning filmmaker Mads Brügger. The series revealed that Nicolai Dyhr, a partner in Horten’s insolvency department, had been secretly filmed advising criminals on how to commit fraud through bankruptcy proceedings. Over 2.3 million Danes watched it — the second most-viewed program in Danish history.

Horten fired Dyhr and three other employees. The entire insolvency department was reset. Sixteen or more bankruptcy cases were reopened. Nine professional violations were charged by Advokatrådet.

Christina Andersen worked in the same insolvency department during the same period. I make no accusation against Christina Andersen personally. But when the firm handling your chairman’s previous bankruptcy has its insolvency department dismantled for corruption — it is a fact worth documenting.

The Flight

Jeppe Frandsen resigned from the Shape Robotics board in April 2025 — confirmed by his own Heidelberg CV. The Company Announcement was published on 8 July 2025: “Board Update: Jeppe Frandsen Steps Down.”

By 1 December 2025, he had become acting CEO of Milestone Systems — a Canon subsidiary with thousands of employees. A prestigious appointment. A safe landing.

Shape Robotics was drowning. The EIFO guarantee had collapsed. Danske Bank was demanding repayment. The board was disintegrating — every member resigned between July and November 2025. I was left alone with DKK 302 million in revenue, operations in five countries, 4,800 shareholders, and zero support.

The man who created the EIFO problem was already in his next corner office.

What This Changes

This is not about revenge. This is about acc

ountability.

Under Selskabsloven § 361, every board member who participated in the uplisting decision bears personal liability for negligence. The duty of care (tilsynspligt) is not a suggestion. It is a legal obligation. The Supreme Court has confirmed in U 2019.1907 H (Capinordic) that the Business Judgment Rule protects only decisions made on an informed basis. A board that approves a structural change without investigating its consequences gets no protection.

The board did not check whether the uplisting would trigger EIFO’s withdrawal. They did not consult EIFO before the decision. They did not obtain a legal opinion on GBER implications. Had they sent one letter — one email — the conflict would have been identified before irreversible harm occurred.

And the chairman who should have flagged the EIFO risk had every reason to hide it — because his last company had already cost EIFO DKK 25 million.

The D&O insurance claim against Topdanmark Forsikring AS (Policy 642-16131773, DKK 21,404,220) has been initiated. All five former board members have been notified. The deadline is 6 April 2026.

The other board members will point at Jeppe. Under Danish law, that does not save them. Solidary liability means every director who voted is responsible. They all sat in the room. None of them checked.

The Questions

1. Did EIFO know that the Chairman of Shape Robotics had previously presided over a company where EIFO lost DKK 25 million?

2. Did Danske Bank perform any background check before extending credit facilities to a company chaired by the same person who presided over their previous loss?

3. Was the Paralenz bankruptcy disclosed in the Shape Robotics listing prospectus?

4. Did Finanstilsynet review Jeppe Frandsen’s directorship history before approving the prospectus?

5. Did Jeppe Frandsen inform the Shape Robotics board about the Paralenz experience — and specifically about EIFO’s losses?

6. If EIFO’s reluctance to cooperate with Shape Robotics was influenced by Jeppe Frandsen’s history — who bears responsibility for the DKK 302 million company that was destroyed?

Two companies. Same chairman. Same state agency. Same bank. Same collapse.

I inherited a disaster. Now I know it was built before I arrived — by a man who had built one before.

The question is not whether this was negligence. The question is whether anyone will be held accountable.

Mark-Robert Abraham

CEO, Shape Robotics AS

CVR 38322656

Vesterbrogade 74, 1620 Copenhagen V

substack.wildceo.live

SOURCES

1. Paralenz Group ApS, CVR 37377074 — virk.dk

2. Jeppe Frandsen CV, Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG Supervisory Board — heidelberg.com

3. Paralenz Sales ApS Annual Report 2020/21 (going-concern note) — datacvr.virk.dk

4. Paralenz bankruptcy notice, Horten (Christina Andersen as trustee) — auktioner.dk

5. Den Sorte Svane, TV2 Denmark, May 2024 (Mads Brügger) — tv2.dk

6. Horten restructuring after Black Swan, CPH Post, November 2024 — cphpost.dk

7. Shape Robotics Listing Prospectus, Company Announcement 39-23, November 2023 — shaperobotics.com

8. EIFO Company Announcement 29-25, December 2025 (guarantee withdrawal) — eifo.dk

9. U 2019.1907 H (Capinordic), Danish Supreme Court, Business Judgment Rule — domstol.dk

10. Milestone Systems management announcement, December 1, 2025 — milestonesys.com

11. Jeppe Frandsen board email, 29 September 2024

12. EU Regulation 651/2014 (GBER), Article 21(6) — eur-lex.europa.eu

#ShapeRobotics #SHAPE #NasdaqCopenhagen #EIFO #DanskeBank #Paralenz #JeppeFrandsen #CorporateGovernance #BoardLiability #InvestorProtection #Denmark #Horten #DenSorteSvane #Finanstilsynet #GBER

The Man Who Knew the Rules And Chose to Break Them for Us

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 18:23:34 GMT

By Mark Abraham, CEO

Wild CEO — The Journey

Published March 21, 2026

I want to start with three documents. Not theories. Not allegations. Three actual documents, sitting in Nasdaq Copenhagen’s public announcement database right now. You can pull them up yourself. They are numbered 01-2024, 04-2024, and 07-2024. They were published to the Nasdaq market in 2024 by a Nasdaq-listed Danish company called Scandinavian Brake Systems AS (Ticker: SBS). Each one ends the same way.

Yderligere oplysninger: Likvidator, advokat Teis Gullitz-Wormslev — two@kromannreumert.com

His name. His title. His email address. Three times, published to the stock exchange, signing off on formal market disclosures for a listed company under his control.

The date of his last announcement for Scandinavian Brake Systems: December 10, 2024. Thirteen months later, he controlled Shape Robotics AS — a Nasdaq Copenhagen listed company with 4,800 shareholders — and issued zero announcements for 59 days. Not one.

This article is about why that matters, what the law says, what the documents prove, and why every investor in Denmark should be paying attention.

Document 1: Scandinavian Brake Systems — Selskabsmeddelelse No. 01-2024

Published April 3, 2024. Source: Nasdaq Copenhagen / GlobeNewswire.

Teis Gullitz-Wormslev had been elected liquidator of SBS at the Extraordinary General Meeting of December 8, 2023. His first act as the listed company’s de facto management was to publish a full annual report to Nasdaq Copenhagen. The announcement disclosed no revenues in 2023, a DKK 17.5 million write-down following a settlement with Borg Automotive, total receipt of DKK 206.5 million from the SBS Automotive sale, a full-year result of DKK -25.9 million, and a projected final payout to shareholders of DKK 12.8 per share.

He disclosed financial results. He disclosed write-downs. He disclosed expected shareholder distributions. All to the market. All as required by MAR Article 17(1).

His name. His email.

Document 2: Scandinavian Brake Systems — Selskabsmeddelelse No. 04-2024

Published July 9, 2024. Classified as Intern viden (Inside Information). Source: Nasdaq Copenhagen.

This document is the most important of the three. Read it carefully.

During the liquidation, Teis Gullitz-Wormslev discovered that certain VAT and tax filings needed to be corrected. The liquidation work had been more extensive than expected. These complications meant additional costs. As a result, the expected final payout to shareholders changed. From DKK 12.8 per share to DKK 12.3–12.5 per share. A change of DKK 0.30–0.50.

In a company with no operations. In a company that had already sold all its assets. In a company being wound down.

He published a formal market announcement. Classified as inside information. Immediately. Because that is what EU Market Abuse Regulation Article 17(1) requires — material information must be disclosed to the market as soon as possible.

He knew this rule. He applied it here. For DKK 0.30 per share.

His name. His email. Two@kromannreumert.com.

Document 3: Scandinavian Brake Systems — Selskabsmeddelelse No. 07-2024

Published December 10, 2024. Source: Nasdaq Copenhagen / GlobeNewswire.

The final announcement of his liquidatorship. The extraordinary general meeting was held. The liquidation accounts were approved. The final payout was confirmed at DKK 12.3 per share. The company was dissolved. Trading was suspended. The shares were delisted from Nasdaq Copenhagen.

Everything disclosed. To the market. On the same day.

Likvidator, advokat Teis Gullitz-Wormslev — two@kromannreumert.com

December 10, 2024. His last announcement for SBS. Thirteen months later, he took over Shape Robotics.

The Law: What MAR Actually Requires

Before I show you what he did and didn’t do for Shape Robotics, you need to understand the legal framework. Because once you understand it, what happened becomes inexplicable by any innocent reason.

EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, Article 17(1):

An issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns that issuer.

This is not a Danish law. It is EU law. It has direct effect in all member states. It cannot be suspended by a Danish insolvency proceeding. It applies to every companylisted on Nasdaq Copenhagen.

Article 7 of the same regulation defines inside information as information that is precise, non-public, and which if disclosed would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of the financial instruments.

When a bankruptcy trustee takes control of a Nasdaq-listed company in Denmark,every board obligation transfers to the trustee. Including, without exception, MAR Article 17(1).

Note carefully: in announcement 04-2024, Teis Gullitz-Wormslev himself classified a DKK 0.30 per share change in a winding-down company’s payout as Intern viden (Inside Information) and disclosed it immediately. He understood the standard. He applied it. He wrote the classification in with his own hands.

What He Controlled at Shape Robotics — and What He Did Not Disclose

Shape Robotics AS was declared bankrupt on January 6, 2026. On that day, Teis Gullitz-Wormslev became the sole de facto management of a live, operating Nasdaq Copenhagen-listed company with 4,800 shareholders. During the 59 days that followed, he possessed and acted upon the following information. None of it reached shareholders. None of it reached the market.

1. He wrote DKK 199 million in assets to zero. Book value as of December 31, 2024: DKK 199 million. Including DKK 138 million in subsidiaries across Romania, Finland, Moldova, and Poland. DKK 30 million in receivables. DKK 21 million in development projects — the Fable robots, the Thinken system, the SmartLab products being used in real schools. DKK 8 million in inventory. He valued the entire estate at DKK 3,722,886.77 — the loose cash in the bank accounts. He did this without engaging independent valuers, as required by Konkurslov § 110, stk. 2 — the provision that uses the word “skal” (shall). Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

2. He cancelled the Extraordinary General Meeting of January 22, 2026. That EGM was the mechanism through which shareholders would have voted on activating a committed financing facility from IRIS Capital — a real European growth fund with a real committed term sheet. He cancelled it without shareholder consent, without a market announcement, without any notification to the 4,800 people whose investment it directly affected. Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

3. He effectively destroyed Sanako Oy. Our Finnish subsidiary, acquired six months earlier for EUR 8.6 million, carried a contract pipeline worth up to EUR 40 million. Under his administration, the subsidiary’s operations were disrupted, its contractual position was undermined, and its commercial viability was eliminated — culminating in a bankruptcy filing in Turku. Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

4. He had four insolvency petitions filed against Shape Robotics Romania S.R.L. Our primary operating subsidiary. Romanian counsel was engaged at estate expense. Four separate proceedings launched. Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

5. He blocked all bank accounts and payment services across five countries. Seventy employees lost their jobs. Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

6. He knew from January 19, 2026 that the bankruptcy was under appeal. My lawyer Hans Holme filed the appeal at Østre Landsret thirteen days after the decree, paid from my personal account. The trustee knew. The non-final legal status of the entire bankruptcy — the fact that the legal foundation of his administration was being contested in Denmark’s highest civil court — is itself material inside information under MAR Article 7. Nothing disclosed to shareholders.

7. He filed MAR violation allegations against me. Within 20 days of taking control, he reported to Danish regulatory authorities under Konkurslov § 110, stk. 4, citing possible Market Abuse Regulation violations by Shape Robotics’ former management (me). He did this while writing in his own creditor letter that he had been “unable to obtain necessary information from the company’s director,” and that “the books were not updated as of the date of the bankruptcy.” He couldn’t read the books. He couldn’t get information. But he found time to file what amount to criminal referrals for MAR violations against the same management that had actually been publishing proper company announcements before he arrived. Nothing disclosed to shareholders. By him.

The Scoreboard

Let me put it in a table, so it cannot be misread.

SCANDINAVIAN BRAKE SYSTEMS AS vs SHAPE ROBOTICS AS

Exchange: Nasdaq Copenhagen | Nasdaq Copenhagen

Trustee/Liquidator: Teis Gullitz-Wormslev | Teis Gullitz-Wormslev

Period: Dec 2023–Dec 2024 | Jan 6–Mar 5, 2026

Announcement 01: Annual report, write-downs, guidance | —

Announcement 04: Changed expectations (DKK 0.30/share), classified Intern viden | —

Announcement 07: Final EGM outcome, dissolution, delisting | —

Total 2024: 7 announcements (numbered 01–07) | 0

MAR referrals filed against others: None | Filed against former management

His email on announcements: two@kromannreumert.com (confirmed) | Not present (zero published)

Shareholders informed: Yes — fully, promptly, with inside information classifications | No — for 59 consecutive days

The Industry Confirms It Too

In case anyone argues this is a systemic failure — that trustees simply don’t know they have MAR obligations — here are five other Danish listed companies in insolvency proceedings in the same period, where the appointed trustees did publish market disclosures:

- Odico AS (self-filed, December 2023) — trustee published selskabsmeddelelser

- Seluxit AS (self-filed, February 2024) — trustee published selskabsmeddelelser

- Audientes AS (creditor petition, November 2024) — trustee published selskabsmeddelelser in an involuntary bankruptcy, exactly like ours

- SPARK Technology AS (compulsory dissolution, 2023) — liquidator published selskabsmeddelelser

- LIDDS AB (Sweden, liquidation/bankruptcy, 2024) — trustee published selskabsmeddelelser

Source: Shape Robotics Company Announcement, March 13, 2026

And the parallel case: Aquaporin AS, declared bankrupt February 2, 2026 — during the same period he controlled Shape Robotics. Gullitz-Wormslev was also appointedtrustee there. But Aquaporin’s board had filed voluntarily and published full disclosures before he arrived. The shares were delisted the same day as the bankruptcy order. The board did the MAR work. There was nothing left for him to disclose.

When the board does it before he arrives, it gets done. When the sole responsibility is his — for a live listed company with thousands of shareholders — he goes silent.

The Internal Contradiction That Prosecutes Itself

Here is the sequence you cannot explain away.

January 6, 2026: Teis Gullitz-Wormslev becomes de facto management of a Nasdaq-listed company. MAR Article 17(1) obligations begin. Within 20 days he filesregulatory notifications under Konkurslov § 110, stk. 4 citing possible MAR violations by Shape Robotics’ former management. January 6 to March 5 — 59 days — he publishes zero market disclosures while possessing at least seven categories of material inside information.

He couldn’t read the books. He couldn’t get information. But he filed MAR allegations against me. Based on information he admitted he didn’t have. While committing the exact violations he was reporting.

For Scandinavian Brake Systems: he classified a DKK 0.30 per share change as inside information and published it immediately. For Shape Robotics: he wrote DKK 199 million to zero, killed a EUR 40 million pipeline, destroyed a EUR 8.6 million subsidiary, eliminated 70 jobs — and said nothing to 4,800 shareholders for nearly two months.

The DocuSign: The Question That Has No Answer

On November 28, 2025 — 39 days before any court appointed him — a DocuSign envelope was created by Kromann Reumert associate Albert Mungo Madsen. The document was the settlement agreement between Danske Bank, EIFO, and Shape Robotics. In the Carbon Copy Events section, Madsen designated a recipient. Title: Kurator. Name: Teis Gullitz-Wormslev. Six minutes later, Gullitz-Wormslev opened the envelope.

Kurator is a precise Danish legal term. It means court-appointed bankruptcy trustee. It has no other meaning. It does not appear in settlement agreements. It does not appear in restructuring advice. It exists in one context: when a court has declared a company bankrupt.

On November 28, 2025, there was no bankruptcy. There was no estate. There was no court order. There was only a settlement agreement that was supposed to prevent bankruptcy — in exchange for the DKK 3,725,000 Shape Robotics had just paid.

One question: if this appointment was not pre-planned, how did the trustee’s name and title appear in a document created 39 days before any court appointed him, by his own firm’s associate, in a matter involving his own firm’s banking client?

Kromann Reumert has not answered this. Danske Bank has not answered this. Gullitz-Wormslev has not answered this.

The formal complaints are pending:

- Advokatnævnet (Gullitz-Wormslev and Madsen, filed March 13, 2026) — Retsplejeloven § 126

- Danish police criminal complaint (filed March 15, 2026) — Retsplejeloven § 535

- Sø- og Handelsretten, Case 147665

- Finanstilsynet, J.nr. 25-026876

- Criminal complaint against Nasdaq Copenhagen (filed March 20, 2026) for refusing to comply with the High Court annulment order

The Pump That Started Everything

Before any of this, there was Lars Topholm, then at Carnegie Investment Bank. March 2024. He published a “back of the envelope” analysis projecting three-to-four-times upside on Shape Robotics shares. He did not disclose that he personally owned 3,500 shares in the company. Shape Robotics raised DKK 35 million at DKK 35 per share on the back of his recommendation. Ordinary retail investors bought in at the top. The stock subsequently fell 79 percent. Total shareholder value destroyed: approximately DKK 205 million.

On November 27, 2025 — the day before the DocuSign envelope was created — Shape Robotics filed a formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen about suspected market manipulation and Topholm’s undisclosed shareholding (Company Announcement No. 27-25). The next day: the DocuSign. The trustee’s name. The settlement. The rest of the story.

I am not drawing the connection for you. I am presenting the sequence in the order it occurred. You can draw your own conclusions.

The Three Judges

On March 5, 2026, three judges at Østre Landsret issued Case K 3337/25-F. Unanimous. Simplified digital service could not, as done, be carried out for then-board member Helle Rootzén at her private digital address. The bankruptcy petition was therefore not lawfully served on Shape Robotics AS. The bankruptcy was annulled. The case was remitted for retrial.

I paid for that appeal out of my own pocket. Not company money — frozen. Not investor money — shares suspended. My money. My lawyer, Hans Holme, filed on January 19, 2026. Six creditors — people the company owed money to — co-signed the appeal. Creditors backed the CEO over the trustee. Think about what that tells you.

Østre Landsret, Case K 3337/25-F (Mar 5, 2026): Unanimous annulment, unlawful service

What This Means for Every Investor in Denmark

Here is the practical danger if you hold shares in a Danish listed SME or growth company. Under current Danish law, a creditor can file a bankruptcy petition. If the petition is served to the wrong address — a former board member’s personal digital account, for instance — your company can be declared bankrupt without its management ever learning about the hearing. The creditor’s own lawyer can be appointed trustee at the same hearing. Denmark has no explicit prohibition.

That trustee has complete control of your listed company. EU MAR applies to him. But apparently no one at Finanstilsynet monitors in real time whether the trustee is actually complying. The trustee can write your company’s assets to zero. He can cancel the AGM. He can destroy subsidiaries. He can block bank accounts. He can eliminate jobs. He can file regulatory allegations against the company’s own management. And he can do all of this without telling the shareholders a single word.

And when the High Court unanimously annuls the bankruptcy and orders everything restored — he can refuse to return the company’s operating funds. All of this happened. Not as a hypothetical. To us. To Shape Robotics. To 4,800 shareholders. On Nasdaq Copenhagen. In 2026. In a country that is supposed to be one of the most transparent and well-regulated markets in Europe.

The Danish Bankruptcy Council acknowledged in a May 2025 reform proposal — still pending while all of this was happening — that the current framework creates structural conflicts for trustees acting where they also represent major creditors. The proposal is still sitting on someone’s desk.

The Scientific Proof

I will state this in the simplest possible terms, backed by primary sources.

Fact 1: EU MAR Article 17(1) requires issuers and those acting as their management to disclose inside information as soon as possible. Source: EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014

Fact 2: When Teis Gullitz-Wormslev was liquidator of Scandinavian Brake Systems AS (Nasdaq Copenhagen: SBS), he published at least three formal market announcements bearing his personal signature and email (two@kromannreumert.com), including one which he himself classified as inside information over a DKK 0.30/share payout change. The last announcement was numbered 07-2024, confirming seven announcements were published in 2024 during his tenure. Source: Nasdaq Copenhagen public database, GlobeNewswire (directly retrieved)

Fact 3: When Teis Gullitz-Wormslev was trustee of Shape Robotics AS (Nasdaq Copenhagen: SHAPE), he published zero market announcements over 59 days, despite possessing at minimum seven categories of material inside information and having sole management control of the listed issuer. Source: Shape Robotics Company Announcement, March 13, 2026; Nasdaq Copenhagen announcement database

Fact 4: Five other trustees of Nasdaq-listed Danish companies in the same period published MAR-compliant disclosures in analogous situations. Source: Shape Robotics Company Announcement, March 13, 2026

Fact 5: Gullitz-Wormslev filed MAR violation allegations against Shape Robotics’ former management while himself issuing zero disclosures. Source: his own creditor information letter and Shape Robotics Company Announcement, March 13, 2026

Logical conclusion: The non-disclosure at Shape Robotics was not caused by ignorance of the obligation (Fact 2 disproves this). It was not caused by an industry-wide gap (Fact 4 disproves this). It was a deliberate, selective choice to apply the law differently to Shape Robotics than to every other company in his portfolio.

The question the regulators must now answer is: why was Shape Robotics different? The documents suggest one answer: Shape Robotics was the company where Gullitz-Wormslev’s long-standing client was the primary secured creditor, and where every piece of information being suppressed — the zero valuation, the destroyed subsidiaries, the killed financing, the High Court appeal — supported the narrative that the company was worthless and Danske Bank should be paid from the estate.

The Call to Action

To Finanstilsynet (J.nr. 25-026876): You have an open file. The Scandinavian Brake Systems announcements are in Nasdaq’s own database, directly retrievable, personally signed by the same man who issued zero disclosures for Shape Robotics. This is not a legal grey area. This is documented selective compliance with EU law. Investigate it.

To the Advokatnævnet: The SBS record is now public. The comparison between a DKK 0.30/share disclosure classified as inside information and DKK 199 million written to zero in silence is now on the record. It belongs in your file.

To the EU Commission and European financial journalists: MAR Article 17(1) is EU law. A court-appointed trustee administered a Nasdaq-listed company for 59 days, issued zero disclosures, and simultaneously filed MAR allegations against the company’s management. That happened in 2026. In the EU. That is a European story.

To the 4,800 shareholders of Shape Robotics: I have not stopped. The SBS documents were retrieved this week. They confirm what we have always known — he understood the obligation because he performed it elsewhere. What happened to your investment was a choice.

To Teis Gullitz-Wormslev: The three announcements are there. Announcement 01-2024. Announcement 04-2024. Announcement 07-2024. All publicly accessible from Nasdaq Copenhagen’s database. All bearing your name. All bearing two@kromannreumert.com. You classified a DKK 0.30 per share change as inside information and disclosed it immediately. You wrote DKK 199 million to zero and said nothing for 59 days. Both facts are now in the public record. The regulators have them. The journalists have them. The shareholders have them. You knew the rules. You had performed them yourself.

Mark Abraham is the CEO of Shape Robotics AS (Nasdaq Copenhagen: SHAPE).

All claims in this article are based on primary sources. Allegations reflect the content of formal complaints pending before the Advokatnævnet, Danish police, Finanstilsynet, and Sø- og Handelsretten. No findings of misconduct have been issued by any authority as of publication. This article represents the author’s perspective.

Primary Sources — All Publicly Verifiable

SBS Selskabsmeddelelse 01-2024 (Apr 3, 2024): Annual report, DKK 17.5M write-down, DKK 12.8/share guidance. Signed Teis Gullitz-Wormslev, two@kromannreumert.com

SBS Selskabsmeddelelse 04-2024 (Jul 9, 2024): Changed payout expectations DKK 12.8→12.3–12.5/share. Classified Intern viden. Signed Teis Gullitz-Wormslev

SBS Selskabsmeddelelse 07-2024 (Dec 10, 2024): Final EGM outcome, dissolution, delisting. Signed Teis Gullitz-Wormslev

Shape Robotics Company Announcement (Mar 13, 2026): MAR violations statement, five parallel trustee cases

Shape Robotics Company Announcement (Mar 16, 2026): DocuSign evidence, pre-planned trusteeship

Finanstilsynet complaint J.nr. 25-026876: Filed Mar 13, 2026

Advokatnævnet complaint (Gullitz-Wormslev and Madsen): Filed Mar 13, 2026 — Retsplejeloven § 126

Criminal complaint (Gullitz-Wormslev, Kromann Reumert, Danske Bank): Filed Mar 15, 2026 — Retsplejeloven § 535

Criminal complaint (Nasdaq Copenhagen): Filed Mar 20, 2026

Sø- og Handelsretten petition, Case 147665: Filed 2026

Shape Robotics Company Announcement No. 27-25 (Nov 27, 2025): Market manipulation complaint re Carnegie/Topholm

EU MAR Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, Articles 7 and 17(1): Legal basis for disclosure obligations (EUR-Lex)

Konkurslov § 110 stk. 2: Mandatory independent valuation (Retsinformation.dk)

P.S. The Straw Man That Prosecutes Itself

This postscript addresses a specific counter-argument that appeared in the comments following publication. It is reproduced here in full so the reader can assess it.

The Comment

A likvidation and a konkurs are legally distinct proceedings. A voluntary liquidation is controlled by shareholders, orderly, and MAR obligations flow naturally from ongoing management. An involuntary bankruptcy under Konkurslov is different — the trustee follows different rules, the company may cease operations immediately, and the Bankruptcy Act can override other obligations including MAR.

Four sentences. Zero cited law. One missing word — which provision of Konkurslov overrides MAR Article 17(1)? Name it. Quote it. The argument lives or dies on that provision. It has not been cited because it does not exist.

Argument One: EU Law Is Supreme. This Is Not Debatable.

MAR is Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 — directly applicable in every EU member state, including Denmark. Under the doctrine of EU supremacy established in Costa v ENEL (1964) and confirmed in every significant constitutional case since, an EU Regulation takes precedence over national legislation. Every national law. Including Konkurslov.

The claim that Konkurslov overrides MAR does not describe Danish law. It inverts the constitutional order of the European Union. No provision of Konkurslov suspends Article 17(1) of MAR. None has been cited. None exists. Finanstilsynet received our formal complaint (J.nr. 25-026876) on March 13, 2026. If the “Konkurslov overrides MAR” argument had any validity, Finanstilsynet would have closed the file within days. They have not closed it. They are investigating.

Argument Two: MAR Asks Who Controls the Company. Not What Title They Use.

Article 17(1) places the obligation on the issuer — Shape Robotics A/S, a company whose shares were admitted to trading on Nasdaq Copenhagen’s regulated main market. When the bankruptcy decree issued on January 6, 2026, Gullitz-Wormslev became the sole person exercising management authority over that issuer. MAR contains no exception for trustees. It contains no exception for creditor-petition bankruptcies. It contains no exception for involuntary proceedings. It contains the word “shall.”

From the perspective of 4,800 shareholders holding a live security on a live exchange — people who could not sell, could not hedge, could not take any protective action based on information they did not have — whether the man controlling the company signed his letters “likvidator” or “kurator” is entirely irrelevant. They were exposed to undisclosed inside information for 59 days. That exposure is precisely what MAR Article 17(1) exists to prevent.

Argument Three: The Comprehensive Study of Danish Listed Companies in Insolvency Proceedings

Below is a documented, primary-source study of every publicly available case of a Danish listed company entering bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings in recent years, and what the appointed trustee or liquidator did or did not do in relation to Nasdaq market disclosures.

Case 1: Odico A/S (Nasdaq First North Denmark) — Decree: Skifteretten i Odense, March 18, 2024. Proceeding type: Konkurs (involuntary). Trustees published Selskabsmeddelelse nr. 94-2024 immediately on decree day. Full market announcement. Classified as material information.

Case 2: Seluxit A/S (Nasdaq First North Denmark) — Decree: Skifteretten i Aalborg, June 27, 2024. Proceeding type: Konkurs (involuntary). Trustee published Selskabsmeddelelse nr. 71-2024 immediately. Classified as containing intern viden (inside information).

Case 3: Audientes A/S (Nasdaq First North Denmark) — Decree: November 2024. Proceeding type: Konkurs (creditor petition / involuntary — same legal structure as Shape Robotics). Trustee published market disclosures. Managed asset bidding process. Communicated with Nasdaq and shareholders.

Case 4: SPARK Technology A/S (Nasdaq) — Proceeding type: Compulsory dissolution/bankruptcy. Trustee published selskabsmeddelelser.

Case 5: Scandinavian Brake Systems A/S (Nasdaq Copenhagen) — Proceeding type: Likvidation (voluntary). Liquidator: Teis Gullitz-Wormslev. 7 announcements over 12 months, including one classified Intern viden for DKK 0.30/share change. Full compliance throughout. Last announcement December 10, 2024.

The pattern is unmistakable. Four trustees. Four different firms. Three involuntary creditor-petition bankruptcies and one voluntary liquidation. All on Nasdaq Copenhagen or Nasdaq First North Denmark. All published market disclosures. All understood the MAR obligation. All complied. Teis Gullitz-Wormslev, at Shape Robotics: zero disclosures for 59 days.

Argument Four: The Statstidende Publication That Reveals the Strategy

On January 6, 2026 — the same day as the bankruptcy decree — something was published in Statstidende that deserves attention. According to reporting by Finans.dk based on the Statstidende record, the bankruptcy petition against Shape Robotics was served publicly via Statstidende on the grounds that Shape Robotics had its address at an “uninhabited office hotel” in Copenhagen, and that “the director’s address is unknown.”

Mark Abraham is a publicly registered CEO of a Nasdaq-listed company. His identity, company affiliation, and contact details are publicly available in the CVR business registry, on Nasdaq Copenhagen’s own website, in every company announcement filed over the prior two years, and in the news. The claim that his address was “unknown” is documented in the Statstidende publication that justified the unlawful service method — the same unlawful service that three High Court judges unanimously found to be the basis for annulling the entire bankruptcy.

Argument Five: The Appeal Was Inside Information From Day Thirteen

On January 19, 2026 — thirteen days after the bankruptcy decree — my lawyer Hans Holme filed an appeal at Østre Landsret. The case was assigned Case No. K 3337/25-F. Teis Gullitz-Wormslev, as sole de facto management of Shape Robotics, knew about this appeal.

A pending High Court challenge to a bankruptcy decree is precisely the kind of information that, under the most elementary application of MAR Article 7, would be likely to have a significant effect on prices. If the appeal succeeded, Shape Robotics was never bankrupt. The shares would resume trading. All actions taken by the trustee would be undone. The MAR obligation was clear. The disclosure obligation had been triggered. He published nothing.

Argument Six: He Told Us What He Knew

In SBS Announcement 04-2024, Teis Gullitz-Wormslev did not write “We are disclosing this because we are in a likvidation and therefore the MAR rules are different.” He classified it as inside information, published it immediately — because he understood the obligation. That understanding existed on January 6, 2026, when he walked into Shape Robotics.

The Verdict

The distinction between a likvidator and a kurator is real. No one disputes this. What is not real: a Konkurslov provision that suspends MAR. It was never enacted. What is not real: an industry practice of trustees staying silent. Three involuntary bankruptcies above prove otherwise. What is not real: ignorance of the obligation. He performed it himself, on the same exchange, thirteen months earlier.

What is real: a pending High Court appeal that three judges later upheld unanimously — undisclosed for 59 days while he simultaneously filed MAR allegations against me. The counter-argument offered was not law. It was a description of proceedings dressed up as a legal exemption. The exemption does not exist. The cases disprove the practice. The man’s own record disproves the ignorance. There is nothing left of the argument. There was not much to begin with.

M.A.

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#ShapeRobotics #SHAPE #NasdaqCopenhagen #MAR #MarketAbuseRegulation #DanskeBank #KromannReumert #ScandinavianBrakeSystems #Finanstilsynet #Advokatnævnet #InvestorProtection #Denmark

Shape Robotics Bankruptcy Annulled: Carnegie, Lars Topholm

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 07 Mar 2026 13:04:33 GMT

There’s a detail about Danish bankruptcy law that almost nobody knows, and it changes everything.

When a company gets hit with a bankruptcy petition in Denmark, the court has to serve it -- physically deliver it, in legal terms -- to the company itself. Not to a person who used to work there. Not to someone’s Gmail. To the company. The law is specific about this. It was written in 2012, debated in Parliament, and the legislative notes spell it out in language even a first-year law student couldn’t misread: service must go to the legal entity’s own digital address. A board member’s private inbox doesn’t count. Their work email doesn’t count. Nothing counts except the company’s address.

This is the kind of detail that exists in thousands of procedural codes across hundreds of countries and never matters to anyone -- until the day it’s the only thing that matters.

March 5, 2026, was that day.

The Email That Killed a Company

On November 25, 2025, a Swedish trade finance company called Treyd AB filed a bankruptcy petition against Shape Robotics A/S in the Maritime and Commercial Court in Copenhagen. The petition sat with the court for fifteen days. Then, on December 10, a clerk sent it out for serviceice.

The clerk chose Helle Rootzen.

Rootzen had been a board member. She was, at that moment, the only person connected to the company who had a Danish CPR number -- a civil registration number that plugs into Denmark’s digital ID system. So the clerk picked her. It was the path of least resistance. A few clicks, a digital notification, done.

Rootzen acknowledged receipt the same day. December 10, 2025.

There was just one problem. Actually, there were two.

First: the notification went to Rootzen’s private digital address. Not the company’s. The law says you can’t do that. Parliament said you can’t do that. The preparatory notes to Section 157a say, in so many words, that you cannot serve process on a board member’s personal account. The whole point of the rule is that companies -- especially listed companies with thousands of shareholders -- receive their legal mail at an address the company controls, not an address controlled by whoever happens to sit on the board this week.

Second: Helle Rootzen had already resigned.

The Disappearing Board

To understand what happened next, you need to understand what happened the week before.

On December 2, 2025 -- exactly seven days after the bankruptcy petition was filed -- Helle Rootzen and Andre Reinhard Fehrn both resigned from the Board of Directors. Same day. Same press release. Fehrn was the Chairman. Rootzen was the last Danish-connected member. They cited personal reasons and timing considerations.

Seven days. A bankruptcy petition lands on the company, and seven days later, the two people who are supposed to be steering the ship jump overboard. Together. On a Monday.

Here is what makes it worse. Rootzen resigned on December 2. But her resignation wasn’t registered on Virk.dk -- Denmark’s official company registry -- until December 19. The gap matters, because on December 10, when the court clerk went looking for someone to serve, Rootzen still showed up in the registry as a board member. The clerk had no way of knowing she had already left.

So the bankruptcy petition was served to a woman who was no longer on the board, at a private email address the law says can’t be used, for a company she no longer represented.

She accepted it anyway. She never forwarded it to anyone.

The actual management of Shape Robotics -- the people running the company -- never saw it.

Twenty-seven days later, on January 6, 2026, the Maritime and Commercial Court held the hearing. Nobody from Shape Robotics showed up, because nobody from Shape Robotics knew about it. The court issued the bankruptcy decree.

And just like that, a Nasdaq-listed company with operations in five countries was dead.

Fifty-Nine Days in Someone Else’s Hands

The moment a bankruptcy decree is issued in Denmark, something absolute happens: the CEO loses all authority. The board loses all authority. A court-appointed trustee walks in, and the company belongs to him. Every bank account, every contract, every employee, every subsidiary, every piece of intellectual property -- it’s all his to manage, his to sell, his to write off.

For Shape Robotics, that trustee was Teis Gullitz-Wormslev of Kromann Reumert, one of the largest and most expensive law firms in Scandinavia.

The company had assets with a book value of DKK 199 million as of December 31, 2024. That included DKK 138 million in subsidiaries across Romania, Finland, Moldova, and Poland. It included DKK 30 million in receivables. DKK 21 million in development projects -- the Fable robots, Thinken, SmartLab, products that real students in real schools were using. DKK 8 million in inventory.

The trustee valued all of it at zero. Not significantly impaired. Not written down to reflect market conditions. Zero. Every line item. Every subsidiary. Every product. Every receivable. Every piece of inventory.

The total value of the estate, according to the trustee: DKK 3,722,886.77. The loose change in the bank accounts.

Danish bankruptcy law, Section 110, paragraph 2, says the trustee must engage independent experts to register and value the estate’s assets. It’s not optional. It’s not best practice. The statute uses the word “skal” -- shall. There is no record of any independent valuer being retained. The trustee did the valuation himself and arrived at the round number of zero.

Meanwhile, he found time -- within twenty days -- to file notifications with regulatory authorities about possible Market Abuse Regulation violations by the company’s former management. He did this while simultaneously writing, in his own creditor letter, that he had been unable to obtain the necessary information from the company’s director, and that the bookkeeping was not updated as of the date of the bankruptcy.

Think about that sequence. He couldn’t get information. He couldn’t read the books. But he could file what amount to criminal referrals with financial regulators. Based on what, exactly?

In Finland, Sanako Oy -- acquired six months earlier for EUR 8.6 million, a real company with real employees and real customers -- was reported to have significant liquidity challenges. No documented attempt was made to keep it running, find a buyer, or protect its customer relationships.

In Romania, four insolvency petitions were filed against Shape Robotics Romania, the group’s primary operating company. A Romanian lawyer was engaged. That’s all we know.

The subsidiaries in Moldova and Poland? The trustee’s letters don’t mention any contact at all.

No creditors’ committee was established. A creditor asked for one. A meeting was held. The trustee continued running the estate alone.

Total claims filed against the estate: DKK 339,459,291.97. Nearly three hundred and forty million kroner in claims. Against an estate valued at 3.7 million.

The Part Nobody Expected

On January 6, 2026, I had a choice.

It was the kind of choice that reveals everything about a person, and I want you to understand both options clearly.

I could walk away. The decree was issued. The company was in the hands of a trustee from Kromann Reumert. I’m a Romanian-born CEO of a small Danish EdTech company. I had no legal obligation to challenge anything. The board had already left. The previous lawyer had already withdrawn. The shares were suspended. The bank accounts were frozen. Every rational calculation said: accept it, move on, start over.

That’s what people expected. That’s certainly what the people who think I’m a fraud would have predicted.

Or I could fight it. With my own money. Against one of the most powerful law firms in the country. In a legal system where I’m a foreigner. In a language that isn’t my first. On behalf of shareholders who might never thank me and creditors who might never know.

I chose to fight.

Thirteen days after the decree, on January 19, my lawyer Hans Holme filed the appeal with the Eastern High Court. Not the company’s lawyer -- mine. Paid for from my personal bank account. Not from company funds, because those were frozen. Not from investor money, because the shares were suspended. From my pocket.

Six creditors -- people the company owed money to -- looked at the appeal and decided to sign on in support. They were owed money by Shape Robotics, and they backed the CEO’s fight to get the company back. That tells you something about what they thought was really happening.

On January 14, I posted on LinkedIn: “We are prepared to win.” People thought I was delusional.

Three Judges, One Sentence

On March 5, 2026, the Eastern High Court issued its decision. Three judges. Unanimous.

The ruling walks through the service requirements methodically. It quotes the law. It quotes the legislative history. It examines what actually happened. And then it delivers a single, devastating conclusion:

“Der ikke som sket kunne foretages forenklet digital forkyndelse for daværende bestyrelsesmedlem Helle Rootzén på dennes private digitale adresse. Konkursbegæringen er derfor ikke lovligt forkyndt for Shape Robotics A/S.”

In English: “Simplified digital service could not, as done, be carried out for then-board member Helle Rootzén at her private digital address. The bankruptcy petition was therefore not lawfully served on Shape Robotics A/S.”

The decree is annulled. The case goes back to the lower court.

Fifty-nine days. DKK 199 million in assets written to zero. Five subsidiaries across five countries left to deteriorate. Regulatory referrals filed. A Nasdaq listing frozen. And all of it built on an email sent to the wrong inbox.

The Fraud Question

There is a simple test for fraud: follow the money. In every fraud case, the money flows out. Here, it flowed in -- from my personal bank account, to a lawyer, to fight a bankruptcy I could have walked away from. If that sounds like fraud, someone needs to explain the following:

Why did I spend my own savings hiring a lawyer to fight the bankruptcy? Fraudsters take the money and disappear. They don’t write checks to law firms.

Why did I file a formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen in November 2025 about the pump-and-dump that destroyed DKK 205 million in shareholder value? Fraudsters don’t invite regulatory scrutiny onto transactions they were involved in.

Why did six creditors -- people owed money by the company -- back my appeal? Creditors don’t support CEOs who are stealing from them.

Why did I stay? Every single board member left. The Chairman. The Danish board member. The previous counsel. Everyone. The easiest, cheapest, safest thing I could have done was walk away. I didn’t.

At every decision point -- when the cost was real and the outcome was uncertain -- I chose the option that only makes sense if you believe the company is worth saving and the bankruptcy was wrong.

Fraudsters optimize for one thing: getting out with money. I optimized for the opposite. I spent money to get back in.

Q.E.D.

The Full Arc

Here is the sequence. Every date is documented. Every claim is verifiable.

March 2024. Carnegie analyst Lars Topholm publishes an aggressive buy report on Shape Robotics, projecting three-to-four-times upside. He doesn’t disclose that he personally holds 3,500 shares. Shape Robotics raises DKK 35 million in a placement at DKK 35 per share. The stock subsequently falls seventy-nine percent.

June 2024. EIFO, Denmark’s export credit agency, pulls its loan guarantees. Not because of company performance. Because of a bureaucratic interpretation that Nasdaq-listed companies shouldn’t receive their support.

November 2025. Danske Bank and EIFO demand repayment. Shape Robotics negotiates a schedule and pays the first instalment -- DKK 3.725 million. The company is trying to survive.

November 25. Treyd AB files a bankruptcy petition.

November 27. I file a formal complaint with Nasdaq about suspected market manipulation.

December 2. Rootzen and Fehrn resign from the board. Together. Seven days after the petition.

December 10. The petition is served to Rootzen’s private email. Unlawfully.

January 6, 2026. Bankruptcy decree issued. I lose all authority.

January 19. I file the appeal. My money.

January 26. The trustee writes DKK 199 million to zero.

March 5. Three High Court judges annul the decree. Unanimously.

A pump-and-dump wrecks the stock. The state pulls its credit support. The bank demands repayment. A creditor files for bankruptcy. The board walks out. The court sends papers to the wrong address. A trustee erases everything.

And one person keeps fighting.

What Comes Next

The bankruptcy decree is annulled. I’m back as CEO. The case returns to the Maritime and Commercial Court.

I’ve already sent the trustee a formal handover demand -- eleven sections, seventy-two-hour deadline. Every action taken. Every meeting held. Every fee charged. Every asset written off. Every notification filed. Every communication with my subsidiaries. Every email to regulators. Everything.

We’re engaging Nasdaq on immediate resumption of trading. The suspension was based on the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy no longer exists.

And we’re preparing damages claims. Against the trustee. Against Kromann Reumert. Against the petitioner. Against anyone who contributed to or profited from fifty-nine days of unlawful corporate destruction.

To the Shareholders

You held your shares through a suspension that never should have happened. Some of you signed the appeal in support. Some of you sent messages I’ll never forget.

I want you to know something simple: I fought for you. Not with your money. With mine.

The High Court has spoken. The decree is gone. We’re coming back.

This isn’t the end of the story. This is where accountability begins.

Mark Abraham

CEO, Shape Robotics A/S

March 7, 2026

Disclosure: I am the CEO referenced in this article. This account reflects my perspective and is based on court filings, public records, and personal experience.

This is part of The Price of Speaking Up, a series on Wild CEO -- The Journey documenting what happens when a CEO refuses to stay silent about corporate misconduct in Scandinavia.

Previously in this series:

How Danish Incompetence Destroyed a Romanian Educational Technology Success Story told the story of a Nasdaq-listed EdTech company fighting for survival.

The Pump-and-Dump That Destroyed DKK 205 Million exposed how Carnegie analyst Lars Topholm’s undisclosed share ownership fuelled a capital raise that wiped out shareholders.

This article is the proof.

Coming next: The Trustee’s Report Card -- a line-by-line examination of what happened to DKK 199 million during fifty-nine days of unlawful administration.

Subscribe to Wild CEO -- The Journey to follow this story as it unfolds. Share it with anyone who cares about corporate accountability, shareholder rights, and the rule of law.

ȚEAPA DANEZĂ

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 28 Feb 2026 20:03:36 GMT

“Someone must have slandered Josef K., for one morning, without having done anything truly wrong, he was arrested.”

— Franz Kafka, The Trial

Go to www.ar-studio.net.

The page says: Site is Under Construction. A phone number. An email. A logo. Nothing else.

AR-Studio was a concept developed by StoryKids S.R.L., a Romanian education company. It was the prototype for what later became the SmartLab — a turnkey classroom solution combining robotics hardware, curriculum software and teacher training. The concept proved that Danish-designed Fable robots could be integrated into Romania’s national education framework. When Shape Robotics A/S acquired StoryKids in August 2021, it acquired AR-Studio with it. The concept became the SmartLab. The SmartLab became the product. The product became 63% of Romania’s STEAM education market.

That market generated 170 million RON in revenue and 26.2 million RON in profit in 2024 through Shape Robotics Romania S.R.L., the subsidiary that executed what AR-Studio had designed.

On January 6, 2026, a Danish court declared Shape Robotics A/S bankrupt. A trustee from Kromann Reumert was appointed. He assessed the estate and informed the court: there are no assets.

This article examines how that conclusion was reached, what it means for creditors, and why Denmark’s opt-out from EU judicial cooperation created the structural conditions for it.

The Word

In Romanian, “teapa” is a stake. The historical reference is to Vlad Tepes, the 15th-century ruler known in the West as Dracula, who used impalement as a form of public punishment for corruption and theft. The word survived in modern Romanian as slang. “Mi-a tras o teapa” means: someone followed the rules on paper while extracting all the value from the other side. It describes a mechanism, not an emotion — a transaction where the letter of the agreement is honoured and the spirit is gutted.

The term applies here because the facts support it.

The Corporate Structure

Shape Robotics A/S was registered in Herlev, Denmark. CVR number, Nasdaq Copenhagen listing, Danish board. On paper, a Danish company.

In practice, approximately 95% of the group’s revenue originated in Romania. The operating subsidiary, Shape Robotics Romania S.R.L., ran the contracts, employed the staff, maintained the SmartLabs and held the relationships with county school inspectors, PNRR administrators and the Romanian Ministry of Education.

The parent company’s principal function was to hold the listing, manage investor relations and consolidate the financials.

The Numbers

Shape Robotics Romania S.R.L.:

2020: Revenue 1.7 million RON. Profit 144,972 RON.

2024: Revenue 170 million RON. Profit 26,220,062 RON.

Group level (Shape Robotics A/S consolidated):

2022: Revenue 39 million DKK.

2023: Revenue 171 million DKK.

2024: Revenue 302 million DKK.

The growth was driven by SmartLab deployments in Romanian schools, funded primarily through the EU Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR). The hardware was manufactured by Moby Industries. The curriculum integration, teacher training and market development were executed by the Romanian team.

The Acquisition

StoryKids became Shape Robotics’ exclusive distributor in Romania in 2019. In August 2021, Shape Robotics A/S acquired StoryKids. The deal included base consideration, deferred consideration contingent on performance, and consultancy and commission agreements linked to generated revenue. These terms were disclosed in the Nasdaq listing prospectus, Shape’s annual reports and investor presentations.

The Listing

Shape Robotics A/S listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen in December 2021. The investment thesis centred on the Romanian market: Romanian revenue, Romanian contracts, Romanian growth trajectory. EIFO, the Danish state investment fund, invested. Danish retail investors purchased shares. At every stage, the value proposition presented to the market was the value being created in Romania.

The Collapse

In late 2025, Finans.dk published a series of articles questioning Shape’s accounting practices. The share price fell sharply. Trading was suspended. On January 6, 2026, a Danish court declared Shape Robotics A/S bankrupt and appointed a trustee from Kromann Reumert.

The Trustee’s Assessment

The trustee’s mandate is to identify assets, assess claims and distribute value to creditors. Here is what the estate contains:

In Denmark: a CVR number, a former office lease in Herlev, no revenue-generating operations, no staff, no contracts, no receivables, no inventory.

In Romania: a 100%-owned subsidiary with 170 million RON in revenue, 26 million RON in profit, active government contracts, EU-backed projects, installed SmartLabs in schools across the country, a trained workforce and a brand holding 63% of the Romanian STEAM education market.

The trustee’s conclusion: no assets to distribute.

On that basis, the Danish court declined to appoint a creditor committee. Without assets, there is no distribution. Without distribution, creditors have no voting rights and no formal voice in the proceedings.

The question this raises is straightforward: how can a company that owns 100% of a subsidiary generating 170 million RON in revenue have no assets?

The Jurisdictional Wall

The answer lies in jurisdiction. Denmark opted out of the EU’s judicial cooperation framework by political choice, reaffirmed by referendum and maintained by successive governments.

The Recast Insolvency Regulation (2015/848), which enables EU member states to recognise each other’s insolvency proceedings, does not apply to Denmark. Denmark has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The only cross-border insolvency instrument Denmark participates in is the Nordic Bankruptcy Convention, covering Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland. Not Romania.

This creates a structural asymmetry. Romania is fully inside the EU insolvency framework. Denmark is not. A Danish trustee sitting in Copenhagen has no automatic authority over Romanian assets, and Romanian creditors have no automatic standing in Danish proceedings.

The practical effect: the trustee can declare the Romanian subsidiary is not an asset of the Danish estate, and there is no cross-border mechanism that automatically compels a different assessment.

What Was Not Done

No independent investigation into the Romanian operations was conducted. No forensic audit of the subsidiary was commissioned. No attempt was made to value the installed base of SmartLabs, the active government contracts, the brand equity, the trained workforce or the 63% market share. No creditor committee was appointed to oversee the process.

The consultancy fees, deferred consideration from the acquisition and commission agreements — all contractually tied to revenue generated by the Romanian operations — remain unpaid. The trustee’s position is that these obligations belong to an estate with no assets.

The Structural Pattern

The Shape Robotics case illustrates a replicable pattern. A Western holding company acquires an Eastern European operating company. The Western entity lists on a Western exchange using the Eastern revenue as its investment thesis. Western capital is raised. When the structure fails, the Western insolvency regime applies, and the Eastern partners and creditors find themselves outside a jurisdictional boundary they cannot cross.

Value flows West. Losses remain East. The jurisdictional wall ensures the asymmetry.

This is not a conspiracy. It is the predictable outcome of corporate structure meeting jurisdictional arbitrage within the EU’s incomplete insolvency harmonisation — specifically, Denmark’s opt-out.

Actions Taken

Claims have been filed in the Danish bankruptcy proceeding. Romanian legal counsel has been engaged. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice has been notified regarding the impact of Denmark’s opt-out on cross-border creditor rights. EIFO has been asked to explain why it invested in a company whose entire value proposition rested on a subsidiary that the insolvency estate now considers worthless.

The full timeline has been shared with Finans.dk, Børsen and journalists covering this case.

Open Questions

For creditors: your claims are being administered by a system that does not recognise the value that generated them.

For Danish investors: how was a company with no meaningful Danish operations listed and promoted as a Danish growth story?

For Romanian officials: why are Danish insolvency proceedings determining the fate of Romanian assets built with Romanian public money and EU funds?

For journalists: how can a 100%-owned subsidiary generating 170 million RON in revenue be declared worth zero?

— Mark Abraham, Bucharest, February 2026

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The Man Who Was Not Supposed to Matter

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Fri, 13 Feb 2026 15:15:27 GMT

“When you see that trading is done, not by consent, but by compulsion -- when you see that in order to produce, you need to obtain permission from men who produce nothing -- when you see that money is flowing to those who deal, not in goods, but in favors -- you may know that your society is doomed.”
-- Atlas Shrugged

On the morning of December 5, 2025, Denmark’s financial newspaper Finans published its first article about me.

Not about my company’s record-breaking revenue. Not about our robots teaching coding to children in schools across Europe. Not about the fact that Shape Robotics had just been advanced from the junior exchange First North to the main Nasdaq Copenhagen market because growth was so strong that regulators deemed us ready for the big leagues.

The article was about me. Personally. A Romanian. With a past they had spent weeks excavating through Romanian court databases.

This is the story of what happened next -- and more importantly, what happened before. If you read nothing else this weekend, read this. Because this is not a story about one small company. This is a story about what happens in a system so small, so interconnected, and so certain of its own virtue that it cannot tolerate someone from outside its walls pointing at what is visible to anyone willing to look.

The Fishbowl

To understand anything about this story, you must first understand the stage on which it was performed.

Nasdaq Copenhagen -- the entire Danish stock exchange -- lists roughly 142 companies. The total market capitalization of every single company in Denmark, added together, is approximately EUR 523 billion. Apple, one single American company, is worth more than all of them combined. The entire Danish stock market is, in the language of global finance, a rounding error.

Now zoom in further. First North Denmark, the junior exchange where Shape Robotics was born, is so small that on any given day, many stocks trade in volumes measured not in millions, not in thousands, but in dozens of transactions. Some days, certain stocks don’t trade at all.

This matters enormously. In a market this small, editorial coverage by a major financial outlet is not a commodity -- it is a scarce and powerful resource. There are only so many journalists, only so many column inches, only so many hours in the news cycle. Every article written about a micro-cap company like Shape Robotics is an article not written about Novo Nordisk’s sixty billion euro market cap swing, or Danske Bank’s two hundred billion euro money-laundering scandal, or the dozens of other stories competing for attention in Denmark’s tiny financial ecosystem.

Editors choose what to cover. And choices, as anyone who has ever sat in a boardroom knows, reveal priorities.

So when a fishbowl this small suddenly generates a tidal wave of coverage about one tiny fish -- six articles in ten weeks, after five and a half years of absolute silence -- the interesting question is not “what is wrong with the fish?”

The interesting question is: who disturbed the water?

The Timeline That Nobody Wanted to Print

On December 12, 2022, Lars Topholm -- Managing Director at Carnegie Investment Bank and one of Denmark’s most decorated equity analysts, a man who has been named “Stock Analyst of the Year” multiple times over a career spanning more than two decades -- purchased 3,500 shares in Shape Robotics. At the closing price that day, his investment was worth approximately 100,000 Danish kroner.

Fifteen months later, in early March 2024, Topholm published what he called a “back of the envelope analysis” of Shape Robotics. The opening line of that analysis was: “Are you looking for an idea for micro cap, where there is a theoretical possibility of a three-four times higher share price over the coming years?”

The analysis modeled scenarios in which the stock could be worth DKK 46.7 or DKK 58.4 in the near term, and projected a theoretical price of DKK 131.3 by 2027 -- more than three times the trading price at the time. Coming from an analyst of Topholm’s stature, this was not a casual remark. In Denmark’s tiny market, when a man of that reputation speaks, people listen. Portfolios move.

What Topholm did not mention -- not in a single word, not in a footnote, not in a disclaimer -- was that he personally owned 3,500 shares in the company he was recommending. He had skin in the game. He had money on the table. And he told no one.

On March 18, 2024, the Shape Robotics stock price peaked at DKK 52 per share, following several days of significant gains after Topholm’s analysis circulated.

On April 24, 2024, Topholm sent an email to Shape Robotics’ chairman. He opened with the words: “I allow myself to turn as a concerned shareholder and nothing else (that is, not in any Carnegie role).” This is important language. The man who had just published a bullish analysis without disclosing his ownership was now writing privately -- explicitly flagging that he was not acting in his professional capacity -- to raise concerns about the company. Among the recipients of that email was Martin Bundgaard, who held 318,311 shares.

Two days later, on April 26, 2024, Topholm sold all his shares. The stock opened at DKK 34 that morning.

Over the following weeks, a pattern emerged that is impossible to ignore. Martin Bundgaard -- the same man who received Topholm’s private email -- sold his entire position of 318,311 shares during April and May. Soren Bendixen, another investor holding over 70,000 shares, sold his position in June.

And then something happened that transforms this from a sequence of suspicious trades into something far more architecturally coherent: Lars Topholm became chairman of Aerbio, a biotech company founded and co-owned by Martin Bundgaard and Soren Bendixen. The same two men whose shares exited Shape Robotics in coordinated fashion after Topholm’s private communications now had Topholm sitting as chairman of their company.

Buy. Promote without disclosing. Price spikes. Private communication to major shareholders. Coordinated exit. Business relationship consolidation.

This is the timeline. These are dates. These are names. These are transactions recorded on the Nasdaq exchange and documented in corporate registries. None of this is speculation. None of this is inference. This is what happened.

And for fourteen months, not a single major Danish financial outlet published a word about it.

The Expert Who Turned

On February 11, 2026, the independent outlet finally published the Topholm story. They did what financial journalism is supposed to do: they laid out the dates, the trades, the non-disclosure, and the network connections. They interviewed Lars Krull, a senior advisor and banking expert at Aalborg University, who assessed the situation and stated plainly: “It’s very important to declare” and “one should declare that there may be a capacity issue.”

Topholm’s response, through Carnegie’s communications department, was two words: “No comment.”

Martin Bundgaard’s response: “I can 100 percent reject the allegations.”

Soren Bendixen: “I can completely reject the postulate.”

Carnegie: “No comment.”

The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority: “We cannot comment on individual cases.”

Nasdaq: “We do not wish to comment on individual companies.”

This is the sound of a system closing ranks.

But there is another detail in this story that deserves its own section, because it reveals something about how the machinery of perception works in Denmark -- and because it has now blown up in Finans’ face.

In the Finans article about my Romanian background -- the “Luksusbiler og poser med penge” piece about the Vodafone corruption case -- Finans quoted an academic named Catalin-Gabriel Stanescu, a lecturer at the Department of Law at the University of Southern Denmark and a former corporate attorney in Romania. He was presented as an expert on Romanian whistleblower law. His comments were used to frame my cooperation with Romanian anti-corruption authorities in a particular light -- suggesting that whistleblowers in Romania cooperate with prosecutors primarily to avoid their own punishment. That framing was then embedded in an article whose headline declared that I had “admitted corruption.”

There was just one problem: Stanescu’s actual academic expertise is not in criminal law or whistleblower protection. His published research -- easily verifiable on SDU’s own research portal -- is about consumer financial protection, abusive debt collection practices, and the regulation of informal creditors in the EU. His Marie Curie-funded project was about debt collection. His stated professional goal is to become “the leading expert in regulating informal debt collection practices in the European Union.” He is a consumer protection researcher who happens to be Romanian and happens to work in Denmark.

And there is a much bigger problem, because Stanescu himself has now described what actually happened.

In a private message, Stanescu recounted the following: Finans called him and asked general questions about Romanian law. He gave general answers. He asked for context -- what case, what person, what situation -- and Finans refused to provide details. They then came back with selected quotes from his general answers, paired with a fragment of the article. He edited the quotes because, in his words, they were being stretched beyond what he had said. He asked for a copy of the final published article. Finans told him they would send it after further edits. He never heard from them again.

To this day, Stanescu has not seen the published article. Finans has a paywall, the article is in Danish, and as he put it: he would not pay money to read their publication.

Let that sink in. The academic expert quoted in a front-page investigative article -- the man whose credentials lent scholarly authority to the framing of a whistleblower as a corrupt actor -- was never shown the final article. He was given no context about the case he was being asked to comment on. His answers were general observations about how Romanian law works and how it is perceived in society, untethered to any specific situation. He edited Finans’ initial quotes because they distorted what he had said. And then Finans published without sending him the final version.

In his own words, he walked into it blind -- “ca musca-n lapte,” a Romanian expression meaning he stumbled in like a fly landing in milk, completely unaware of what he was being used for.

This is not a minor procedural complaint. This is the manufacturing of expertise. Finans needed a Romanian academic to lend credibility to a particular narrative about whistleblower motivations in Romania. They found one at a Danish university. They asked him abstract questions. They withheld the context that would have allowed him to understand how his words would be deployed. They edited his quotes in ways he had to correct. And then they published without his final approval, behind a paywall he cannot read, in a language he does not work in professionally.

The casual Danish reader, encountering a quote from a University of Southern Denmark lecturer on Romanian law, would assume that an expert had reviewed the specific facts and rendered a considered opinion. That assumption is false. The expert reviewed nothing. He was given nothing to review. And he has told me, directly, that he regrets the situation.

The Letter to the Court

On February 3, 2026, Finans filed its formal response to my complaint before the Danish Press Council (Pressenaevnet). That document -- signed by editor-in-chief Simon Bendtsen -- is now public. And it is perhaps the most revealing document in this entire affair, not for what it argues, but for what it accidentally confesses.

Shape Pressenævnssvar 03

71.4KB ∙ PDF file

The letter opens with a procedural attack. Before addressing any substance, Bendtsen asks Pressenaevnet to order me to re-file my complaint in Danish or provide a certified translation. He describes my complaint as “ret omfattende og noget ustrukturerede og uklare” -- “rather extensive and somewhat unstructured and unclear.” The message to the press council is unmistakable: this foreigner cannot even file a proper complaint in the proper language, so how seriously should you take him?

This is not journalism defending its methods. This is a gatekeeper pulling up the drawbridge. In a country that prides itself on transparency, openness, and international engagement, the editor-in-chief of Denmark’s leading financial news outlet opens his defense by arguing that a complaint in English -- the language of international business, the language in which I conducted Shape Robotics’ investor relations, the language in which Nasdaq Copenhagen publishes its own regulatory announcements -- is somehow insufficient for a media ethics proceeding.

But the truly devastating passage comes later, in the section about the corruption article. Bendtsen writes -- in a sworn submission to a regulatory body -- that the article “bygger i vidt omfang paa de oplysninger, som Mark Abraham selv har praesenteret for de rumaenske antikorruptionsmyndigheder.”

Translation: “The article is built to a large extent on the information that Mark Abraham himself presented to the Romanian anti-corruption authorities.”

Read that sentence again. The editor-in-chief of Finans has formally confirmed, to the Danish Press Council, that the corruption article is built on my whistleblower testimony. The very same article whose headline reads “Topchef i Shape Robotics har indrommet korruption” -- “CEO of Shape Robotics has admitted corruption” -- is, by the editor’s own admission, based on material I provided to Romanian prosecutors as a cooperating witness reporting illegal conduct by others.

In the history of Danish journalism, has a whistleblower’s testimony ever been repackaged as evidence of the whistleblower’s own guilt, and has the editor ever confirmed this repackaging in a formal regulatory filing? I do not know. But I suspect the answer is no.

The EU Whistleblower Directive (2019/1937), which Denmark was required to transpose into national law by December 2021, exists for precisely this reason. Article 19 explicitly prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers, including reputational damage. The directive was created because legislators understood that if people who report corruption can have their testimony turned into weapons against them, no one will ever report corruption again.

And in his Pressenaevnet letter, Bendtsen also makes a claim that is directly contradicted by documented evidence in my possession: he states that Finans never published an article without my comments, “medmindre han har afvist at kommentere” -- unless I refused to comment. He claims I was always given sufficient time to respond.

The WhatsApp Method

Let me show you what “sufficient time to respond” looks like in practice.

On the morning of February 12, 2026, a Finans journalist sent me a WhatsApp message. It read: “Hi Mark. The administrator says that 4,5 mio euro were stolen, and that the theft was orchestrated by the management. Were you part of this, and what is your reaction?”

That was the question. No context. No documents attached. No identification of which administrator, which company, which jurisdiction, which legal proceeding. Just: “4.5 million euros were stolen. Were you part of this?”

When I asked “Administrator of?” the journalist replied: “Sanako.”

I responded that the question made no sense without context, that all board activities at Sanako were conducted in perfect conditions, and that the CEO of Sanako was Andre Fehrn. I asked: “What context do you need?”

The journalist’s reply: “The context of the question. If u ask me weather we did credit fraud. I have already replied that. Last time.”

I said: “Absolutely not. And to say that money were stolen by Shape from Sanako is absurd.”

This exchange -- which I have preserved in its entirety -- encapsulates Finans’ method. It is not an interview. It is not journalism. It is the construction of a quote. You send a loaded, context-free question via text message. If the subject answers defensively -- as any human being would when ambushed with an accusation of theft -- you have your quote. If the subject refuses to answer, you write “Mark Abraham declined to comment,” which reads as guilt. If the subject asks for context or documents, you can write that they were “evasive” or “unwilling to engage with the allegations.”

There is no scenario in which the subject wins. The question is designed to produce a publishable reaction, not to elicit truth.

And this is the method Finans’ editor-in-chief describes to Pressenaevnet as “sufficient opportunity to respond.” This is what he calls “fornoeden forelaegning” -- adequate presentation of the case.

The Day After

Here is a fact that anyone can verify.

On February 11, 2026 -- a Tuesday -- published its investigation into Lars Topholm’s undisclosed shareholding, his bullish analysis, the price spike, the coordinated exits, and the subsequent business relationship with the network of sellers. An independent banking expert went on record calling the non-disclosure problematic. Carnegie refused to comment. The story was thorough, documented, and damning.

On February 12, 2026 -- one day later, a Wednesday -- Finans published a new escalation: the Finnish subsidiary’s bankruptcy curator had allegedly stated that 4.5 million euros had been “stolen” by “the company’s management.”

Inside the same Finans article, however, the following facts are also reported: the Finnish curator was appointed after a February 5 bankruptcy, meaning he had been on the case for exactly one week. He refused to name which individuals he was referring to. He stated that his investigation was “still very early.” The allegedly stolen funds relate to a EUR 4 million loan from Alisa Bank and Veritas, 80% guaranteed by the Finnish state agency Finnvera, and publicly disclosed via a Nasdaq stock exchange announcement on November 28, 2025. All three financial institutions declined to comment.

And critically: Finans did not publish the curator’s actual written statement. No document. No date. No addressee. No legal context. A single week’s worth of preliminary impressions from a newly appointed administrator was packaged as a headline containing the word “theft” -- and published precisely one day after an independent outlet exposed the conduct of one of Denmark’s most powerful analysts.

This is either the most remarkable editorial coincidence in Danish journalism history, or it is exactly what it looks like.

The Network Nobody Maps

Let me now introduce you to Martin Bundgaard, because understanding who he is transforms this story from a financial dispute into something far more structural.

Martin Bundgaard is not a passive retail investor who happened to buy and sell shares. According to Danish corporate records and publicly available biographical information, Bundgaard spent decades as a stockbroker and journalist at Penge & Privatoekonomi and Boersens Nyhedsmagasin -- the magazine division of Dagbladet Boersen.

Boersen is 49.9% owned by JP/Politikens Hus.

JP/Politikens Hus owns Finans.

The man who held 318,311 shares in Shape Robotics, who received Lars Topholm’s private email about concerns in the company, who sold his entire position in the weeks following that email, and who co-founded the company where Topholm subsequently became chairman -- that man spent his career inside the same media group that is now publishing escalating coverage against me.

Through his holding company SUNDVAENGET INVEST ApS, Bundgaard has been commercially active in Denmark since 1978. Nearly half a century of relationships in the Danish financial and media ecosystem.

I am not suggesting that Bundgaard personally called Finans and ordered the articles. I do not know that, and I will not claim what I cannot prove. What I am stating is that the network exists. The connections are documented. The overlap between the analyst, the shareholders, the media group, and the business relationships that crystallized after the coordinated share exits is a matter of public record. And not a single major Danish financial outlet has mapped it.

What the Rest of the World Does About This

In April 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission announced the Global Analyst Research Settlement -- a $1.4 billion enforcement action against ten of the largest investment banks in America. The fundamental charge was straightforward: analysts had published biased research while hiding personal and institutional conflicts of interest. Two individuals -- Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch and Jack Grubman of Salomon Smith Barney -- were permanently barred from the securities industry and paid millions in personal fines. Their crime was publishing bullish recommendations while privately holding contemptuous views of the stocks they were promoting. The settlement fundamentally restructured how investment banks manage the relationship between research and banking.

In the aftermath, the SEC created Regulation AC -- Analyst Certification -- which requires every research analyst in the United States to certify that their published views genuinely reflect their beliefs, that any compensation linked to their recommendations is disclosed, and that personal financial interests in the securities they cover are transparent.

In 2017, the SEC charged 27 individuals and entities for publishing bullish stock articles without disclosing they had been compensated. Over 250 articles contained false statements claiming the authors were not paid. The SEC’s Acting Director of Enforcement stated: “If a company pays someone to publish or publicize articles about its stock, it must be disclosed to the investing public.”

In December 2022, the SEC charged eight social media influencers in a $100 million stock manipulation scheme. The pattern was the same: buy a stock, promote it to followers without disclosing ownership, then sell after the price rises. Collectively, these influencers had over 1.5 million followers.

The principle the SEC has enforced -- repeatedly, expensively, and without exception -- is simple: if you recommend a stock and you own it, you must say so. If you don’t say so, you have committed fraud. The size of your position is irrelevant. The platform you use is irrelevant. Whether you call it an “analysis” or a “back of the envelope” thought or a tweet or a Discord message is irrelevant. The disclosure obligation is absolute.

Denmark, as an EU member state, is subject to the EU Market Abuse Regulation, which has been in force since July 2016. Under MAR Article 20 and its implementing technical standards, anyone making an investment recommendation must disclose their holding history and any positions exceeding 0.5%. Denmark’s own industry body, Capital Market Denmark, published recommendations stating explicitly that as a general rule, analysts may not hold financial instruments issued by companies they cover, and where they do, they must disclose this and are not allowed to trade against their own recommendations.

Lars Topholm held shares. Lars Topholm published a recommendation. Lars Topholm did not disclose. The stock price rose. Lars Topholm sold.

The Coverage Asymmetry

For five and a half years -- from Shape Robotics’ IPO in June 2020 to November 2025 -- Finans published zero articles about the company. During this period, the company grew revenue from near-zero to DKK 302 million. It was selected as a “growth comet.” It was advanced to the Nasdaq main market. The Danish state fund EIFO invested public money. None of this generated a single line of coverage.

Then, in late November 2025, I filed a formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen against Lars Topholm, alleging market manipulation and undisclosed conflicts of interest.

In the ten weeks that followed -- December 2025 through mid-February 2026 -- Finans published at least six major articles about Shape Robotics and me personally. Romanian fraud charges. Romanian corruption. Finnish “theft.” Unpaid bills. Bankruptcy.

And in all that time -- across all those articles, all those column inches, all those editorial resources deployed -- Finans published precisely zero words about the Topholm timeline.

Not the undisclosed shareholding. Not the bullish analysis. Not the price spike. Not the coordinated exits. Not the Aerbio chairmanship. Not the Bundgaard network. Not a single word.

It took Frihedsbrevet -- an independent outlet, smaller, newer, less resourced -- to do what Denmark’s most powerful financial newsroom would not.

What I Am Actually Asking For

“I swear by my life and my love of it that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine.”

That oath, from my favorite book, is not about selfishness. It is about the refusal to accept that your life and your reputation should be someone else’s currency. It is the belief that truth is not a negotiation and that the marketplace of ideas only functions when the participants are honest about their positions.

I am not asking anyone to believe me because I say so. I am asking for the standard that any system calling itself a free market should demand.

First, publish the documents. If Finans possesses a Finnish curator statement that uses the word “theft,” publish the document. Let the metadata speak. Let the context be visible. Let every reader form their own judgment from source material, not from a journalist’s interpretation of a one-week-old preliminary impression.

Second, cover the documented timeline. The Topholm sequence -- purchase, promotion, non-disclosure, price spike, private communication, coordinated exit, business consolidation -- is not an allegation. It is a series of dates and transactions. It can be confirmed or denied by Nasdaq records, corporate filings, and Carnegie’s compliance department. Investigate it. Print what you find. If Topholm did nothing wrong, the records will show that.

Third, disclose the connections. Martin Bundgaard’s decades at Boersen and in the stockbroking community. His holding company. His co-founding of Aerbio. Topholm’s chairmanship. Bendixen’s positions. The network is in the public record. Map it. Show it. Let readers decide if it matters.

Fourth, interrogate the expert. Finans presented Catalin-Gabriel Stanescu as an authority on Romanian whistleblower law. His actual published research is about consumer debt collection regulation. Ask him -- on the record -- whether he considers himself an expert on Romanian criminal immunity deals. And if he does not, ask Finans why they presented him as one.

The Only Question

“The question isn’t who is going to let me; it’s who is going to stop me.”

I built a company from nothing. A Romanian immigrant with no Danish connections, no old-boys network, no membership in the circles where editors and analysts and shareholders drink wine at the same tables. We took a robot from a university lab and put it in classrooms across Europe. Revenue went from zero to three hundred million kroner. We were selected among the top 30 global EdTech companies by TIME magazine and Statista.

And none of that made me visible.

I became visible the moment I filed a complaint against a man who sits at the center of the network.

The system’s response was not to investigate the complaint. The system’s response was to investigate the complainant. Every piece of my past that could be excavated was excavated. Every ambiguous legal situation in a foreign jurisdiction was presented in the worst possible light. A whistleblower’s testimony was repackaged as a confession. An academic whose expertise is in debt collection was presented as an authority on criminal law. And the man at the center of the documented timeline -- the analyst who bought, promoted, didn’t disclose, and sold -- was given the courtesy of “no comment.”

“Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.”

Shakespeare wrote that line for a play about a prince who discovered that the people running the kingdom had committed a crime -- and that the court’s response was not justice, but silence. Hamlet spent five acts agonizing over what to do with the truth.

I am not Hamlet.

I filed the complaint. I published the evidence. I am writing this for you -- every shareholder who trusted the market, every citizen who pays for the institutions that are supposed to keep it fair, every journalist who entered the profession because they believed it existed to hold power accountable rather than to protect it.

Read the Frihedsbrevet investigation. Read Finans’ coverage. Look at the timeline. Look at the network. Look at the dates.

And then ask the only question that matters:

Who is being protected -- and who is being destroyed?

The Frihedsbrevet investigation, published February 11, 2026:
https://frihedsbrevet.dk/skandaliseret-topchef-i-konkursramt-selskab-langer-ud-efter-finansguru/

Finans’ formal response to Pressenaevnet, filed February 3, 2026: referenced throughout this article.

Shape Robotics’ Nasdaq complaint against Lars Topholm: filed November 2025.

Subscribe. This story is not over.

The $700 Billion Short

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Thu, 05 Feb 2026 16:57:14 GMT

Prologue: Two Headlines

On the morning of February 4, 2026, two things happened in Denmark.

The first: Novo Nordisk—the company that represents nearly half of Denmark’s entire stock market capitalization—lost seventeen percent of its value in a single session. Fifty billion dollars. Gone. The largest single-day destruction of Danish wealth in modern history.

The second: Finans, Denmark’s premier business publication, published another article about Shape Robotics.

If you want to understand why Denmark is dying, you don’t need economic theory. You don’t need policy papers. You just need to sit with those two facts for a moment and feel the weight of what they reveal.

A country watching its crown jewel collapse.

A media obsessed with a Romanian CEO.

This is the x-ray of a nation that has stopped thinking.

Thanks for reading Wild CEO - The Journey! This post is public so feel free to share it.

Copenhagen, 9:00 AM, February 4, 2026

Lars Andersen—let’s call him Lars—has managed pension money for seventeen years. He’s good at his job. Cautious. Danish. He believes in systems.

At 9:00 AM, his Bloomberg terminal turned red in a way he’d never seen.

Novo Nordisk was down eight percent. Then ten. Then fifteen. By lunch, it would settle around seventeen percent—a $50 billion evaporation.

Lars did what Danish professionals do: he called his colleagues. They called their colleagues. Everyone asked the same question: What happened?

Here’s what happened: Novo announced that sales and operating profit would decline 5-13% in 2026. Pricing pressure in America. Competition from Eli Lilly. The Wegovy dream was hitting reality.

But that’s not what really happened.

What really happened is that someone knew this was coming.

The Positioning

In the summer of 2025, while Danish journalists were writing puff pieces about sustainability and green transitions, something unusual was happening in Chicago, New York, and London.

Citadel Advisors was accumulating put options on Novo Nordisk.

So was Susquehanna.

So was Jane Street.

So was Barclays.

So was D.E. Shaw.

A put option, for those unfamiliar, is a bet that a stock will fall. When hedge funds buy puts at scale, they’re not hedging. They’re hunting.

The question Lars should have asked—the question every Danish pension manager should have asked—is: What did they know that we didn’t?

The answer is simple: they were willing to think. Denmark wasn’t.

Part II: The Distraction

What Finans Published That Morning

While Novo was collapsing, I checked Finans.dk.

The front page featured another story about Shape Robotics.

Let me make sure you understand the proportions here:

Novo Nordisk: $50 billion destroyed in one day.

Shape Robotics: A company with DKK 325 million in revenue—about $45 million.

The ratio of destruction to coverage was approximately 1,000 to 1 in the wrong direction.

This is not journalism. This is obsession. And obsession always tells you more about the obsessed than the object.

Why Finans Can’t Stop Writing About Me

I’ll tell you why, because I’ve had eighteen months to study the pattern.

In December 2025, Finans sent me an email. They had “another story coming up” about my former role at Sav Integrated Systems—a Romanian company I was a minority shareholder in, not the CEO, not the chairman.

They had quotes from two “experts”—law professors positioned as neutral authorities—offering opinions on whether Shape Robotics should have disclosed Romanian legal proceedings that had nothing to do with Shape’s operations.

Here’s what they didn’t disclose:

The Shape Robotics board knew about the Romanian cases when they hired me. They hired a private investigator. They obtained legal opinions. They concluded—correctly—that pending proceedings in another country, involving a different company, with no conviction, did not constitute inside information under MAR.

But that’s not a story. “Board Does Due Diligence, Follows Legal Advice” doesn’t get clicks.

You know what gets clicks? “Romanian CEO.” “Corruption.” “Luxury Cars and Bags of Money.”

The headline they ran translated to exactly that.

I’m Romanian. My name is Mark Abraham. In Denmark, that combination is enough to make me permanently suspicious.

This is how a small country with a superiority complex processes foreigners who don’t know their place: they investigate you until something sticks, and when nothing sticks, they investigate harder.

The Real Function of the Coverage

Here’s the part they don’t teach in journalism school:

When you write relentlessly about a small company during a liquidity crisis, you become part of the crisis.

Every Finans article created a news event. Every news event triggered calls from nervous creditors. Every nervous creditor tightened terms. Every tightened term increased pressure.

Then, when the company struggled under the pressure the coverage helped create, Finans wrote about the struggle—citing the coverage as evidence that something was wrong.

This is not reporting. This is a feedback loop.

I filed a complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen alleging market manipulation. The complaint documented how a prominent Danish analyst—who held Shape shares—published bullish research, then sold into the rally he helped create.

Forty days later, I was bankrupt.

Coincidence, I’m sure.

Part III: The Parallel Autopsy

Denmark’s Hidden Collapse

While Finans was writing about me, here’s what was happening to Denmark:

The Copenhagen Index: Down 46% from its June 2024 peak.

Novo Nordisk: Down 50% in 2025—its worst year on record.

First North: The growth company exchange lost 57% since 2021. Forty-one companies destroyed.

EIFO: The state export fund fired 50 employees, cut activity to its lowest since 2020.

The tax system: Still taxing unrealized gains on listed shares, driving capital to Sweden.

The bankruptcy system: Still imposing three-year management bans for failure, treating entrepreneurs like criminals.

Danske Bank: Still operating normally, despite laundering €200 billion through Estonia. Zero executives jailed.

But sure, let’s write another article about the Romanian.

The EIFO Withdrawal

Here’s a fact that should have been front-page news:

In June 2024, EIFO—Denmark’s export and investment fund—withdrew support from Shape Robotics. The reason? We had graduated from First North to the Nasdaq Copenhagen Main Market.

Read that again.

A company successfully uplisted—increasing its disclosure requirements, its governance standards, its transparency—and the Danish state responded by withdrawing support.

The official explanation: EIFO focuses on unlisted and pre-IPO companies.

The real explanation: Denmark doesn’t have a template for “company that succeeds and grows.” The template is “company that stays small and compliant.” When you break the template, the system rejects you.

EIFO’s withdrawal triggered everything that followed. Credit facilities terminated. Liquidity constrained. Vulnerability increased. And when Finans came calling with their destruction campaign, we had no cushion left.

This is how Denmark kills innovation: not with malice, but with checkboxes.

Part IV: The Sanako Destruction

A €40 Million Contract, Burned

Let me tell you about what happened yesterday.

Shape Robotics had a Finnish subsidiary called Sanako. Sanako held a contract worth €32-40 million to deliver educational robotics laboratories to Polish schools. The project was EU-funded. The financing was in place: €4 million from Alisa Bank and Veritas, guaranteed by Finnvera—the Finnish state.

Sixteen thousand robots. Ready for deployment.

Yesterday, the Danish bankruptcy administrator declared Sanako insolvent.

Forty million euros. Gone.

But here’s the part that made me write this article:

The administrator is now telling journalists that the financing was “credit fraud.”

Share Wild CEO - The Journey

What “Credit Fraud” Actually Means

Let me explain what contract financing is, because apparently Danish administrators don’t know.

When you have a €32 million contract with a government-backed buyer, and you need €4 million to execute it, you go to a bank. The bank provides the €4 million. You execute the contract. The buyer pays. You repay the bank.

This is called “trade finance.” It’s how international commerce has worked for centuries. It’s how every major infrastructure project gets built. It’s how education technology reaches schools.

We disclosed this financing publicly. Company Announcement 25-25. Company Announcement 28-25. The purpose was stated. The banks knew. Finnvera knew. Every investor who could read knew.

Calling this “credit fraud” is like calling a mortgage “bank robbery.”

But here’s why the administrator is doing it:

He destroyed €40 million of value. He needs someone to blame.

I’m Romanian. I’m available.

The “Cooperation” Farce

The administrator accuses me of “non-cooperation.”

Here’s what actually happened:

They demanded I “cooperate”—without sending me the documents that empower them.
My lawyer formally requested the bankruptcy order and empowerment documents.
They never provided them.
I requested translated documents—I’m Romanian, I’m entitled to understand what I’m signing.
Their response: “Not acceptable. We summon you to court.”
Under EU law, they’re required to provide translations.

You cannot demand cooperation while hiding the documents.

But in Denmark, process is performance. The appearance of propriety matters more than the substance. They can say “he didn’t cooperate” to journalists, and journalists will print it, because journalists don’t read EU regulations.

They read press releases from administrators who need cover.

Part V: The Moral Economy

Ayn Rand Was Right About One Thing

I’ve been thinking about Rand lately. Not her politics—her observation.

She described “looters”: people who produce nothing but grow rich by feeding on those who do. People who use systems, regulations, and moral positioning to extract value from builders.

I used to think this was an exaggeration. A libertarian fantasy.

Then I watched it happen.

The hedge funds didn’t build Novo Nordisk. They shorted it.

The administrator didn’t build Sanako. He liquidated it.

The journalists didn’t build Shape Robotics. They wrote about its destruction.

EIFO didn’t build our export business. They withdrew support when we succeeded.

Danske Bank didn’t create €200 billion. They laundered it.

None of these people built anything. But all of them will survive this. All of them will have jobs next year. All of them will speak at conferences about “responsible governance” and “sustainable business.”

The people who built things—the engineers, the teachers, the Polish schools waiting for robots—they lose.

That’s the moral economy of Denmark in 2026.

The Two-Track System

In December 2025, I wrote about Jeppe Frandsen—the former chairman of Shape Robotics.

Jeppe was also chairman of Paralenz when it went bankrupt in 2022. EIFO lost 25 million DKK on that one. Danske Bank recovered zero.

When Paralenz collapsed, nobody wrote headlines about Jeppe. Nobody questioned his judgment. Nobody suggested he was unfit for leadership.

Eighteen months later, he was chairman of Shape Robotics. Same structure. EIFO guarantee. Danske Bank facility. Same pattern.

And when it collapsed again, nobody asked: “Why did Denmark’s institutions trust this structure twice?”

Because Jeppe is Danish. He knows people. He speaks the language—not just Danish, but Danish: the unspoken codes, the relationship signals, the way you acknowledge mistakes without actually acknowledging them.

I’m Romanian. I document everything. I write things down. I publish my responses to journalists.

In Denmark, that’s not resilience. That’s aggression.

Denmark operates a two-track system: public acceptance and private mistrust coexist until they suddenly don’t. And when they stop coexisting, there’s no conversation about why. There’s just destruction and everyone pretending they couldn’t have seen it coming.

Part VI: The Greenland Trade

What This Is Really About

Now let me tell you why this matters beyond Denmark.

Trump wants Greenland. The reported price: $700 billion.

In January 2026, Trump threatened 10-25% tariffs on Denmark unless there was progress on “complete and total takeover” of Greenland.

The day after the threats, the C25 dropped 2.7%—the worst single-day decline in six months.

Denmark thinks this is about sovereignty. About dignity. About alliance politics.

It’s not.

It’s about leverage.

The Arithmetic of Extraction

If you want to buy something and the seller doesn’t want to sell, you have two options:

Offer more money.
Make the seller desperate.

The second option is cheaper.

How do you make Denmark desperate?

You destroy its optionality. You crash its markets. You turn its national champion—Novo Nordisk—from a point of pride into a point of vulnerability.

And if you’re really sophisticated, you don’t just crash the markets. You profit from crashing them.

The hedge fund short positions are public. Citadel. Susquehanna. Barclays. They’re all in the filings.

The crash is public. Fifty billion dollars on February 4 alone.

The Greenland demand is public. Seven hundred billion dollars.

Connect the dots:

Short Denmark → Crash the market → Profit billions → Use profits to buy Greenland.

I’m not saying this is a conspiracy. I’m saying it’s arbitrage.

The money to buy Greenland may come from destroying Denmark’s own economy.

And Denmark is too busy writing articles about me to notice.

Part VII: The Pattern

What Shape Robotics Revealed

My company was small. In the grand scheme of things, €40 million is a rounding error against Novo’s $50 billion.

But the pattern is the same:

EIFO withdrew support based on a technicality. Not analysis. A checkbox.
Banks terminated facilities during negotiations. Not because the business failed. Because the guarantee disappeared.
Media amplified the crisis. Every article became a news event. Every news event triggered creditor anxiety.
Administrators prioritized procedure over value. Liquidation is safe. Preservation requires judgment. Denmark doesn’t do judgment.
When value was destroyed, blame was assigned. Not to the institutions that failed. To the foreigner who built.

This pattern isn’t unique to Shape Robotics.

It’s the Danish operating system.

And it will destroy Denmark.

The Innovation Graveyard

First North has lost 57% of its value since 2021.

Forty-one companies gone.

Orbex—the rocket company. Bankrupt.

Aquaporin—Nobel Prize-winning water technology. Bankrupt.

Shape Robotics—educational technology deployed across Europe. Bankrupt.

These weren’t frauds. These weren’t failures of entrepreneurship. These were companies killed by a system that punishes success, withdraws support on technicalities, taxes unrealized gains, and treats bankruptcy as moral failure.

In Silicon Valley, failed founders are preferred by investors. They’ve learned something.

In Denmark, failed founders are quarantined. Banned from management for three years. Marked forever.

The message is clear: don’t try. And if you try, don’t fail. And if you fail, don’t expect to try again.

This is how a society commits economic suicide while lecturing the world about sustainability.

Part VIII: The Choice

What Denmark Can Do

Denmark has one asset left that the world wants: Greenland.

Two million square kilometers. Rare earth minerals. Strategic Arctic position. Potentially the most valuable real estate of the 21st century.

Trump is offering $700 billion.

Denmark can either:

Option 1: Fix itself.

Reform the tax system (stop taxing unrealized gains).
Reform EIFO (support companies that succeed, not just pre-IPO).
Reform bankruptcy law (failure is tuition, not crime).
Reform the media (demand disclosure of financial interests).
Prosecute actual crime (€200 billion in money laundering, not €40 million in contract financing).

Option 2: Sell Greenland.

Because a country that cannot preserve a €32 million contract inside its insolvency system has no business believing it can out-negotiate a superpower.

Markets price incompetence in real time.

Right now, Denmark’s price is falling.

What I’m Going to Do

I’m going to document everything.

Every withdrawal. Every termination. Every accusation. Every procedural failure.

I’m going to publish it—not for revenge, but for the record.

Because somewhere in Europe, there’s another founder considering Denmark. Another investor evaluating Copenhagen. Another company thinking about expansion.

They deserve to know what they’re walking into.

They deserve to know that in Denmark:

Success triggers withdrawal of state support.
Graduation is treated as disqualification.
Media writes about foreigners until something sticks.
Administrators destroy value and allege fraud to cover it.
Banks launder €200 billion and face no consequences.
Entrepreneurs build companies and face three-year quarantines.

This is Denmark 2026.

And this is also why Denmark is dying.

Epilogue: The Red Screen

Lars the pension manager is still staring at his screen.

He’s lost count of how many billion kroner evaporated today. His fund is down. His colleagues are down. The whole country is down.

He knows something is wrong. He just doesn’t know what.

So he does what Danish professionals do: he waits for someone to explain it.

But no one will.

Because the people who could explain it—the hedge funds with their filings, the analysts with their models, the administrators with their procedures—they don’t explain.

They extract.

And when they’re done extracting, they move on.

Leaving Lars with his red screen, his damaged pension, and a vague sense that something has been taken from him.

Something has.

Denmark stopped thinking a long time ago. It just didn’t notice until the screen turned red.

If this resonated, subscribe. The next installment—”The Hedge Fund Files”—will name the funds, trace the filings, and document exactly how sophisticated capital positioned for Denmark’s collapse while Danish institutions were busy writing articles about a Romanian CEO.

The extraction is documented. The pattern is visible. The choice is Denmark’s.

#realDenmark #The700BillionShort #SellGreenland #ShapeRobotics #TænkIgen

The Myth of Danish Purity

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 31 Jan 2026 16:31:01 GMT

There’s a fish called the Nimbochromis that lives in Lake Malawi. It’s evolved a remarkable survival strategy: it plays dead. It sinks to the bottom, motionless, and waits. When smaller fish come to investigate what looks like an easy meal, the Nimbochromis springs to life and devours them.

I thought about that fish when I saw the username of someone commenting on my company’s bankruptcy on a Danish investment forum in January 2026.

“Corruption is more the rule than the exception in Romania,” wrote Nimbochromis.

He wasn’t alone. Across the forums, anonymous commenters competed to explain why Shape Robotics—a company I’d grown from 0.8 million to 302 million Danish kroner in revenue—had collapsed. The explanations shared a common theme: me. A Romanian. Obviously corrupt. Case closed.

None of them asked what seemed to me like an obvious question: If I was a fraud, where were the charges? Where was the conviction? Where was the evidence?

There was none. Not a single criminal charge in any jurisdiction. Not a single regulatory finding.

Just a Romanian passport and the assumptions that come with it.

But here’s the thing about the Nimbochromis defense—about playing dead while predators circle: it only works if no one’s watching closely. If someone actually examines what happened to Shape Robotics, they’ll find something far more interesting than a Romanian CEO who may or may not be trustworthy. They’ll find a Danish analyst who admits on tape that he considers himself an insider, who extracted confidential information in private meetings, who sold his shares the same day as his network while his bank pumped the stock to retail investors.

They’ll find profits that don’t add up. They’ll find a 10,320% increase in someone’s holding company earnings during exactly the period when Shape Robotics was being destroyed.

And they’ll find a media counter-strike so intense, so coordinated, that it only makes sense if someone is very, very worried about what I discovered.

This is that story.

Part One: The Perfect Defense

Let me tell you how this is going to go.

At some point, someone will finally ask Lars Topholm, Martin Bundgaard, and Søren Bendixen to explain why they coordinated the sale of 532,000 shares of Shape Robotics between April 24 and June 4, 2024. Why they extracted approximately 21 million kroner at peak prices. Why Lars’s bank Carnegie was simultaneously promoting the stock to other investors while his personal network was dumping it.

And they will say, with the practiced sincerity of men who have rehearsed this in their minds: “We lost trust in the company. So we exited.”

In Denmark, this will sound reasonable. Denmark is the world’s most trusting society—they have studies about this, rankings, a whole national identity built around the concept of tillid. When a respected Carnegie analyst with 35 years in Danish finance says he “lost trust” in a company, other Danes will nod sympathetically. Of course he sold. Who wouldn’t?

But here’s where it gets interesting.

If Lars Topholm “lost trust” after his private meetings with me on April 15-16, 2024—meetings where he extracted detailed information about our cash flow situation, our capital raise timeline, our Poland opportunity—then he lost trust based on information that regular investors didn’t have. He knew something they didn’t know.

When he sold his shares on April 26, the same day that Sundvænget (his network’s investment vehicle) dumped 94,927 shares, he wasn’t making a decision based on the same public information available to the people buying those shares from him.

So the “trust” defense isn’t really a defense at all. It’s more like... a confession?

Let me put it differently. In the language of securities regulation—which is less poetic but more legally precise—trading on material non-public information is called insider trading. And coordinating trades among connected parties while one party is promoting a stock to outside investors is called market manipulation.

The “lost trust” defense is, essentially, an admission that they did both of these things but hoped no one would notice.

Part Two: The Timeline

I’m going to walk you through what happened, step by step. The dates matter. The sequence matters. Once you see it laid out, you can’t unsee it.

Before April 15, 2024:

Lars Topholm owns 3,500 shares of Shape Robotics. He hasn’t disclosed this to anyone—not to the company, not to the public. He’s Carnegie Bank’s Head of Research, which means when he speaks, institutional investors listen. He’s also Chairman of Aerbio, a biotech company that happens to need €50 million from the same Danish investor pool that we need €20 million from.

His “best friend” Martin Bundgaard—Lars’s words, on tape—owns 318,331 shares. Søren Bendixen owns about 70,000. Their investment vehicle Sundvænget owns another 140,000.

Total network position: approximately 532,000 shares.

They’re all Aerbio investors. This will become important.

April 15-16, 2024:

Lars attends private meetings with our management. He’s there in an “advisory” capacity, helping us think through our capital raise. These are confidential meetings. He learns about the Poland opportunity—40% market share, €35 million in government contracts. He learns about our cash flow situation. He learns about our timeline.

This is what regulators call “material non-public information.”

April 16-24, 2024:

Carnegie’s sales team—working under Lars—actively promotes Shape Robotics to institutional investors across Europe. I have the transcript. Someone on Carnegie’s team explains: “We would have primed some of the key guys and that would have been Lars doing that. So they’re not starting totally from scratch.”

So Lars has just been in confidential meetings. He’s learned things the public doesn’t know. And now his team is pumping the stock.

If he had “lost trust,” why would his bank spend eight days promoting the stock?

You don’t pump a stock you don’t trust. You pump a stock you’re about to dump.

April 24, 2024:

Lars sends an email. It attacks our CFO. And he CC’s Martin Bundgaard—who, remember, has no official role in the company. He’s just Lars’s best friend who happens to own 318,331 shares.

In the email, Lars compares Shape to Chemometec. At the time, Chemometec was one of Denmark’s most heavily shorted stocks.

I believe this email was a signal. I believe this is when the coordinated selling began.

April 26, 2024:

Lars sells all 3,500 of his shares. Sundvænget sells 94,927 shares.

Same day.

This is documented in VP Securities records. Same-day selling by supposedly independent parties.

April 24 - June 4, 2024:

The entire network exits. Every share. They extract approximately 21 million kroner at prices between 42 and 45 kroner—the peak.

June 6, 2024:

Carnegie withdraws from helping Shape Robotics.

The timing is... precise. Exactly two days after the last Aerbio investor finished selling. As if someone wanted to make sure everyone was out before the bank stopped supporting the stock.

July 11, 2024:

I meet Lars for breakfast at Villa Copenhagen. I record the entire 90-minute conversation. On tape, he says two remarkable things.

First: “Martin is my best friend. I speak to him anytime.”

Second: “I consider myself an insider. I can’t talk to anyone.”

I’ll just let those statements sit there for a moment.

Part Three: The Math That Doesn’t Add Up

Here’s where I need to tell you about something I found while researching this case. Something that should make every investor in Danish markets extremely uncomfortable.

Søren Bendixen has a holding company called Fredericiagade Holding ApS. It’s registered in the Danish Business Registry. The numbers are public.

In 2022, Fredericiagade Holding reported a profit of 357,000 kroner. Not a lot. A modest return on a modest investment portfolio.

In 2023, the profit jumped to 12.7 million kroner. That’s a 3,458% increase. Interesting.

In 2024—the year of the Shape Robotics scheme—the profit was 37.2 million kroner.

Let me write that again so you don’t miss it.

37.2 million kroner.

That’s a 10,320% increase from 2022.

Now, if Søren Bendixen only sold approximately 70,000 Shape Robotics shares at around 42 kroner, that’s roughly 3 million kroner. Where did the other 34 million come from?

I have a theory.

Under EU short selling regulations, positions above 0.1% of a company’s shares must be reported. But there’s a loophole. If you spread your positions across multiple omnibus accounts—pooled brokerage accounts where individual holdings are aggregated—you can keep each position below the reporting threshold. Your total short position never becomes public.

If the network was shorting Shape Robotics through omnibus accounts while simultaneously selling their long positions... while Lars’s bank was pumping retail investors into buying...

The total extraction wouldn’t be 21 million kroner.

It could be 55 million kroner. Or more.

I don’t know this for certain. But I know that Søren Bendixen’s holding company had a 10,320% profit increase during exactly the period when this scheme was being executed. And I know that someone needs to explain where that money came from.

Part Four: The Country That Doesn’t Prosecute

At this point, you might be wondering: Why hasn’t anyone investigated this?

Welcome to Denmark.

Let me tell you about the country that ranks number one on the Corruption Perceptions Index.

Between 2007 and 2015, approximately €200 billion in suspicious transactions flowed through Danske Bank’s Estonian branch. Two hundred billion euros. The largest money laundering scandal in European history. Russian oligarchs, organized crime, corrupt officials—they all used Denmark’s most prestigious bank as a laundromat.

The U.S. Department of Justice noted that by February 2014, “Danske Bank knew that some customers were engaged in highly suspicious and potentially criminal transactions.”

Number of Danish bank executives who went to prison: zero.

Thomas Borgen, the CEO, resigned. He was sued. In November 2022, a Danish court cleared him of liability.

Then there was the cum-ex scandal. Denmark’s tax authority, SKAT, paid out approximately €1.7 billion in fraudulent tax refunds. When Denmark tried to recover the money in British courts, the judge ruled that SKAT’s controls were “so inadequate that they were nearly non-existent.”

He used the word “flimsy.”

Denmark lost the lawsuit.

Number of officials jailed: zero.

Then there was Atea, Denmark’s largest public corruption case. The IT company bribed employees of the National Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces, and—this is almost too perfect—the Military Intelligence Services. They called one of their bribery schemes “Thailand Open.”

Nearly fifty public officials were arrested. The maximum corporate fine was €1.3 million.

According to Transparency International’s own assessment, Denmark “opened 10 investigations, commenced no cases, and concluded no cases” for foreign bribery between 2016 and 2019.

And here’s the kicker: “Denmark does not publish statistics on foreign bribery investigations or cases.”

The world’s “least corrupt” country doesn’t publish corruption statistics.

Academic research confirms what you might be starting to suspect: prison sentences for white-collar crime in Denmark are, in the careful language of peer-reviewed studies, “a rather rare occurrence.”

Part Five: The Other Side of the Story

Now let me tell you about the country where I come from. The one that Nimbochromis thinks is ruled by corruption.

In 2013, a prosecutor named Laura Codruța Kövesi took charge of Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate—the DNA.

What followed was unprecedented in European history.

The DNA prosecuted over 12,300 officials. The conviction rate approached 90%. They didn’t go after small-time bureaucrats. They went after everyone.

Adrian Năstase was Prime Minister from 2000 to 2004. The DNA convicted him of bribery. He tried to kill himself when the verdict was announced—shot himself in the neck. He survived. He went to prison. The first Romanian head of government ever imprisoned.

Liviu Dragnea was, by 2018, the most powerful politician in Romania. President of the Chamber of Deputies. President of the ruling party. The DNA convicted him of abuse of power. When the verdict was announced, Romanians celebrated in the streets of Bucharest.

This wasn’t some show trial. This was actual accountability, applied to the most powerful people in the country.

In 2019, Laura Codruța Kövesi was appointed the first European Chief Prosecutor.

A Romanian anti-corruption prosecutor now leads Europe’s fight against financial crime.

Meanwhile, anonymous Danish investors call me corrupt because of my passport.

Part Six: Why This Matters More Than Shape Robotics

Shape Robotics was a small company. 302 million kroner in revenue. Educational robots for schoolchildren. Not exactly systemically important.

I was a nobody. A Romanian outsider. No powerful Danish connections.

So when I filed a market manipulation complaint with Nasdaq in November 2025, you might expect the response to be... nothing. A small company complaining about a respected analyst. Who cares?

Instead, here’s what happened.

Within weeks of me publishing my investigation on Substack, Finans—a major Danish financial publication—launched a counter-strike. But they didn’t investigate Lars Topholm. They investigated me.

They dug up a case from 2017. Eight years ago. A Romanian insolvency case that had been fully disclosed and was completely unrelated to Shape Robotics.

And then they obtained sealed whistleblower documents.

I need to explain what this means. In 2018, I went to Romanian anti-corruption authorities as a protected whistleblower. I reported fraud at a previous company. That testimony is sealed under Romanian law and EU directive. It’s protected.

The only way Finans could have obtained those documents is through criminal disclosure. Under Romanian law, leaking sealed court documents carries a penalty of one to five years imprisonment.

And they published on January 27, 2026—one day before I was scheduled to testify to the bankruptcy trustee.

One day.

This is not journalism. This is witness intimidation dressed up as journalism.

But here’s what I want you to understand: the intensity of this response only makes sense if I’ve discovered something real.

If my accusations were baseless, they would be ignored. Who cares what a Romanian CEO says about a respected Danish analyst? Let him yell into the void.

But they didn’t ignore it. They obtained criminally sealed documents. They timed the publication to maximize damage. They went all in.

The intensity of the attack is proportional to the threat.

They’re not attacking because I’m wrong. They’re attacking because I’m right.

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Part Seven: The Calculation

Let me tell you what I think happened.

Lars Topholm looked at me and saw an easy target. A Romanian. An outsider. Someone with a disclosed insolvency case in his past. No media connections, no establishment protection, no powerful friends.

He calculated that if things went wrong, no one would believe me. Lars has 35 years in Danish finance. He’s Carnegie’s Head of Research. He speaks at conferences. When Lars says something, people listen.

When a Romanian CEO makes accusations? Everyone remembers that corruption is “the rule” in Romania.

They were too courageous because I looked easy to destroy.

They didn’t understand several things.

They didn’t understand that I came from a country that jails its Prime Ministers. That I grew up watching the DNA achieve 90% conviction rates. That I have a different relationship with accountability than they do.

They didn’t understand that I documented everything. Every meeting. Every email. Every trade. Every word.

They didn’t understand that when you destroy someone’s company, take away their livelihood, and then attack them with criminally obtained documents—you don’t create a victim. You create an enemy.

They thought this would be over quickly. The Romanian would go away. The media attack would silence him. The bankruptcy would bury the story.

Instead, they created someone with nothing left to lose, documentary evidence of everything they did, and a story that keeps getting more interesting the deeper you dig.

Søren Bendixen’s holding company had a 10,320% profit increase during the year of the scheme. Where did that money come from?

Someone is going to have to answer that question eventually.

Part Eight: The Reckoning

I’m going to tell you what I know for certain, and what I suspect.

What I know:

Lars Topholm owned undisclosed shares in Shape Robotics while serving as an “advisor” to the company. He extracted material non-public information in private meetings. He sold his shares the same day as his network’s investment vehicle. His bank pumped the stock while his network dumped it. On tape, he admits: “I consider myself an insider.”

Martin Bundgaard, Lars’s self-described “best friend,” owned 318,331 shares and was CC’d on the email that appears to have been the coordination signal.

Søren Bendixen’s holding company went from 357,000 kroner profit in 2022 to 37.2 million kroner profit in 2024—a 10,320% increase during exactly the period of the scheme.

Finans obtained criminally sealed whistleblower documents and published them one day before my testimony.

Denmark, the world’s “least corrupt” country, does not publish statistics on corruption investigations.

What I suspect:

The total extraction was far larger than the documented 21 million kroner. The profits in Bendixen’s holding company suggest they may have been shorting through omnibus accounts while selling their long positions and while Carnegie pumped retail investors to buy.

The media attack isn’t about Shape Robotics. It’s about what I’ve discovered. The intensity only makes sense if this threatens something bigger than one small educational robotics company.

Epilogue: We Will Never Back Down

There’s a moment in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead where Howard Roark, the architect who refuses to compromise his vision, stands alone against the entire establishment. They attack him, marginalize him, try to destroy him. But he doesn’t bend.

I used to think that was just fiction. The kind of heroic narrative that sounds good in books but doesn’t survive contact with reality.

I don’t think that anymore.

I am Mark Abraham. I’m Romanian. I built a company from Zero to 302 million kroner. I served 300,000 students with educational technology. I created seventy jobs.

I exposed market manipulation. I documented the scheme. I filed complaints. I’m suing for defamation. I’m pursuing criminal complaints for the leaked sealed documents.

And I’m writing this, so that everyone who reads it understands what happened.

My Romanian nationality cannot be used against me. The evidence is documented. The timeline is precise. The profits are in public records.

In December 2025, the European Court of Justice ruled that Denmark’s “ghetto law”—which targets neighborhoods based on the proportion of “non-Western immigrants”—may constitute direct ethnic discrimination.

Denmark, the mother of happiness and fairness, ruled potentially discriminatory by Europe’s highest court.

The myth is cracking.

They thought destroying a Romanian would be easy. They calculated that no one would believe me, that the media attack would silence me, that I would go away quietly.

They made a grave mistake.

Every attack makes me stronger. Every sealed document they leak becomes evidence of their crimes. Every coordinated media strike proves the conspiracy exists.

We will never back down.

If you want to follow this story, subscribe to my Substack:

Wild CEO - The Journey

Key investigations:

📖 THE CURRENCY KILLER — The complete investigation with trading data, recordings, and the 8-step causality chain

📖 The Price of Speaking Up — What happens when a whistleblower fights back

📖 In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It — The full history

📖 Why We Are Suing Finans — The €45 million defamation lawsuit

📖 Fifty-Three Euros Per Minute — The human cost

This essay is dedicated to every Romanian who has been judged by their passport instead of their character: You are not alone.

The truth is on our side.

THE CURRENCY KILLER: How a Danish Banker Destroyed 70 Jobs to Protect His Own Company

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:43:17 GMT

I’m going to tell you how a trusted Danish investment banker used his position at Carnegie Bank to pump my company’s stock, coordinated with his investor network to dump 21 million kroner at peak prices, then destroyed our ability to raise capital—all to protect his own company that was competing for the same investor money.

And when I exposed it in December 2025, Danish financial media attacked my credibility to cover it up.

This is documented. This is irrefutable. This is checkmate.

THE SIMPLE VERSION

April 15-16, 2024: Lars Topholm (Carnegie Bank analyst, Chairman of Aerbio biotech) extracts all our secrets in “advisory” meetings.

April 16-24, 2024: Lars briefs Carnegie’s sales team. They pump our stock to investors across Europe.

April 24-June 4, 2024: Lars and his entire Aerbio investor network dump ~532,000 shares, extracting ~21 million kroner at peak prices. Same-day exits prove coordination.

June 6, 2024: Carnegie withdraws from helping us—exactly 2 days after the last Aerbio investor finishes selling.

July 11, 2024: Lars meets me for breakfast. I record everything. He admits “Martin is my best friend” and explains “your currency issues here.”

August 26, 2024: Børsen (Danish financial media) publishes glowing articles about Aerbio’s €50 million fundraising plans.

December 2025: I publish Episodes 1-2, exposing the pump-and-dump with complete evidence.

Late December 2025: Finans (same media group as Børsen) publishes attack article about my 7-year-old Romanian case—trying to destroy my credibility before people investigate Lars.

January 8, 2026: Shape Robotics bankrupt. 70 jobs lost.

The conflict: Lars’s Aerbio needed €50 million. My company needed €20 million. Same investor pool. Lars chose: kill Shape, protect Aerbio.

The proof: I have the 90-minute recording where Lars admits everything. I have the complete trading records. I have the Carnegie transcript. I have all of it.

PART I: THE PLAYERS

Lars Topholm

Carnegie Bank Head of Research (Denmark’s top investment bank)
Chairman of Aerbio (biotech startup)
Owned 3,500 Shape shares (undisclosed during advisory process)
35 years in Danish finance
Everyone trusts Lars

Martin Bundgaard

Professional investor, Sundvænget Invest
Owned 318,331 Shape shares (worth 12-14 million kroner)
Lars’s “best friend” (Lars admits on recording)
Investor in Aerbio
Also trusted by everyone

Søren Bendixen

Professional investor
Owned ~70,492 Shape shares
Investor in Aerbio
Co-investor with Martin in multiple ventures

Sundvænget (Investment Vehicle)

Owned by Martin and Søren
Owned ~140,000 Shape shares
Vehicle used by Aerbio investors

Me (Mark Abraham)

Romanian CEO of Shape Robotics
Had an insolvency case in Romania 2017 (I maintain innocence, publicly disclosed 2023)
Nobody trusts the Romanian guy

That last point matters. Keep it in mind.

THE CONFLICT NOBODY TOLD ME ABOUT

Here’s what I didn’t know in April 2024:

Lars is Chairman of Aerbio. They’re raising €50 million to build commercial facilities and prepare for IPO within 3 years.

My company, Shape Robotics, needs €20 million to execute Poland contracts worth €35 million.

Same Danish investor pool. Same institutional investors. Same timing.

If Shape successfully raises €20M → Aerbio has less capital available

If Shape’s stock collapses → Aerbio has full access to investor capital

Lars had to choose: Shape or Aerbio.

He chose Aerbio.

Then he used his Carnegie position to make it happen.

PART II: THE INTELLIGENCE EXTRACTION

April 15, 2024: The Private Meeting

Lars calls me. Carnegie Bank might help us raise capital. I’m excited—Carnegie is Denmark’s top bank.

I meet Lars in Copenhagen. I show him everything:

What I disclosed:

Our exact cash flow situation (need money by Q3 2024)
Our Poland opportunity (40% of Polish school market—massive revenue)
Our new CFO (Wiktor, young, limited experience)
Our capital raise plans (€20 million target)

Lars takes detailed notes.

What I didn’t know:

Lars owns 3,500 shares (undisclosed)
Lars’s best friend Martin owns 318,331 shares (undisclosed)
Lars is Chairman of Aerbio (competing for same €50M)
Martin, Søren, and their vehicle Sundvænget are all Aerbio investors
They’re all about to dump

April 16, 2024: The Official Call

Carnegie’s corporate advisory team does an official Zoom call with us. 48 minutes. Recorded. Transcribed.

Key quote from Carnegie advisor:

“We would have primed some of the key guys and that would have been Lars doing that. So they’re not starting totally from scratch.”

Translation: Lars is going to brief Carnegie’s global sales team with all the inside information he just extracted.

But wait—isn’t Lars the “research analyst”? Isn’t he supposed to be separated from corporate advisory/sales? Isn’t that the whole point of “Chinese walls”?

There was no wall.

On that same call, I reveal even more:

“Poland could be more than 40% market share, double what we initially discussed.”

Now Lars knows:

Exactly how big our opportunity is
Exactly how much cash we need
Exactly when we need it
Exactly where we’re vulnerable

And he owns 3,500 shares.
And his best friend owns 318,331 shares.
And they’re all Aerbio investors.

PART III: THE PUMP

Between April 16-24, 2024, Carnegie’s sales team actively pitched Shape stock to institutional investors across Europe.

The pitch (using inside information):

Poland: 40% market share opportunity (Lars learned April 16)
€35 million government contracts secured
Revenue growth: 1,597% (2021-2024)
“Attractive entry point” at 43-45 kroner

The result:
Stock stays elevated at 43-45 kr throughout the pump period.

During this pump:

Lars owns 3,500 shares (undisclosed)
Martin owns 318,331 shares (undisclosed)
Søren owns ~70,492 shares (undisclosed)
Sundvænget owns ~140,000 shares (undisclosed)

Total Aerbio network position: ~532,000 shares

This is the “PUMP” in pump-and-dump.

PART IV: THE COORDINATION SIGNAL

April 24, 2024: Lars sends an email.

From: lars.topholm@carnegie.dk
To: Jeppe Frandsen (our Chairman)
CC: martin@sundvaengetinvest.gmail.com

Wait. Why is Martin CC’d? He’s not on the board. He has no official role. He’s just a shareholder.

The email attacks our CFO:

“Your new CFO’s experience at KPMG was a 6-month internship. His experience at Ernst & Young was 7 months as intern + 13 months as analyst. His CFO experience was at a company with only €5 million revenue.”
“I told a big London hedge fund about this and they said: ‘Now I can become a CFO too, this is even worse than Chemometec.‘”

Chemometec is Denmark’s most shorted stock. It’s code for “sell this stock now.”

The timing:

April 16-24: Lars pumps stock through Carnegie
April 24: Lars emails attack, CCs Martin
April 26: Lars and network dump

The email is the coordination signal.

PART V: THE SYNCHRONIZED DUMP

Now I’m going to show you the trading data. This is from VP Securities (Danish government registry). Public record. Irrefutable.

The Complete Dump Sequence:

April 24, 2024: Sundvænget starts selling (20,000 shares)

April 25, 2024:

Martin dumps 131,581 shares (massive exit)
Sundvænget sells 20,865 more

April 26, 2024:

LARS SELLS ALL 3,500 SHARES
SUNDVÆNGET DUMPS 94,927 SHARES
SAME DAY = THE COORDINATION PROOF

April 30, 2024: Sundvænget finishes (100% out)

May 24-28, 2024: Martin finishes dumping (318,331 total, 100% out)

June 4, 2024: Søren dumps ALL shares (~70,492, 100% out)

June 6, 2024: Carnegie withdraws—exactly 2 days after last Aerbio investor is out

[TABLE 1: The Synchronized Dump Timeline]

Look at that coordination:

All four entities connected through Aerbio
All dumped within 6 weeks
Lars + Sundvænget dumped same day (signal)
Carnegie withdrew 2 days after last exit

This is network pump-and-dump.

Thanks for reading Wild CEO - The Journey! This post is public so feel free to share it.

[TABLE 2: The Money Extracted]

Conservative estimate at 40 kr average:

The Aerbio network extracted 21 million kroner at peak prices.

Share price never recovered, Shape went bankrupt.

PART VI: THE BREAKFAST CONFESSION

Two months after the dump, Lars asks to meet me for breakfast.

July 11, 2024. Villa Copenhagen hotel.

I record the entire 90-minute conversation.

Here’s what Lars says on tape:

“Your Currency Issues Here”

LARS:

“But the problem, whatever you do, your currency issues here. You want to pay for something or to print new ones, and you want to make sure the share price is good. You have a currency that’s undervalued.“

Lars is explaining that stock price = currency for public companies.

Destroy the stock price = destroy the company.

And he’s sitting across from me, explaining exactly how he killed our currency.

Two months after pumping our stock and dumping with his network.

“Martin Is My Best Friend”

ME: “I wanted to understand what really happened with Martin.”

LARS: “I know he sold his shares as I did.”

ME: “You talk with Martin?”

LARS: “Martin is my best friend. I speak to him anytime.”

He admits it. On tape.

Martin is his best friend.
They’re both in Aerbio.
They both owned Shape shares.
They both sold April 26-May 28.

And Lars never disclosed any of this.

“I Consider Myself an Insider”

ME: “Can you help me reach out to investors?”

LARS: “I consider myself an insider. I can’t talk to anyone.”

I check the registry after our meeting.

Lars is not registered as an insider.

But here’s the beautiful irony:

If Lars is an insider (as he claims) → He committed insider trading

If Lars is NOT an insider → He still committed insider trading (material non-public information)

Either way, he’s guilty.

And he admitted it on tape.

Lars Never Denies Coordination

ME: “Why didn’t Martin talk to me before selling?”

LARS: “They’re free to sell their shares. Martin is arguably the best investor I know.”

Notice what he doesn’t say?

He doesn’t say: “Martin and I didn’t coordinate.”
He doesn’t say: “I didn’t share information with Martin.”
He doesn’t say: “We made independent decisions.”

In 90 minutes of recorded conversation, Lars never denies coordination.

That’s an admission.

PART VII: THE MEDIA COMPLICITY

August 26, 2024: Børsen Promotes Aerbio

Exactly 4 months after the Aerbio network dump, Børsen (Denmark’s leading financial newspaper) publishes:

“IPO candidate raising capital: Pandora CEO joins board”

Key excerpt:

“Biotech company Aerbio with stock analyst Lars Topholm as chairman wants to list the company on the stock exchange within three years. He is hunting for 50 million euros in capital.”

The article is glowing. Lars is a visionary. Aerbio is the future.

No questions asked:

Why did Lars’s network dump Shape stock?
Why did Carnegie withdraw right after?
Does Aerbio competing for €50M create conflicts?

Zero questions. Just promotion.

December 2025: I Expose the Pump-and-Dump

Throughout 2024-2025, Shape struggles. Stock collapses. We can’t raise capital. Everything Lars predicted comes true.

In December 2025, I’ve had enough, I broke free.

I publish Episodes 1 and 2 on my Substack.

I expose:

Lars’s conflicts of interest
The April 16 Carnegie call where Lars got inside information
The April 24 email where Lars CC’d Martin
The April 26 same-day dump
The complete trading records
The July 11 recording

I present complete documented evidence of pump-and-dump.

The story starts spreading. People start asking questions.

Late December 2025: Finans Attacks

Within weeks of my Episodes 1-2 going public, Finans publishes:

“Shape Robotics CEO Under Criminal Investigation in Romania”

About my 2017 insolvency case.

What Finans doesn’t mention:

Already disclosed to board prior to acquisition of StoryKids
I maintain innocence
No connection to Shape’s current problems
No connection to Lars’s pump-and-dump

Why publish now?

Because I just exposed Lars with documented evidence, and they need to destroy my credibility before people investigate him.

The Logic Is Simple

If my accusations are false:
Finans reports: “Former CEO makes baseless claims. Regulators find no evidence.”

Instead, they dig up my 7-year-old case immediately after I expose Lars.

Why?

If people trust Mark → They investigate Lars
If people hate Mark → They ignore evidence

Finans chose option 2.

The timing proves everything. I expose Lars in December 2025. Finans attacks me within weeks. This is coordinated establishment defense.

Finans and Børsen: Same Company

Important context: Both owned by Bonnier News.

August 26, 2024: Børsen promotes Lars’s Aerbio (glowing coverage)
December 2025: I publish Episodes 1-2 (exposing Lars)
Late December 2025: Finans attacks me (same media group)

This is coordinated establishment protection.

PART VIII: THE 8-STEP CAUSALITY CHAIN

Here’s the complete sequence that destroyed Shape Robotics:

Step 1: Intelligence Extraction (April 15-16, 2024)
Lars gets complete non-public information through private meeting and Carnegie call.
Evidence: Carnegie transcript, my testimony

Step 2: The Pump (April 16-24, 2024)
Lars briefs Carnegie sales team. They pitch Shape to investors. Stock stays at 43-45 kr.
Evidence: Transcript quote “Lars would have primed the key guys”

Step 3: Coordination Signal (April 24, 2024)
Lars emails CFO attack, CCs Martin (no official role).
Evidence: Email from lars.topholm@carnegie.dk

Step 4: The Synchronized Dump (April 24-June 4, 2024)
Entire Aerbio network dumps: Lars + Martin + Søren + Sundvænget. Same-day exits prove coordination.
Evidence: VP Securities trading records

Step 5: Carnegie Withdrawal (June 6, 2024)
Carnegie withdraws exactly 2 days after Søren (last Aerbio investor) finishes selling.
Evidence: Withdrawal letter dated June 6

Step 6: Currency Destruction (July 2024-December 2025)
Stock collapses 42 kr → 6 kr. Can’t raise capital. Can’t execute contracts.
Evidence: Stock data + July 11 recording

Step 7: Mark Exposes the Scheme (December 2025)
I publish Episodes 1-2 with complete evidence of pump-and-dump.
Evidence: Published articles with recordings, trading data, timeline

Step 8: Media Attack (Late December 2025)
Finans attacks my credibility within weeks of my exposé—trying to protect Lars.
Evidence: Finans article published after my exposé

Step 9: Bankruptcy (January 8, 2026)
Shape bankrupt. 70 jobs lost.
Evidence: Bankruptcy filing

Remove Lars’s actions → Shape survives.

This is causation, not correlation.

[TABLE 3: THE COMPLETE TIMELINE - CORRECTED]

From 45 kroner to 0 kroner in 20 months.

But the Aerbio network got out at 42 kroner in April 2024.

After Lars pumped the stock using Carnegie’s credibility.

And when I exposed it in December 2025, Finans attacked me within weeks.

WHY THIS IS IRREFUTABLE

1. THE CONFLICT (Proven)

Aerbio needs €50M (Lars is Chairman)
Shape needs €20M
Same investor pool
Lars chose: kill Shape, protect Aerbio
Evidence: Børsen article + corporate records

2. THE INSIDE INFORMATION (Proven)

Lars learned Poland 40%, CFO weakness, cash timing
All non-public information
Evidence: April 16 Carnegie transcript

3. THE PUMP (Proven)

Lars briefed Carnegie sales team
They pitched Shape to investors April 16-24
Evidence: “Lars would have primed the key guys”

4. THE COORDINATION (Proven)

April 24 email CCs Martin
April 26 same-day dump (Lars + Sundvænget)
Network all connected through Aerbio
Evidence: Email + VP Securities + July 11 recording

5. THE NETWORK (Proven)

Lars = Aerbio Chairman
Martin = Aerbio investor + “best friend”
Søren = Aerbio investor
All dumped April-June 2024
Evidence: Corporate docs + recording + trading records

6. CARNEGIE COMPLICITY (Proven)

Withdrew June 6 (2 days after last Aerbio investor out)
Mission accomplished timing
Evidence: Withdrawal letter + trading records

7. MEDIA COMPLICITY (Proven)

Børsen promoted Aerbio (Aug 2024)
I exposed Lars (Dec 2025)
Finans attacked me (Late Dec 2025 - within weeks of my exposé)
Same ownership (Bonnier News)
Evidence: Published articles with dates

8. CAUSATION (Proven)

Remove Lars → Shape survives
Stock collapse → Can’t raise capital → Bankruptcy
Evidence: Timeline + July 11 recording

THE THREE QUESTIONS

Question 1: Why would Lars risk his reputation?

Answer: Because he had to choose between Shape (not his company) and Aerbio (his company as Chairman). Aerbio needed €50M. If Shape raised €20M successfully, Aerbio would have less available capital. The choice was obvious.

Question 2: Why did Carnegie help him?

Answer: Lars was Carnegie’s Head of Research. He generated revenue for the bank. And after the network dumped, Carnegie’s exposure was zero. They withdrew June 6. No consequences for them.

Question 3: Why did Danish media attack me instead of investigating Lars?

Answer: The timing proves everything. I exposed Lars with documented evidence in December 2025. Within weeks, Finans published the attack article. This isn’t journalism—this is establishment protection. Lars is Danish establishment (35 years in finance, Carnegie, everyone trusts him). I’m a Romanian CEO with an insolvency in my past. When establishment media has to choose between investigating a Danish insider and destroying a foreign whistleblower, they protect the insider. The fact that they attacked me immediately after my exposé proves my accusations have merit.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

I’m publishing this on January 13, 2026.

I’m sending this to:

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-113-sec-announces-formation-cross-border-task-force-combat-fraud

I’m asking for criminal investigation of:

Pump-and-dump scheme
Insider trading
Market manipulation
Network conspiracy
Chinese wall violations

IF I’M WRONG

If regulators investigate and find:

No insider trading
No coordination
No pump-and-dump
Everything was legal

Then I was wrong. I’ll publish a retraction.

But they must actually investigate:

Interview Lars, Martin, Søren under oath
Analyze trading patterns
Review communications
Listen to July 11 recording
Review Carnegie transcript

Then make a determination.

IF I’M RIGHT

If the investigation confirms:

Pump-and-dump occurred
Network coordination occurred
Media complicity occurred

Then Danes should know.

Because this means the Danish financial system is compromised. Trusted insiders can exploit conflicts without consequences. Foreign CEOs are scapegoated when they expose fraud. And Danish media attacks whistleblowers instead of investigating the powerful.

And if this happened to Shape Robotics, it can happen to any company.

FINAL WORD

On January 8, 2026, Shape Robotics went bankrupt.

70 people lost their jobs:

15 in Denmark
25 in Romania
20 in Poland
5 in Moldova
5 in other countries

205 million kroner of shareholder value was destroyed.

But Lars Topholm and his Aerbio network got out at 42 kroner in April 2024.

Same day exits. April 26, 2024.

After Lars pumped the stock using Carnegie’s credibility.

After Lars extracted our secrets in private meetings.

After he CC’d Martin on the attack email.

Lars explained it to me over breakfast in July 2024:

“Your currency issues here. You have a currency that’s undervalued.”

He was right. And he helped destroy that currency.

When I exposed it all in December 2025, Finans attacked me within weeks.

That timing tells you everything.

I’m publishing this because those 70 people deserve to know what really happened.

Not the version where “the Romanian CEO with a criminal past ran a company into the ground.”

The version where a trusted Danish insider executed a network pump-and-dump, extracted 21 million kroner, destroyed a competitor to protect his own company, and when exposed, had the media destroy the whistleblower’s credibility to cover the tracks.

This is not revenge. This is documented evidence.

This is checkmate.

EVIDENCE REPOSITORY

All documentation is preserved and available for regulatory review:

Primary Evidence:

July 11, 2024 audio recording (90 minutes, full transcript) https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1M1GkdCUk8SAtzIeAalRgpsTsXhDalN66?usp=sharing
April 16, 2024 Carnegie transcript (48 minutes)
April 24, 2024 email (Martin CC’d)
VP Securities trading records (complete history, all 4 accounts) https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1pvStf5ifDmebNYj0gJ-BtzZ4LcO15jRG?usp=sharing
Text messages (October 2024)
Carnegie withdrawal letter (June 6, 2024)
Episodes 1-2 (Published December 2025)
Finans attack article (Published late December 2025, after my exposé)

Lt5

69.1KB ∙ PDF file

Shape Robotics X Carnegie Transcript 65bd3afd 73e7 4590 B1bd D0ffe1955777

174KB ∙ PDF file

Lt2

520KB ∙ PDF file

Lt6

234KB ∙ PDF file

Lt4

607KB ∙ PDF file

Messages Between Mark And Lars

1.58MB ∙ PDF file

Lt3

325KB ∙ PDF file

Lt1

2.92MB ∙ PDF file

Lt7

2.78MB ∙ PDF file

Carnegie Meets Shape Robotics April 2024

9.05MB ∙ PDF file

Public Sources:

Børsen articles (Aug 26, 2024): [Links in full version]
Finans article (Late Dec 2025): [Link in full version]
Aerbio corporate documents: [Links in full version]
VP Securities registry:

https://www.vp.dk

Episode 2: https://open.substack.com/pub/mevk827/p/episode-2-the-pump-and-dump-a-four

Published January 13, 2026

Episode 3: CHECKMATE

Read Episode 2: https://open.substack.com/pub/mevk827/p/episode-2-the-pump-and-dump-a-four

Share this story if you think:

70 jobs matter
Pump-and-dump schemes should be prosecuted
Media should investigate the powerful, not attack whistleblowers
Conflicts of interest should be disclosed
Trust needs verification

Make sure the world knows what happened.

#ShapeRobotics #LarsTopholm #MartinBundgaard #PumpAndDump #AerbioNetwork #70Jobs #CurrencyKiller #Carnegie #Børsen #Finans #CheckMate #Whistleblower

THE END

The network is exposed.
The evidence is irrefutable.
The timeline proves establishment defense.
This is checkmate.

How Danish Incompetence Destroyed a Romanian Educational Technology Success Story — And What It Means for Europe

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 10 Jan 2026 13:10:59 GMT

On the evening of January 6, 2026, I was working from my home office in Romania when my phone started buzzing with messages from shareholders. “What’s happening?” they asked. “Why are the shares suspended?” “Is it true?”

I had no idea what they were talking about.

It took me twenty minutes to discover that a Danish court had declared Shape Robotics A/S bankrupt that afternoon. The company my domestic partner Elena Pasat and I had built together into a 300-million-kroner success story. The company that provided educational technology to thousands of Romanian children. The company whose bankruptcy I learned about the same way as everyone else: from panicked messages and news alerts.

The Danish court had held a hearing without me. Without my knowledge. Without sending me any notification.

I am a Romanian citizen, residing in Romania. Under European Union law, specifically Regulation 1393/2007, Danish courts are required to properly serve foreign citizens in cross-border legal proceedings. They must transmit documents through official channels. They must ensure the recipient actually receives them. They must provide an opportunity to defend.

None of that happened.

But the violation of EU law was just the final act. The real story started forty days earlier, on November 27, 2025, when I filed a formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen alleging market manipulation by a prominent Danish financial analyst.

What happened in those forty days is a story about whistleblowing and retaliation. About ethnic discrimination in European media. About a Romanian success story deliberately destroyed. And about whether European institutions will defend their own laws and values when the victim is Romanian.

This is that story, told in full, with complete documentation, for the Romanian government, the European Commission, and anyone who cares about justice.

PART ONE: THE ROMANIAN SUCCESS THAT NOBODY WANTED TO TALK ABOUT

The story actually begins in 2017, in Romania, with a partnership between me and my domestic partner Elena Pasat.

Elena had spent years working in educational journalism and pedagogy. She understood Romanian schools intimately. She understood teachers, curriculum development, and the humanistic side of education. She understood the gap between the education system Romania had and the education system Romanian children deserved. I brought the technology expertise—systems architecture, product development, technical implementation.

In 2017, we founded a company called StoryKids together. Elena owned the company and focused on the educational content and pedagogical approach. I served as CTO, handling all technical aspects. Our mission was straightforward: bring modern digital learning tools to Romanian classrooms.

The product was called a “smart lab” or “smart classroom.” Not just a single device, but a complete learning environment. 3D printers so students could design and build physical objects. Robotics kits for programming education. Tablets and computers for digital literacy. An integrated online platform with video-based lessons aligned to the Romanian curriculum, developed with Elena’s educational expertise. Everything a school needed to step into 21st-century education, delivered as a package, installed and ready to use.

It was exactly what Romanian schools needed, but for the first few years, scaling was slow. Government procurement is complicated. School budgets are limited. Building a business in educational technology in Romania meant patience and persistence.

Then COVID-19 changed everything.

In 2020, as Europe locked down and economies collapsed, the European Union created the Recovery and Resilience Facility—a 723-billion-euro program to help member states recover and modernize. Each country developed a plan for how to use the funds. Romania’s plan included a major focus on digitalizing education, particularly in rural and underserved areas.

Smart classrooms became a national priority, with hundreds of millions of lei allocated for procurement over several years.

StoryKids was perfectly positioned. Elena and I had the products, the experience, the relationships with the Ministry of Education, and the operational capacity to deliver at scale. In 2021, StoryKids started winning major contracts under the RRF program.

That same year, a Danish company came calling.

Shape Robotics A/S was a small firm listed on the Nasdaq Copenhagen First North exchange. It had been founded by researchers at Denmark’s Technical University who developed an educational robot called “Fable”—modular blocks that students could assemble and program. It was clever technology, but the business was modest. In 2019, Shape Robotics had revenue of 8.1 million Danish kroner—about one million euros.

When Shape Robotics executives heard about StoryKids’ success winning Romanian government contracts, they saw an opportunity. StoryKids needed capital to scale. Shape Robotics needed growth to justify a move to the main stock exchange. The combination made strategic sense.

In 2021, Shape Robotics acquired StoryKids for up to two million euros, paid partly in cash and partly in shares. Elena and I stayed on to run the Romanian operations, maintaining our division of labor—Elena handling educational strategy and content, me handling technology and operations. The plan was simple: StoryKids would continue executing its Romanian contracts while Shape Robotics provided capital, international credibility, and a platform for expansion.

What happened next exceeded everyone’s expectations.

The numbers tell the story. In 2021, Shape Robotics’ revenue was around 40 million kroner. In 2022, it jumped to 87 million. In 2023, it reached 171 million. By 2025, we were on track for over 300 million kroner in annual revenue.

Where was that growth coming from? Romania. According to the company’s annual reports, 95 percent of Shape Robotics revenue came from Romanian contracts. Not Danish robot sales. Not international expansion. Romanian smart classrooms for Romanian schools, funded by EU recovery programs, executed by a Romanian team that Elena and I had built together.

The Finans newspaper article published on January 9, 2026—the same article that framed our bankruptcy as inevitable failure—acknowledged this plainly: “It was the so-called smart classrooms that drove sales, and 95 percent of revenue came from Romania according to the annual report.”

By any reasonable calculation, StoryKids represented 99 percent of Shape Robotics’ enterprise value by 2025. The “Danish robotics company” was actually a Romanian educational technology company with a Danish stock ticker.

Thousands of Romanian students were using StoryKids smart classrooms. Rural schools in counties that had never had modern technology were getting 3D printers and robotics labs. Teachers were being trained in digital pedagogy using Elena’s curriculum materials. The online learning platform was delivering content to students across the country.

This was Romanian innovation, Romanian execution, Romanian excellence. Serving Romanian children. Funded by European investment in Romania’s future.

It was, in other words, exactly the kind of success story the European Union was designed to enable.

Nobody in Denmark wanted to talk about that part.

PART TWO: THE ANALYST WHO FORGOT TO MENTION HE OWNED THE STOCK

In March 2024, a prominent Danish financial analyst named Lars Topholm published a research report on Shape Robotics.

Lars Topholm is well-known in Copenhagen’s small financial community. He writes for several publications, appears in media, and is considered an authority on small-cap stocks. When Topholm publishes analysis, people pay attention.

His March 2024 report on Shape Robotics was glowing. He highlighted the company’s growth trajectory. He emphasized the enormous market opportunity in educational technology. He projected continued revenue acceleration. The analysis was detailed, professional, and strongly positive.

There was just one problem.

At the time he published the report, Lars Topholm personally owned shares in Shape Robotics. And he didn’t disclose that fact to readers.

In financial journalism, this is called a conflict of interest. In securities regulation, it’s a violation of disclosure requirements. In plain English, it’s something you’re not allowed to do. When you recommend a stock to others, you have to tell them if you’ll profit from them buying it based on your recommendation.

Topholm didn’t tell them.

What happened next followed a pattern that anyone familiar with pump-and-dump schemes would recognize. After Topholm’s positive analysis was published and the stock price rose on buying interest, Topholm and his business partner sold their shares. And over the following months, as I investigated trading patterns in my capacity as CEO, the evidence suggested that Topholm and his associate were working together to drive the price down through coordinated selling and negative commentary.

The pattern was clear enough: buy shares, publish positive analysis without disclosing your position, sell into the buying interest, then manipulate the price downward through coordinated trading. Classic manipulation.

As CEO of a listed company, I had a legal obligation to report suspected market manipulation to authorities. This wasn’t optional. This wasn’t a vendetta. This was my fiduciary duty to shareholders and regulatory duty under Danish securities law.

On November 27, 2025, Shape Robotics filed a formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen, the stock exchange where we were listed. The complaint detailed Topholm’s undisclosed conflict of interest, provided evidence of the coordinated trading pattern, and requested a regulatory investigation.

The announcement went public that morning. “Notification of Potential Share Price Manipulation Submitted to Nasdaq,” the company announcement read. It named no names publicly—regulatory complaints are confidential—but in Copenhagen’s small financial community, everyone knew who we were talking about.

I was acting as a whistleblower, exposing financial crime through the proper regulatory channels.

What I didn’t fully understand was that I had just threatened powerful people in the Danish financial establishment. People who had the means to destroy me. People who would not tolerate a Romanian CEO exposing their schemes.

The retaliation began within twenty-four hours.

PART THREE: THE FIGHT WITH EIFO THAT BECAME A WEAPON

The next morning, November 28, 2025, Shape Robotics was forced to issue a public announcement that would change everything.

Denmark’s export credit agency, known as EIFO, was withdrawing its guarantee for part of our debt. The announcement hit the market like a bomb. Share price dropped. Investors panicked. Media started writing about “crisis” and “troubled company.”

But the real story of what happened with EIFO is more complicated than anyone reported, and it reveals something important about how we were set up to fail.

Let me explain what actually happened.

When Shape Robotics moved from the junior First North exchange to the main Nasdaq Copenhagen market in November 2023, EIFO informed us that under their standard rules, they don’t provide guarantees for companies listed on the main exchange. The logic is that main market companies supposedly have better access to capital markets and don’t need state support.

We were given time to find alternative financing. We had multiple options and were actively pursuing them throughout 2024 and into 2025. By late 2025, we had made significant progress with IRIS Capital Investment, a Paris-based institutional investor, and had signed engagement letters and term sheets. The board had given us until November to secure the alternative financing, and we were on track.

But here’s what almost nobody knows, and what makes this whole situation even more damaging: there was a way for EIFO to continue supporting us.

Under the EU’s General Block Exemption Regulation—GBER—there are specific exceptions that allow state agencies like EIFO to support companies engaged in digital transformation initiatives. This is exactly what we do. StoryKids wasn’t just selling hardware to schools. We were implementing comprehensive digital transformation of Romanian education infrastructure. Digital learning labs. Teacher training in digital pedagogy. Online platforms integrated with national curriculum. This is precisely the kind of digital transformation initiative that GBER exceptions are designed to support.

EIFO was unwilling to apply for this exception on our behalf.

Think about what this means. We had a legitimate basis under EU regulations for continued state support. We were doing exactly the kind of work—digital transformation in education—that European policy is designed to encourage. But EIFO wouldn’t even try to use the available exception.

We pushed back. Hard. We argued that they should at minimum apply for the GBER digital transformation exception before simply walking away. Eventually, after considerable pressure, EIFO did agree to explore the exception process rather than outright canceling their guarantees.

But by then, the damage was done. The November 28 announcement that EIFO was withdrawing support—even though we were actively fighting to preserve it through the GBER exception—created the crisis narrative. Investors didn’t hear “EIFO exploring exception process for digital transformation company.” They heard “EIFO pulling out, company in crisis.”

The fact that EIFO was initially unwilling to even try for an exception we clearly qualified for raises uncomfortable questions. Were they under pressure? Did someone want us weakened? Or was it simply bureaucratic rigidity?

I don’t know. But the timing is impossible to ignore. One day after we filed a market manipulation complaint against a prominent Danish analyst, suddenly we’re in a very public “crisis” with a Danish state agency.

Still, we worked to stabilize the situation. On November 30, just three days after the EIFO announcement, we concluded a formal repayment agreement—an afdragsordning under Danish law—with Danske Bank and EIFO. We made the first payment of 3.7 million kroner immediately, demonstrating both our seriousness and our liquidity. A second payment of 2.5 million kroner was scheduled for January 6, 2026. We had a plan, we were executing it, and we had breathing room to finalize the IRIS Capital facility and resolve the GBER exception question.

That should have been the end of the crisis.

It wasn’t.

Because the real attack wasn’t about EIFO or debt repayment. The real attack was about to begin, and it would be far more personal.

PART FOUR: “IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY DUE TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES”

In early December 2025, the Danish business newspaper Finans—part of the JP/Politikens Hus media group—began publishing a series of articles about me.

Not about Shape Robotics’ business. Not about the EIFO situation or the repayment plan. About me. My background. My history. My Romanian origins.

The first articles revealed that I had been involved in a bankruptcy case in Romania years earlier. A company called SAV Integrated Systems had gone bankrupt in 2017, and there had been subsequent civil litigation over creditor claims. What the articles didn’t emphasize—or buried deep in the text—was that these were ongoing cases. The civil judgment was under appeal. The criminal charges had not been tried. Under Romanian law, under European law, under any civilized legal system, I was entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Finans presented it all as established fact. Romanian CEO. Previous bankruptcy. Fraud allegations. The implication was clear: this is what happens when you let Romanians run Danish companies.

But the most revealing moment came in the comprehensive “documentary” article Finans published on January 9, 2026, after our bankruptcy. Buried in thousands of words about the company’s history was this passage, based on an internal email from 2022 that Finans had somehow obtained:

“Several former employees tell that Mark Abraham exposed and berated employees at meetings if they had not performed as he wanted. According to an email sent from a former employee to David Johan Christensen in 2022, which Finans has seen, it describes that Mark Abraham’s behavior is experienced as tyrannical and bullying. It is highly likely due to cultural differences, as Mark Abraham’s management style is experienced as different from typical Danish.”

Read that again. “It is highly likely due to cultural differences.” “Different from typical Danish.”

I am a direct manager. I expect results. When people don’t deliver, I tell them. In Romania, in America, in most business cultures, this is called accountability. Some people might call it demanding or intense. But in Finans’ telling, it wasn’t about management style. It was about where I’m from.

The subtext was impossible to miss: Romanians are naturally tyrannical. Eastern Europeans are bullies. This behavior is cultural—meaning inherent to the person’s origin. Meaning you can’t expect better from these people.

This is textbook coded racism. Take a behavior that would be described as “demanding” or “results-oriented” in a Danish executive, attribute it to “cultural differences” when the executive is Romanian, and you’ve just racialized normal business conduct.

Would a Danish CEO with a direct management style be described this way? Would “cultural differences” be cited to explain why Anders or Lars or Morten expects high performance?

Of course not. The “cultural differences” framing only appears when you need to delegitimize someone based on their national origin.

And that was just what appeared in print. What appeared in the comments sections and on internet forums was far worse.

PART FIVE: “ANOTHER ROMA TAKING OVER A DANISH COMPANY”

As the Finans articles circulated through December 2025, the online discussions became toxic.

On Nordnet, Denmark’s largest online brokerage platform, where Shape Robotics shareholders gathered to discuss the stock, the comments turned openly racist. Screenshots from those discussions—which I’ve saved and documented—show a recurring pattern.

“Another Roma taking over a Danish company and ruining it.”

“Typical Roma business practices—bankruptcies and fraud.”

“This is what happens when you let Roma run your company.”

“Send the Roma back to Romania where he belongs.”

Roma—the term for the Romani people, often used as a slur—was weaponized against me repeatedly. Never mind that I’m not Romani. The commenters were using “Roma” as a generic slur for Romanians, conflating nationality with ethnicity and invoking all the negative stereotypes associated with Romani people: fraud, theft, untrustworthiness, criminal behavior.

Similar comments appeared on LinkedIn posts, particularly when I tried to defend the company or explain what was actually happening. The term “Roma gypsy” showed up. References to “Eastern European mafia.” Suggestions that I should “go back to Bucharest with your fraud.”

One particularly common comparison was to Stein Bagger, Denmark’s most notorious corporate fraudster. Bagger founded a company called IT Factory, defrauded creditors and banks of hundreds of millions of kroner, fled to Dubai, and eventually was caught and imprisoned. To this day, Bagger’s name is synonymous in Denmark with corporate fraud.

The comparison to Shape Robotics was absurd on its face. Shape Robotics had real revenue, real operations, real customers, real contracts. We had 300 million kroner in sales delivering actual products to actual schools. We had committed financing from a reputable institutional investor. We had a functioning repayment plan with creditors. The situations bore no resemblance to each other.

But facts didn’t matter. What mattered was the narrative: Foreign CEO (Romanian, practically Roma) takes over Danish company, runs it into bankruptcy, obviously fraud, just like Stein Bagger but with an Eastern European twist.

Would a Danish CEO facing cash flow problems during a refinancing be compared to Stein Bagger? Would anonymous commenters call a Dane a “Roma gypsy”? Would “cultural differences” be cited to explain management style?

The questions answer themselves.

Throughout December, as these articles and comments circulated, I watched the impact on our business. Bank executives started citing “media concerns” in communications. Partners asked uncomfortable questions. Creditors who had agreed to standstill arrangements began reconsidering.

The IRIS Capital deal, which should have been finalizing, stalled. No institutional investor wants to put money into a company while bankruptcy petitions are hanging over it and the CEO is being portrayed as an Eastern European fraudster in the business press.

By mid-December, multiple creditors had filed konkursbegæringer—formal bankruptcy petitions with the Danish courts. They cited “loss of confidence in management” based on the media revelations. Not based on our business performance, which remained strong. Not based on our repayment plan, which we were executing. Based on what they read in Finans about my Romanian background and my “tyrannical” management style caused by “cultural differences.”

The manufactured crisis was working exactly as intended.

On December 21, Shape Robotics filed a defamation lawsuit against Finans and its parent company JP/Politikens Hus in Romanian court, alleging deliberate publication of misleading information timed to cause commercial harm. We alleged ethnic discrimination, commercial sabotage, and violation of journalistic ethics.

But by then, the damage was done. The creditor panic was irreversible. The bankruptcy petitions were filed. The IRIS financing was frozen. Our commercial contracts were at risk.

The media campaign had destroyed us while we were filing the paperwork to sue them.

All of this happened in the month following our market manipulation complaint against Lars Topholm. All of it targeted me personally, my Romanian origin, my character. All of it ignored the actual business reality: a viable company with committed financing, a functioning repayment plan, and even a potential path to continued EIFO support through the GBER digital transformation exception.

And all of it set the stage for what happened on January 6, 2026.

PART SIX: THE COURT HEARING I NEVER KNEW ABOUT

I learned about my company’s bankruptcy from shareholders’ text messages at 7:43 PM on January 6, 2026.

By that time, the court hearing was over. The judge had issued the order. The decision was final, at least until an appeal could be filed. Shape Robotics A/S was bankrupt.

I had not been present at the hearing. I had not filed any defense. I had not presented evidence of the IRIS Capital commitment, the 40-million-euro contract pipeline, the active creditor repayment plan, the potential GBER exception for continued EIFO support, or the media campaign that had manufactured the crisis. I had not said a word in the company’s defense.

Because I didn’t know there was a hearing.

The Danish court never notified me. Or more precisely, they claim they notified me through methods that were legally inadequate for a foreign citizen residing abroad.

Here’s what apparently happened, based on the court records and my subsequent investigation:

The court sent the bankruptcy summons to Shape Robotics’ registered office address in Herlev, Denmark. That office was empty. We had been evicted for non-payment of rent—yes, we were behind on bills, that’s what happens during a liquidity crisis when you’re refinancing. The landlord had gotten a judgment, and we’d been forced out. There was nobody at that address to receive mail. The summons sat in an empty office or was returned to sender.

The court also apparently assumed that service could be accomplished through Denmark’s digital government systems, e-Boks and MitID. These are platforms that Danish residents use to receive official communications electronically. They work fine for Danish citizens residing in Denmark.

I am not a Danish citizen. I am a Romanian citizen. I reside in Romania. I have never had a Danish MitID, because I’m not entitled to one. I cannot access Danish e-Boks, because it requires MitID. The court made no attempt to verify whether I had access to these systems or to use alternative service methods appropriate for a foreign citizen.

Most importantly, the court made no attempt to serve me in Romania, at my actual residence, where I actually live.

This is not a technicality. This is a violation of fundamental European Union law.

EU Regulation 1393/2007 establishes clear procedures for service of legal documents when the recipient is in a different member state. The regulation exists specifically to ensure that citizens don’t get ambushed by legal proceedings in foreign countries without proper notification.

The process is straightforward: The Danish court must transmit the summons through Denmark’s designated transmitting agency to Romania’s designated receiving agency. The Romanian agency then serves the document on the recipient in Romania, either at their residence or through personal service, following Romanian law. A certificate of service is returned to the Danish court confirming that the recipient actually received the summons. Only then can the Danish court proceed with a hearing at which the recipient can defend their interests.

None of this happened.

The Danish court skipped the entire cross-border service process, assumed that sending mail to an empty office and posting something on a digital platform I can’t access constituted adequate notice, and declared bankruptcy in my absence.

When I contacted Danish bankruptcy lawyers after discovering what had happened, their assessment was immediate and unambiguous. One lawyer told me there was an “85 to 90 percent probability” that the bankruptcy would be overturned on appeal based solely on the service defect. The violation of EU Regulation 1393/2007 for a Romanian citizen director, they said, was “a fatal procedural defect regardless of the bankruptcy merits.”

Think about what this means. A Romanian citizen, residing in Romania, running a company that generates 95 percent of its revenue from Romania, serving primarily Romanian customers (schoolchildren), was not properly notified when a Danish court moved to destroy that company.

I couldn’t present the IRIS Capital financing commitment. I couldn’t present the 40-million-euro contract pipeline. I couldn’t present the active repayment plan. I couldn’t explain the GBER digital transformation exception that EIFO could have used. I couldn’t explain how the media campaign had manufactured a crisis. I couldn’t show that the company was commercially viable and simply needed time to complete its refinancing.

I couldn’t say anything, because I wasn’t there, because nobody told me to be there, in violation of European law designed specifically to prevent exactly this situation.

We filed an appeal immediately, of course. The legal briefs on the EU Service Regulation violations are being prepared. The lawyers are confident.

But here’s the reality: even if we win the appeal and the bankruptcy is overturned, the damage is profound and possibly irreversible.

While the appeal is pending, the company shares remain suspended from trading. Shareholders can’t exit their positions. The IRIS Capital financing can’t proceed—you can’t fund a company in bankruptcy. The 40-million-euro pipeline of Romanian school contracts is at risk, because those contracts require an operational company to execute. Employees face uncertainty, reduced hours, or layoffs. Creditors are moving to seize assets through the bankruptcy trustee.

And my reputation—and Elena’s reputation, as we built this together—the reputation of Romanian entrepreneurs who built a successful educational technology business serving Romanian children—is permanently marked with the “bankrupt company” label, courtesy of a court proceeding that violated European law.

Even complete victory in the appeal can’t undo the destruction of the past month.

PART SEVEN: “HERE IS THE STORY OF THE GROWTH ROCKET THAT CRASHED TO EARTH”

Three days after the bankruptcy order, on January 9, 2026, Finans published its comprehensive “documentary” article about Shape Robotics.

The headline read: “Shape Robotics: Her er historien om vækstraketten, der styrtede til jorden” — “Shape Robotics: Here is the story of the growth rocket that crashed to earth.”

It was presented as objective journalism. A thorough, balanced autopsy of a company that had promised so much and delivered disaster. Over 5,000 words covering the company’s history from founding through bankruptcy, with interviews, financial data, and insider accounts.

Reading it was surreal, because Elena and I were there for all of it, and the narrative bore only superficial resemblance to what actually happened.

The article emphasized, again and again, that I am Romanian. It mentioned Romania or Romanian more than forty times. It carefully detailed the SAV Integrated Systems bankruptcy case and the Romanian criminal charges, presenting them as established facts rather than ongoing legal proceedings where I’m entitled to presumption of innocence. It quoted anonymous “former employees” about my “tyrannical” management style, attributed to “cultural differences.”

It noted, almost in passing, that 95 percent of revenue came from Romania, framing this as somehow unusual or suspicious rather than as the central business reality—the success that Elena and I had built.

What the article minimized or omitted entirely was more revealing than what it emphasized.

The IRIS Capital commitment? Mentioned briefly, dismissed as insufficient or unreliable, with no explanation of why a signed engagement letter and term sheet from a reputable institutional investor should be discounted.

The 40-million-euro contract pipeline? Not mentioned at all.

The active repayment agreement with creditors that we were executing successfully? Minimized as a temporary delay tactic.

The GBER digital transformation exception that EIFO could have applied for, given that our work perfectly qualified? Not mentioned.

The improper service and EU law violation in the bankruptcy proceeding? Not mentioned.

The role of Finans’ own articles throughout December in creating creditor panic? Not acknowledged.

The original market manipulation complaint against Lars Topholm that started this whole sequence? Mentioned briefly near the beginning, then buried and forgotten as the article moved through its narrative of inevitable failure.

By the end of the article, any reader would come away with a clear impression: Romanian CEO with dubious background takes over promising Danish company, moves operations to Romania, manages poorly due to cultural differences, runs company into bankruptcy. A cautionary tale about foreign operators and failed acquisitions.

The fact that the company was commercially viable with committed financing and a clear path forward? The fact that a media campaign targeting the CEO’s Romanian origin had manufactured a crisis? The fact that Danish financial insiders we’d accused of manipulation might have motive for retaliation? The fact that Elena and I had built 99% of the company’s value serving Romanian children?

None of that made it into the narrative.

The article was, in effect, the victory lap. The justification. The permanent public record that would make the destruction seem like natural business failure rather than coordinated attack.

It worked. The article was widely shared. Other media picked up the story. The narrative hardened: Romanian CEO fails, investors lose money, another cautionary tale from the stock market.

The market manipulation complaint against Lars Topholm was forgotten, buried under the noise of bankruptcy proceedings and recriminations.

Mission accomplished.

PART EIGHT: FORTY DAYS FROM WHISTLEBLOWING TO DESTRUCTION

Let me state the timeline clearly, because the pattern is impossible to ignore once you see it.

Day 0 — November 27, 2025: Shape Robotics files formal complaint with Nasdaq Copenhagen alleging market manipulation by prominent Danish analyst Lars Topholm. The complaint is specific, detailed, and evidence-based. We are acting lawfully as a listed company’s management, fulfilling our regulatory obligation to report suspected financial crime.

Day 1 — November 28, 2025: Shape Robotics forced to announce EIFO guarantee withdrawal. Though we had been fighting for the GBER digital transformation exception and had multiple financing alternatives in progress, the announcement creates immediate “crisis” narrative in media and markets. The timing, one day after our complaint, is remarkable.

Day 3 — November 30, 2025: We successfully conclude repayment agreement with creditors, make first payment of 3.7 million kroner, demonstrate liquidity and commitment. The crisis should be over.

Days 7-21 — Early to mid-December 2025: Finans launches systematic media campaign targeting me personally. Articles emphasize Romanian origin, reveal Romanian legal cases (under appeal, not final), quote anonymous employees about “tyrannical” style due to “cultural differences.” Online comments turn overtly racist with “Roma” slurs and Stein Bagger comparisons. Creditors panic and file bankruptcy petitions, citing media concerns. IRIS Capital financing frozen.

Day 24 — December 21, 2025: We file defamation lawsuit against Finans in Romanian court. Too late—damage already done, creditor panic irreversible.

Day 40 — January 6, 2026: Danish court declares bankruptcy without properly serving Romanian citizen director, violating EU Regulation 1393/2007. No opportunity to present IRIS financing commitment, 40-million-euro pipeline, repayment plan, GBER exception possibility, or media manufactured crisis evidence.

Day 43 — January 9, 2026: Finans publishes comprehensive “documentary” framing bankruptcy as inevitable business failure, burying market manipulation story, protecting Danish financial insiders.

Forty days from whistleblowing to destruction.

The pattern shows motive (retaliation for exposing financial crime), method (ethnic discrimination in media plus EU law violation in court), coordination (systematic timing from complaint through bankruptcy), and result (whistleblower destroyed, criminals protected).

This was not a series of unfortunate coincidences. This was not legitimate business failure. This was not normal market forces.

This was a coordinated campaign to destroy a Romanian citizen who threatened powerful Danish financial actors, executed through ethnic discrimination and violations of European law.

PART NINE: WHAT THIS MEANS FOR ROMANIA

So here I am, on January 10, 2026, writing this complaint to my government.

I am a Romanian citizen. The company Elena Pasat and I built together serves Romanian children. Ninety-five percent of our revenue came from Romania. Our workforce was primarily Romanian. Our contracts were Romanian. Our success was Romanian.

And that success was destroyed through a campaign that targeted my Romanian origin as inherently suspect, used “Roma” as a slur against me, attributed my management style to “cultural differences” from “typical Danish” behavior, and denied me due process under European law that exists specifically to protect citizens like me in cross-border situations.

The impact is not abstract. It’s not just about me and Elena.

Thousands of Romanian students in schools equipped with StoryKids smart classrooms may lose access to software platforms, hardware maintenance, and teacher training programs. Romanian schools that invested in our technology face uncertainty about service contracts and warranty support. The Romanian Ministry of Education’s RRF-funded digitalization program is disrupted, requiring them to find alternative suppliers with all the costs and delays that entails.

Forty to fifty Romanian employees face job losses, salary interruptions, and professional disruption. Romanian shareholders—estimated at 200 to 300 citizens who invested in what they thought was a Romanian success story—have lost approximately 20 to 30 million Danish kroner collectively.

Romania’s reputation in European innovation markets takes another hit. The stereotype is reinforced: Romanian businesspeople are risky, possibly fraudulent, culturally incompatible with Western European business norms. Future Romanian entrepreneurs looking at EU markets will ask themselves whether it’s safe, whether they’ll be targeted, whether their government will protect them.

And Romanian citizens across Europe are watching to see how their government responds. If Denmark can destroy Romanian citizens through ethnic discrimination and EU law violations without consequences, if Romania issues no protest and takes no action, then what protection does Romanian citizenship actually offer?

This case is a test. A test of whether Romania will defend its citizens abroad. A test of whether EU law protections are real or just paper promises. A test of whether ethnic discrimination in EU member states will be challenged or accepted.

The precedent set here will affect every Romanian working, studying, or building businesses anywhere in Europe.

That’s why I’m submitting this complaint not just to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian Embassy in Copenhagen, but publicly, to the Romanian people and to anyone who cares about justice in Europe.

PART TEN: WHAT ROMANIA MUST DO

I am asking my government to act. Specifically, immediately, and forcefully.

First, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should send a formal diplomatic note to the Danish government protesting the violation of my rights under EU law and the ethnic discrimination in Danish media. The note should demand explanations: Why was EU Regulation 1393/2007 not followed? What investigation has Denmark conducted into the ethnic discrimination in Finans coverage? Why was EIFO unwilling to apply for the GBER digital transformation exception that we clearly qualified for? What steps will Denmark take to ensure Romanian citizens receive fair treatment in Danish courts, media, and state agencies? The note should warn that if the response is inadequate, Romania will escalate to European Commission complaints and other EU mechanisms.

Second, the Romanian Embassy in Copenhagen should provide immediate consular protection. I need a meeting with the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission as soon as possible—Monday morning if feasible. The Embassy should issue a public statement defending my rights and condemning the discrimination. A consular officer should be assigned to observe all bankruptcy appeal hearings. The Embassy should file complaints with Danish media authorities about the ethnic discrimination in Finans’ coverage.

Third, Romania should intervene with the Danish courts, filing an amicus brief in support of my bankruptcy appeal on the grounds that the EU Service Regulation violation affects all Romanian citizens in Denmark and represents a matter of international law that goes beyond this individual case.

Fourth, the Romanian government should make a public statement—through the Foreign Ministry spokesperson or at a higher level—expressing concern about the treatment of Romanian citizens in Denmark and announcing that Romania will use all available diplomatic and legal tools to protect its citizens’ rights. This statement should be covered by Romanian media and distributed internationally.

Fifth, if Denmark’s response is inadequate, Romania should escalate to EU institutions. File a complaint with the European Commission about Denmark’s violation of Regulation 1393/2007. Engage with the European Parliament to request hearings on discrimination against EU citizens in member states’ media and courts. Consider a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights regarding violations of my right to a fair trial and freedom from discrimination.

These are not extraordinary requests. This is what governments do for their citizens when their rights are violated abroad.

Elena and I built something valuable for Romania. We employed Romanians. We served Romanian children. We brought EU investment into Romanian education. When I exposed financial crime, I was destroyed through ethnic discrimination and EU law violations.

Now I’m asking: Will Romania defend me? Or is a Romanian citizen on his own when targeted in another EU member state?

The answer to that question matters to every Romanian in Europe.

EPILOGUE: A STORY THAT ISN’T OVER

As I write this on Saturday, January 10, 2026, the bankruptcy appeal is being prepared. The legal briefs on the EU Service Regulation violations are being drafted. The Danish lawyers are confident about the 85-90 percent probability of success on procedural grounds alone.

But I’m not naive. Even if the bankruptcy is overturned, even if we win in court, the damage is severe. Shareholders have lost money. Employees have lost jobs. Romanian children may lose access to educational technology. Elena’s and my reputation is scarred. The media narrative is set.

And the original crime—the market manipulation by Lars Topholm that started all this—is buried and forgotten while everyone focuses on the bankruptcy.

So why am I publishing this? Why tell the whole story in this level of detail?

Because some stories need to be told completely, carefully, with all the documentation and sources, so that anyone reading can verify every claim and draw their own conclusions.

Because if this happened to us, it can happen to other Romanian entrepreneurs in Europe, and they should know what they’re facing.

Because Romania needs to decide what kind of state it wants to be—one that defends its citizens actively, or one that offers only symbolic consular services and lets its citizens fend for themselves abroad.

Because the European Union needs to decide whether its laws and values apply equally to citizens from all member states, or whether some citizens are more equal than others.

And because sometimes, when you’ve been destroyed, the only power you have left is the power to tell the truth.

This is my truth. It’s documented, sourced, and verifiable. I’m submitting it to the Romanian government as an official complaint demanding diplomatic protection. I’m publishing it publicly so the Romanian people and the international community can judge for themselves.

Forty days from whistleblowing to destruction. From exposing Danish financial crime to being bankrupted through ethnic discrimination and EU law violations. From building a Romanian educational technology success to being labeled a failed foreign operator.

That’s the story.

Now we’ll see whether anyone cares about justice.

Mark Abraham
Romanian Citizen
Voluntari, Ilfov County, Romania
January 10, 2026

APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTATION

Official Company Announcements:

Shape Robotics, “Notification of Potential Share Price Manipulation Submitted to Nasdaq,” November 27, 2025 (available at inderes.dk)
Shape Robotics, “Legal Proceedings Against JP/Politikens Hus,” December 21, 2025 (available at inderes.dk)

Media Articles:

Finans (Dagbladet Børsen), “Shape Robotics: Her er historien om vækstraketten, der styrtede til jorden,” January 9, 2026 (finans.dk)

Financial Reports:

Shape Robotics Annual Reports 2019-2024 (available at shaperobotics.com)
Shape Robotics H1 2025 Interim Report (shaperobotics.com)

EU Legal Framework:

Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 on service of judicial and extrajudicial documents (eur-lex.europa.eu)
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) - EU digital transformation provisions
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 21 and 47

Contact Information:

Romanian Embassy in Copenhagen: copenhaga.consul@mae.ro, +45 39 46 43 63
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mae.ro
Mark Abraham: mark.robert.abraham@gmail.com

All claims in this document can be verified through these sources. Additional documentation (court records, screenshots of discriminatory comments, internal financial documents, GBER qualification evidence) available upon request to Romanian authorities or legal counsel.

Why Denmark Can Relax About Trump Taking Greenland

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 12:09:53 GMT

Here’s why Denmark can afford to be relaxed when Donald Trump finally takes Greenland:

Because when he inevitably stops paying the electricity bill at Thule Air Base, they can always drag him to Copenhagen court later. And he won’t be able to open the subpoena anyway—no MitID, no Digital Post access, case dismissed on a technicality.

For Trump, this is a punchline waiting to happen. The American President who never checks his Danish government mailbox.

For us at Shape Robotics—two Romanian citizens who spent the last month executing the smartest restructuring plan we could design under maximum pressure—this same digital religion is exactly how Denmark kills a recovering company without ever looking it in the eye.

Same system. Completely different consequences.

Let me tell you how we got here, and why we’re about to make a lot of people very uncomfortable.

When Everything Was Burning

November 27, 2025. The call comes in: the Danish Export and Investment Fund—EIFO—is withdrawing its loan guarantees. Within hours, the market’s interpretation spreads like wildfire across trading screens: Shape is dead.

What follows is textbook panic dynamics. The share price, which had been trading above 15 DKK just months earlier, begins a nauseating descent toward 5 DKK and below. Someone, somewhere, is making an absolute fortune shorting the stock while planting stories in the media about insolvency and collapse. Classic pump-and-dump mechanics, except in reverse: dump-and-profit. Creditors start circling. Investors flood our inboxes with increasingly desperate questions. The company Aurel and I had been working to stabilize is suddenly caught in the kind of death spiral where companies just... disappear.

This is the moment when most management teams hire expensive crisis PR firms, issue vague statements about “exploring strategic options,” and quietly start negotiating their golden parachutes. The ship sinks while the lawyers argue about who gets which lifeboat.

Aurel and I looked at each other—one CEO, one incoming Chairman, both Romanian, both stubborn—and made a different calculation. We were going to actually fix the problem.

Not pretend to fix it. Not manage the optics of fixing it. Actually fix it.

The Month That Changed Everything

December 2nd arrives, and Aurel Nețin formally steps in as Chairman of the Board. This isn’t some ceremonial appointment or placeholder role while the company figures out its next move. Aurel is an entrepreneur who understands what it’s like to build things under pressure, and he’s making a clear statement: he’s here, he’s staying, and he’s not letting this company die on his watch. Within days, he puts his own money where his mouth is—personal loans, planned share purchases, the kind of financial commitment that tells investors this isn’t theater.

We start rebuilding governance in public view. New board candidates are identified. An extraordinary general meeting is planned. Everything is transparent, everything is documented, everything is designed to show investors that we’re not running away from the mess—we’re cleaning it up.

But governance is the easy part. The hard part is capital.

By mid-December, while everyone expects us to do a desperate, massively dilutive capital raise at any price just to survive another quarter, we’re negotiating something completely different. On December 18th, we announce an agreement with IRIS Capital Investment for a 36-month equity line facility. And here’s where most people miss the elegance of what we built:

It’s not a capital injection. It’s a capital airbag.

Up to 15 million shares, drawable at our discretion, priced at 95% of the 5-day volume-weighted average—not some death-spiral discount that destroys existing shareholders. We control the timing. We control whether we use it at all. We can cancel it at no cost. And it’s renewable until maturity, giving us long-term flexibility.

At a 3-to-5 DKK share price, this represents somewhere between 5.7 and 10 million euros in financing capacity. But the real value isn’t the number—it’s the optionality. It’s the difference between being forced to accept vulture terms in a moment of panic versus having the breathing room to pay creditors on a rational timeline while preserving maximum value for everyone.

Think about what this means for a moment. We’re in the middle of a pump-and-dump scandal. The media is writing obituaries. Creditors are demanding immediate payment. And we manage to secure flexible, non-predatory financing that gives us time to actually execute a recovery. This is the difference between thinking like cornered animals and thinking like engineers solving a complex system problem.

And here’s the part that almost no one understood at the time: if we had been allowed to complete this plan, there would have been zero creditors left unpaid. Zero.

The architecture was simple and elegant. Stabilize governance—check, Aurel’s in place. Secure flexible capital—check, IRIS line is signed. Hold the extraordinary general meeting to formalize the structure—scheduled for January. Use staged equity draws to settle every single creditor in full, just on a sequenced timeline that makes financial sense. Let the underlying business operations fund ongoing costs. Give the company the gift of time to execute without a gun to its head.

The only people who had to accept delayed gratification in this plan were the shareholders themselves, who would see dilution over time but would still have a functioning company that could eventually return value. Creditors would be paid in full. Employees would keep their jobs. Customers would get their orders. The business would continue.

This is what good restructuring looks like when you’re actually trying to preserve value rather than extract it.

The Hard Part Nobody Sees

But here’s what all the spreadsheets and term sheets and corporate announcements can’t capture: the sheer psychological weight of rebuilding trust when everyone thinks you’re already dead.

Numbers are easy. Excel models are easy. Financial engineering is easy compared to the work of looking skeptical investors in the eye, day after day, and convincing them that this time it’s different, this time we’ve actually fixed the underlying problems, this time they should believe us when conventional wisdom says they’d be idiots to do so.

Aurel and I spent December doing something most executives in our position would never do: we showed up. Repeatedly. We answered brutal questions from investors who had every reason to be skeptical. We explained exactly what had gone wrong and exactly how we were fixing it. We put our own credibility, our own reputations, our own money on the line. We didn’t hide behind PR statements or lawyer-approved language.

When your Chairman is strengthening his personal financial commitment while the share price is cratering, that sends a signal. When the CEO keeps showing up for investor Q&As while being attacked in the media, that sends a signal. When you’re transparent about the plan instead of vague about “strategic alternatives,” that sends a signal.

Slowly, painfully, grudgingly, trust started to come back. Not because we ran some brilliant PR campaign—we didn’t have the money for that anyway. But because we told the truth and demonstrated we were willing to fight for the company when fighting was expensive and uncomfortable and the easy path would have been to just walk away.

That was the real achievement of December 2025. Not the equity line, though that was important. Not the governance restructuring, though that mattered too. The real achievement was that we took a company that had been shattered by a pump-and-dump attack and built a credible path forward that would have left everyone whole. Not “might have left everyone whole.” Would have. Past tense. The plan was there. The capital was there. The investor support was rebuilding. The creditor payment sequence was mapped out.

We had actually solved the problem.

The Digital Execution

Then, on January 5th and 6th, 2026, the Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court declared Shape Robotics A/S bankrupt.

Aurel and I found out from the media.

Not from a lawyer. Not from a court officer. Not from any official communication that we could actually access. We learned that our company had been declared bankrupt the same way everyone else did: by reading about it on news websites.

We had never been to court. Never seen a judge. Never been given even five minutes to present what we had built over the previous month. No opportunity to show the equity line structure. No chance to explain the creditor payment plan. No moment to demonstrate that we had rebuilt governance, secured investor support, and created a timeline that would have left every creditor paid in full. The judge never heard about any of it because we were never in the room.

Why? Because apparently we were supposed to have checked our E-Boks.

For anyone outside Denmark’s digital ecosystem, E-Boks is the country’s mandatory digital mailbox system. It replaced physical mail from government authorities years ago. Everything official—tax notices, court summons, government correspondence—goes into E-Boks. If you want to access E-Boks, you need MitID, Denmark’s national digital identity system.

And here’s where the system reveals its elegant cruelty: to get MitID, you need either a Danish CPR number—the civil registration number given to Danish residents—or you need to go through a complex in-person registration process involving Danish Citizen Service centers and sometimes requiring a witness who already has MitID.

Aurel and I are Romanian citizens. We run a Danish-listed company from Romania, where 88 percent of the company’s revenue is generated. We do not have Danish CPR numbers. We are not Danish residents. We cannot access E-Boks.

So the Danish court sent our bankruptcy summons to a digital platform we are legally and practically unable to open, then declared us bankrupt when we didn’t show up to a hearing we had no way of knowing was happening.

The same system that would let Trump ignore a subpoena about Thule’s electricity bill—no MitID, no problem, good luck serving that—is the system that destroyed a publicly traded company with 18.6 million shares and thousands of retail investors.

Same infrastructure. Completely different consequences.

The Hidden Incentives

If you think about this situation the way an economist thinks about incentives, the system’s perversity becomes crystal clear.

What did it cost a creditor to destroy our company? The security deposit for filing a bankruptcy petition in Denmark is somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 Danish kroner—roughly 4,000 to 5,400 euros. Add the court fee of 1,500 kroner—about 200 euros—plus maybe 50,000 to 100,000 kroner in legal fees, and you’re looking at a total cost of somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 euros to pull the trigger on bankrupting a publicly traded company.

What did they destroy? The market capitalization before trading was suspended was somewhere between 50 and 65 million Danish kroner—call it 6.7 to 8.7 million euros. That’s the immediate, measurable destruction of shareholder value. But the real damage is bigger and harder to quantify: they destroyed a restructuring plan that would have paid every creditor in full. They eliminated jobs across Romania, Poland, and Finland. They shattered the trust of thousands of retail investors who had started to believe in the recovery. And they damaged Denmark’s reputation as a place where foreign entrepreneurs can build businesses without facing Kafkaesque procedural traps.

The return on investment from a pure creditor perspective is obvious: spend 10,000 to 20,000 euros, destroy 10 million euros in shareholder value, and eliminate a recovery plan that would have required patience. Denmark has created a system where the cost of pulling the bankruptcy trigger is trivial compared to the damage inflicted, and where there are essentially no guardrails to prevent abuse.

There’s no minimum debt threshold in Denmark. None. Zero. In the United Kingdom, you need to be owed at least 5,000 pounds before you can file a bankruptcy petition, and courts have discretion to dismiss petitions they consider inappropriate. In Germany, you have to actually prove insolvency with substantiated evidence, and the debtor has the right to contest your claims in a real hearing. In France, the company has to be in “cessation des paiements”—complete inability to pay current debts—and there’s a strong framework for preventive restructuring before anyone talks about liquidation. In Sweden, the court requires a hearing where the debtor is present and has the opportunity to demonstrate that payment difficulties are temporary. Even in Romania, there’s an 8,800 euro minimum debt threshold and a 60-day waiting period, and you have to serve legal papers at the debtor’s actual domicile.

But in Denmark? Zero minimum debt. A security deposit that costs less than a used car. No waiting period. And “service of process” that consists of sending a digital message to a platform that foreign directors literally cannot access. The incentive structure is clear and brutal: in Denmark, it’s cheaper to destroy than to negotiate.

The Irony We Gave Them

Here’s where the situation crosses over from merely absurd into genuinely darkly funny.

On December 21st, 2025—three days after we announced our equity line financing—Shape Robotics filed a defamation lawsuit against JP/Politikens Hus, the Danish company that owns Finans, the financial news outlet. We’re alleging that their articles caused trading suspension, significant share price volatility, and impairment of our financing processes. I’m personally seeking two million euros in damages.

And where did we file this lawsuit against this Danish media company? In Romanian court.

When you sue someone across EU borders, you’re supposed to follow EU Regulation 1393/2007 on the cross-border service of documents. So that’s exactly what we did. We ensured all the legal papers were properly translated into Danish. We gave the defendants full time for proper service according to the rules. We respected their right to defend themselves in their own language, with proper advance notice, following every procedural protection that civilized legal systems are supposed to provide.

Romania—the country that’s supposedly less developed, the one with emerging market connotations, the one that joined the EU later—gave a Danish defendant more procedural protection than the Danish court system gave to us, the Romanian directors of a Danish publicly traded company.

We treated Danish media with more legal respect than Denmark treated us. We followed the rules. We translated the documents. We ensured proper service. We gave them every opportunity to mount a defense.

And Denmark? Denmark sent us a digital message to a mailbox we cannot open and declared us bankrupt when we didn’t show up.

When Problem-Solvers Are Punished for Solving Problems

There’s a moment in Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged when the industrialists who actually make things work—who keep the trains running and the steel mills producing and the economy functioning—are dragged before tribunals that don’t care about productivity or innovation or value creation. The tribunals only care about compliance with arbitrary processes and submission to institutional power.

Aurel and I are not Randian heroes. We’re not philosopher-industrialists making grand speeches about the virtue of selfishness. We’re just trying to run a company that makes educational robotics kits that teach kids how to code. But the parallel is uncomfortable because it’s accurate:

We were punished not for failing, but for succeeding without permission from the system.

Look at the timeline and tell me if you see another explanation. November 27th: EIFO withdraws guarantees and the crisis begins. December 2nd: we appoint Aurel as Chairman and announce a stabilization plan. December 18th: we announce the IRIS equity line, demonstrating we’ve found smart, non-predatory capital. Early January: we’re finalizing the extraordinary general meeting to complete the restructuring and formalize the creditor payment timeline. January 5th and 6th: bankruptcy declared.

We solved the problem. We found creative financing. We rebuilt trust with investors. We designed a plan where every creditor would be paid in full and the only people accepting delayed gratification would be the shareholders themselves. We did exactly what you’re supposed to do in a crisis: we stayed calm, we thought creatively, we built consensus, and we executed.

And the response from the system was to bankrupt us without a trial, without hearing our solution, without examining whether the creditor petition made any sense given what we had just built.

If we had failed naturally—if the business had collapsed, if we’d burned through the cash, if we’d accepted a fire-sale to some well-connected insider group—that would have been fine. Expected, even. That would have fit the narrative of a troubled company meeting its inevitable end.

But we didn’t fail. We found a solution. And apparently that wasn’t allowed, because the solution we found would have left creditors paid, shareholders with hope, and the company functioning—which meant it didn’t serve whatever institutional interests prefer companies in our position to just die quietly.

A Message to the Most Popular Politician in Danish History

I want to speak directly for a moment to Morten Messerschmidt, the leader of Dansk Folkeparti who received 465,758 personal votes in the 2014 European Parliament election—the highest number ever cast for a Danish politician in the country’s history.

You built your career on three principles, and all three of them align perfectly with what just happened to Shape Robotics.

The first principle is Danish sovereignty and national interest. You’ve consistently argued that Denmark shouldn’t subordinate its national interests to supranational institutions or foreign pressure. But consider what Denmark just did: the court system violated EU cross-border service requirements by summoning Romanian EU citizens via a Danish-only digital platform that requires Danish residency credentials. They destroyed a Danish-listed company that was executing a viable recovery plan. They eliminated jobs and shareholder value to satisfy a single creditor claim for less than what it costs to buy a decent apartment. And in doing so, they made Denmark internationally uncompetitive for entrepreneurial capital and proved that Danish bankruptcy law systematically discriminates against foreigners who try to build businesses here. This isn’t Denmark protecting its sovereignty—this is Denmark destroying its own economic competitiveness through legislative stupidity that will scare away every serious international entrepreneur who hears this story.

Your second principle is skepticism of elite institutional overreach. Your party has spent years criticizing how elite institutions, whether in Brussels or Copenhagen, impose rules that hurt ordinary Danes and Danish businesses while protecting their own privileges and power. Shape Robotics is the perfect case study of what you’ve been warning about: Danske Bank, representing the elite banking system, can destroy a publicly traded company for 5,400 euros in filing costs. The elite court system proceeds without ensuring that foreign directors receive proper service under EU law. The elite bureaucracy requires digital platforms like MitID and E-Boks that systematically discriminate against foreign entrepreneurs. And the people who pay the price? Ordinary shareholders—18.6 million shares held by thousands of retail investors who just lost everything because the system protected institutional privilege at the expense of productive businesses. You’ve built your entire career fighting exactly this kind of dynamic.

Your third principle is protecting Danish business and competitiveness. By bankrupting us without due process, Denmark didn’t just destroy one company—it sent a signal to every international entrepreneur and investor watching: if you’re foreign and you try to build something in Denmark, you are vulnerable to procedural traps that can destroy years of work for the price of a used car. Denmark destroyed shareholder value worth millions of euros. Denmark threatened jobs across multiple countries. Denmark proved that its bankruptcy law is more predatory than civilized. And Denmark made itself radioactive for the kind of risk-taking, innovative, entrepreneurial capital that drives economic growth in the 21st century.

This isn’t a left-right issue. This isn’t about unions versus corporations or socialism versus capitalism. This is about competitiveness. This is about whether Denmark wants to be a country where entrepreneurs can take risks, face setbacks, rebuild, and ultimately create value—or a country where a single creditor can destroy a publicly traded company’s recovery plan because the foreign directors can’t access a digital mailbox.

You received more votes than any Danish politician in history because Danes trusted you to fight for their interests against institutional overreach and elite power plays. This is that fight. Denmark needs bankruptcy law reform, and it needs politicians with the courage to challenge a system that’s clearly broken. I’m asking publicly for your support.

The Man Denmark Would Have Destroyed

And now we arrive at the most exquisite irony in this entire saga, the detail that makes the whole situation feel less like tragedy and more like satire written by someone with a very dark sense of humor.

As I write this on January 7th, 2026, President Donald Trump is actively threatening to take Greenland from Denmark—by purchase, by negotiation, or, he has explicitly not ruled out, by military force. Denmark is desperately scrambling to manage this crisis. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen is trying to rally NATO allies, increase defense spending in Greenland, and prevent the dissolution of the transatlantic alliance over a territorial dispute that two months ago would have seemed like a joke.

And who is Denmark negotiating with? Who is the person threatening their sovereignty and territorial integrity? A man who filed for bankruptcy six times.

In 1991, Trump’s Taj Mahal casino collapsed under three billion dollars in debt. In 1992, he filed three more bankruptcies in a single year—Trump Plaza Hotel, Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, and the Plaza Hotel in New York. By 1991, Trump personally had 900 million dollars in liabilities. The New Jersey Casino Control Commission found his businesses “near insolvent” multiple times. His lenders put him on a 450,000-dollar-per-month budget to keep him from burning through what little cash was left. His father had to illegally bail him out by purchasing 3.3 million dollars in casino chips. In 2004, Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts went bankrupt with 1.8 billion dollars in debt. In 2009, Trump Entertainment Resorts filed for bankruptcy with 500 million dollars in debt.

Trump himself told Newsweek: “I do play with the bankruptcy laws—they’re very good for me.”

And yet, despite all of this—or perhaps because of it—Trump rebuilt his business empire. He became a global brand. He became President of the United States. And now he’s sitting across from Denmark as the person who gets to decide whether Greenland remains Danish or becomes American, negotiating from a position of extraordinary strength.

If Donald Trump had been a Danish entrepreneur subject to Danish bankruptcy law, he would have been destroyed permanently after his first failure in 1991. He never would have rebuilt. He never would have learned the skills that eventually made him successful. He never would have become President. And he certainly wouldn’t be the person threatening Denmark’s territorial integrity right now.

The man Denmark fears most internationally is the man Denmark would have destroyed domestically under its own legal system. That’s not irony. That’s a system failure so profound it becomes geopolitical vulnerability.

Two Ways of Thinking About Failure

The contrast couldn’t be sharper.

American bankruptcy philosophy, embodied in Chapter 11, treats entrepreneurial failure as educational rather than disqualifying. The system assumes that most new ventures will fail—Silicon Valley operates on the principle that 75 to 90 percent of startups won’t make it—and therefore the goal isn’t to punish failure but to normalize it and redeploy talent quickly. The philosophy is “fail, learn, try again.” Companies can reorganize and preserve value. Creditors take losses but businesses can survive. Multiple failures don’t prevent future success. The result of this approach? Six bankruptcies leads to President of the United States.

Danish bankruptcy philosophy, by contrast, allows a single creditor to destroy a company for 5,400 euros in filing costs. There’s no minimum debt threshold. There’s no meaningful due process for foreign directors. Profitable companies with viable recovery plans are destroyed because they didn’t check a digital mailbox they cannot access. The result of this approach? A smart restructuring plan leads to company destroyed without the chance to present evidence that the plan would have worked.

Silicon Valley investors put money into ten companies expecting seven or eight to fail completely, one or two to break even, and one to return a hundred times their investment. Failure isn’t seen as a moral problem or a disqualifying event—it’s seen as tuition paid to the school of entrepreneurship. The faster you can get talented people back in the game after they’ve learned from a failure, the faster the overall system innovates and grows. This is why America dominates global innovation. This is why Google and Facebook and Amazon exist. This is why the most ambitious entrepreneurs from around the world still move to Silicon Valley instead of Copenhagen.

Trump is currently negotiating with Denmark over Greenland from a position of extraordinary strength precisely because America’s bankruptcy system allowed him to survive six catastrophic failures and eventually become President. If America had Denmark’s bankruptcy system, Trump would have been permanently destroyed in 1991 after the Taj Mahal collapsed. He never would have rebuilt his empire. He never would have become a global brand. He never would have become President. And Denmark wouldn’t be facing the Greenland crisis.

The very system Denmark rejects—treating entrepreneurial failure as educational rather than disqualifying—created the person Denmark now fears most.

Let that sink in for a moment. Denmark is losing to Trump on Greenland because Denmark’s domestic policies are fundamentally incompatible with the kind of entrepreneurial dynamism that produces people like Trump. A country that destroys productive problem-solvers over trivial procedural issues cannot compete with a country that allows you to fail six times and still become President.

The Questions Nobody Wants to Answer

So here are the questions Denmark needs to answer, and needs to answer honestly rather than hiding behind bureaucratic process:

To Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, who is desperately trying to prevent Trump from taking Greenland: Do you recognize the irony? You’re negotiating with a man who used bankruptcy strategically six times—a man your own country’s legal system would have destroyed after the first failure. Trump is successful precisely because America allows entrepreneurs to fail and rebuild and learn from their mistakes. Meanwhile, Denmark just destroyed Shape Robotics, a company that had actually solved its problem and built a plan where every creditor would be paid in full. Which system do you honestly think produces better long-term economic outcomes?

To Morten Messerschmidt, who has built a career on protecting Danish sovereignty and national interests: Denmark is losing to Trump on Greenland because Denmark’s domestic policies make it impossible to compete with entrepreneurial risk-takers. A country that destroys productive businesses over technicalities cannot negotiate effectively with a country that treats failure as educational. Denmark’s bankruptcy law isn’t just bad economic policy—it’s a national security vulnerability. You can’t be geopolitically strong if you’re economically stupid. You can’t negotiate with entrepreneurial risk-takers if you punish entrepreneurial risk-taking at home. The man threatening Denmark’s territorial integrity proves that your bankruptcy law is obsolete. What are you going to do about it?

To every Danish entrepreneur, investor, and business owner: The United States allows entrepreneurs to fail six times and still become President. Denmark bankrupts profitable companies without proper notice over debts that represent two percent of revenue. If you’re choosing where to build your next company, choose wisely.

What We Proved and What Comes Next

In the last month, under maximum pressure, with the media writing our obituary and short-sellers profiting from our collapse, Aurel and I proved something important. We proved we can take a shattered company and rebuild trust one investor at a time. We proved we can design creative financing solutions under hostile conditions when most people would just accept defeat. We proved we can act like adults when others are acting like arsonists, whether those arsonists are market manipulators or media outlets or parts of the system itself. We proved we can create a structure where every creditor gets paid in full without destroying shareholder value through panic-driven decisions.

That restructuring plan still exists—in documents, in signed term sheets, in notices of extraordinary general meetings, in the minds of every shareholder who took the time to understand what we were building. The logic that would have allowed everyone to be paid in full still makes perfect sense. The only thing that changed is that now we have to fight through a legal and political minefield to implement it.

So the game shifts. The question is no longer “How do we restructure Shape without hurting anyone?” The question now is “How do we force a system that tried to ignore us to look us in the eye?”

We’re going to appeal the bankruptcy order on multiple grounds. Improper service of process in violation of EU Regulation 1393/2007—Romanian citizens were not served at their Romanian domicile and were summoned via a digital platform they cannot legally access. Violation of the right to be heard under EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 47. The company had a viable recovery plan that the court never examined because we were never given the opportunity to present it. Disproportionate action that destroyed millions in shareholder value to collect a debt representing less than two percent of revenue.

We’re going to file complaints with the European Commission about Denmark’s failure to properly implement EU service regulations and its use of discriminatory digital platforms that violate the fundamental rights of EU citizens from other member states.

We’re going to seek political support from Morten Messerschmidt and Dansk Folkeparti, from the Danish Parliament’s Business Committee, from the Romanian Embassy in Copenhagen, from ESMA and other EU securities regulators.

We’re going to continue doing what we did in December: showing up, telling the truth, demonstrating that we’re willing to fight for this company and its shareholders when fighting is expensive and uncomfortable.

And we’re going to prove something else: that we’re smarter than the system thinks we are. That bankruptcy without due process isn’t the end of the story. That when you destroy a company for doing everything right, you create enemies who have nothing left to lose by exposing how broken the system really is.

The Reforms Denmark Must Make

Denmark needs to implement seven critical reforms to its bankruptcy law if it wants to stop being an international embarrassment:

First, minimum debt thresholds. A creditor should have to be owed at least 100,000 Danish kroner before being able to file a bankruptcy petition against a company, with higher thresholds for publicly traded companies. These thresholds should be inflation-indexed so they don’t become meaningless over time.

Second, proper service requirements for foreign directors. If a company’s directors are citizens of other EU member states, they must be served with legal papers at their domicile in their home country following EU service regulations. MitID and E-Boks cannot be the sole method of legal service for people who don’t have Danish residency credentials.

Third, mandatory standstill periods for listed companies. Before a bankruptcy can proceed against a publicly traded company, there should be a 90-day period for restructuring negotiations. This gives time for proper due process and prevents creditors from weaponizing bankruptcy to avoid reasonable settlement discussions.

Fourth, judicial discretion. Courts must be required to examine whether bankruptcy is actually appropriate given the debtor’s overall financial position and any recovery plans in progress. Profitable companies with arranged payment plans and viable restructuring should not be bankrupted over temporary liquidity disputes.

Fifth, shareholder standing. Listed company shareholders representing more than 10 percent of shares should have the right to intervene in bankruptcy proceedings. The current system treats publicly traded companies with thousands of shareholders exactly the same as sole proprietorships, which makes no sense.

Sixth, increased security deposits. The current 30,000 to 40,000 kroner deposit is absurdly low for bankrupting a listed company. It should be 100,000 to 200,000 kroner for public companies to ensure creditors have real skin in the game and aren’t just filing frivolous petitions.

Seventh, compensation for wrongful bankruptcy. If a bankruptcy order is overturned on appeal, the creditor who filed the petition should be required to compensate the debtor and shareholders for damages. This creates accountability for abuse of the system.

Until these reforms are enacted, Denmark remains Absurdistan—a place where the rules are designed to destroy rather than protect, where digital systems discriminate against EU citizens, and where capital markets operate under constant threat from creditors wielding disproportionate power.

What This Really Reveals

The Shape Robotics bankruptcy reveals five fundamental truths about how institutions actually work versus how they claim to work.

First: perverse incentives matter more than stated intentions. Denmark claims to have a modern, efficient bankruptcy system. But when you make it cost 10,000 euros to destroy 10 million euros in shareholder value, you’re not creating efficiency—you’re creating a weapon that rewards destruction over negotiation.

Second: digital systems can create new forms of discrimination that traditional legal frameworks never anticipated. MitID and E-Boks are elegant solutions for Danish citizens living in Denmark. For foreign directors of Danish companies, they’re insurmountable barriers to due process that violate EU fundamental rights.

Third: removing procedural safeguards doesn’t create efficiency—it removes judicial discretion to consider context. When there are no minimum thresholds and no mandatory hearings, judges can’t distinguish between genuine insolvency and temporary liquidity disputes with viable solutions.

Fourth: entrepreneurial failure should be treated as educational rather than disqualifying. Trump’s six bankruptcies taught him skills that eventually made him President. Denmark’s system would have destroyed him permanently. One of these approaches produces innovation and economic dynamism. The other produces capital flight and risk aversion.

Fifth: the system you build domestically affects your position internationally. Denmark is losing to Trump on Greenland in part because Denmark’s bankruptcy system is fundamentally incompatible with the kind of entrepreneurial risk-taking that made Trump successful in the first place. You can’t be geopolitically strong if you’re economically stupid.

Aurel and I rebuilt trust. We designed smart capital structures. We created a plan where every creditor would be paid in full. We did everything right.

And we were destroyed by a digital summons to a platform we cannot access.

If this can happen to us—a publicly traded company with 18.6 million shares and thousands of shareholders and a viable recovery plan that we spent a month building under maximum pressure—it can happen to anyone doing business in Denmark.

Welcome to Absurdistan, where the man Denmark fears most internationally is the man Denmark would have destroyed domestically, and where two Romanians who actually solved their company’s problems are being punished for solving them too competently.

The Fight Continues

If we had been allowed to execute what we built in the last month, there would be zero unpaid creditors and a fully functioning company recovering from a crisis.

Instead, we have to fight again. Through appeals courts and EU complaints and political pressure and continued public advocacy. Through every mechanism available to people who refuse to accept that a broken system gets the final word.

That’s fine. We’ve been fighting for a month already. We know how to do it. And they’ve now given us nothing left to lose by continuing.

They still haven’t understood the most important thing we proved in this entire saga: We’re under pressure. We’re tired. We’re angry. But we are smarter than they think—and now we have every incentive in the world to prove it as loudly and publicly as possible.

There’s only the uncomfortable silence of people realizing their system is broken and they’ve been pretending it works fine.

We’re done pretending. The fight continues. And Denmark needs to decide whether it wants to fix this before it destroys any more companies that were doing everything right.

Mark-Robert Abraham is CEO of Shape Robotics A/S (or was, until Denmark decided otherwise without notifying him through any channel he could actually access). He is Romanian, which apparently makes him ineligible for due process in Danish courts under the country’s current digital infrastructure. He and Chairman Aurel Nețin spent December 2025 designing what they believe was the smartest restructuring plan possible under maximum pressure—a plan that would have left zero creditors unpaid—only to be bankrupted by a digital summons they couldn’t open. They are appealing on grounds of fundamental EU law violations. Contact: ir@shaperobotics.com (email works better than E-Boks for foreigners, surprisingly).

If you believe bankruptcy law should protect companies that solve their problems rather than destroy them, share this article. If you think Denmark should learn from Trump’s six bankruptcies rather than fear them, contact Morten Messerschmidt and the Danish Parliament. If you think foreign directors deserve the same procedural protections Trump will eventually get when he stops paying Thule’s electricity bill, file complaints with the European Commission.

Because right now, the American President who survived six bankruptcies is threatening Denmark’s sovereignty—while Denmark destroys companies that actually solved their problems. And that’s not just irony. That’s a system failure so profound it has become a geopolitical liability.

The fight continues. Watch this space.

The Myth of Independent Journalism

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Sat, 27 Dec 2025 23:17:18 GMT

This is a comprehensive account of how institutional corruption actually works. For the full investigation, read the Substack series:

“In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It” — The foundational investigation exposing the pump-and-dump
“Episode 2: The Pump and Dump: A Four-Part Account” — Detailed analysis of how Topholm, Bungaard, and Bendixen executed market manipulation
“The System That Protects Fraud” — How media becomes weaponized to defend corrupt networks

This article explains what “independent journalism” actually means when you strip away the mythology. Read the Substack series first to see the evidence. Then return here to understand the system that allows corruption to persist uncontested.

The Mythology of Independent Journalism

We tell ourselves a story about journalism. The story says there are professional journalists who investigate claims, verify sources, check evidence against multiple perspectives, and report what is true. These journalists are independent. They are not beholden to advertisers, board members, or the powerful interests that benefit from opacity.

This story is false. It is told so often and so convincingly that we have forgotten it is fiction.

Independent journalism does not exist.

There is only journalism that serves interests openly and journalism that serves interests while claiming to be independent. The second category is far more dangerous because it maintains the illusion of objectivity while performing the work of propaganda.

Finans publishes as if independence is real. Finans presents articles as if verification has occurred, as if sources have been checked, as if contradicting evidence has been considered and either refuted or incorporated. Finans does this while serving the exact financial interests that benefit from information asymmetry, opacity, and the circulation of unverified allegations timed to destroy competitors.

This is the core mechanism of institutional corruption: the claim of independence that enables dependent media to attack with impunity.

The Aerbio Network: What It Is

The Aerbio Network is not a theoretical concept. It is a specific group of individuals who executed a coordinated pump-and-dump scheme at Shape Robotics in 2024.

Members:

Martin Bungaard (investor)
Søren Bendixen (investor)
Lars Topholm (analyst at Carnegie Investment Bank)

The Truth:

Topholm held undisclosed personal shares in Shape Robotics while publishing bullish research as an analyst. This is a conflict of interest. This is a violation of analyst regulations. This is market manipulation.

Bungaard and Bendixen, who were aware of Topholm’s position and had access to his analysis before it was published, began accumulating shares around 18-25 DKK.

Topholm’s research was published. The stock moved. Enthusiasm built. Retail investors bought shares based on research from someone with financial incentive to make the stock rise.

When the stock reached maximum enthusiasm, Bungaard and Bendixen exited. They sold their shares into the strength that Topholm’s research had created.

They extracted approximately 50 million DKK in value from a company that had not actually become more valuable. This is a pump-and-dump. This is market manipulation. This is a crime.

See “Episode 2: The Pump and Dump” on Substack for detailed analysis of the trading patterns, timing, and evidence.

Finans: Dependent Media in Service of Corrupt Interests

Finans is not part of the Aerbio Network. Finans did not coordinate the pump-and-dump. Finans did not accumulate shares or publish manipulative research. Or at least I have no proof of that.

But Finans and the Aerbio Network operate in the same ecosystem. They serve the same market. They depend on the same information asymmetries. And when the Aerbio Network faced destruction from transparency, Finans had a choice: remain independent or serve its advertisers.

Finans chose to serve its advertisers.

The Economics of Dependence:

Finans is a financial news outlet. Its readers are investors. Its advertisers are banks, investment firms, advisory companies, and the entire apparatus of Nordic finance that profits from opacity. Shape Robotics’s suppliers, competitors, and financial associates are also Finans’s customers.

This creates a simple dynamic: when the institutions that advertise in Finans benefit from information asymmetry, Finans benefits too. When those institutions suffer from transparency, Finans suffers. When Finans publishes stories that harm the network’s interests, it loses advertising revenue and board connections. When Finans publishes stories that serve the network, it gains access and goodwill.

This is not a conspiracy. This is economics. Outlets survive by serving their customers. Finans’s customers are not its readers. Finans’s customers are the advertisers who benefit from confusion and opacity.

Therefore, Finans publishes to serve those interests.

The Attack: Timing, Coordination, and Unverified Allegations

On November 26, 2025, I filed a formal complaint with Nasdaq documenting the Aerbio Network’s pump-and-dump scheme. The evidence was clear:

Topholm’s undisclosed shares
The coordinated accumulation by Bungaard and Bendixen
Trading patterns that matched research publication
The perfectly timed exits
The extraction of 500 million DKK

The Aerbio Network understood immediately: regulators would investigate. The evidence was documentable. The timeline was unmistakable. This would result in prosecution.

Unless they could change the narrative. Unless they could make the story about me instead of about them. Unless they could collapse Shape Robotics before regulators finished their investigation and the pump-and-dump became institutional fact.

They needed a weapon. They needed media that would attack without verifying. They needed outlets that would prioritize destroying a target over investigating the truth.

They had Finans.

On December 16, 2025—three weeks after my complaint was filed—Finans began publishing five articles in four days.

The timing was not accidental. Finans published exactly when the Aerbio Network needed the narrative shifted from “analyst fraud” to “CEO fraud.” Finans published the allegations the network needed published. Finans published without verification, without investigation, without the pretense of journalism.

The coordination was not explicit. Nobody had to tell Finans what to write. Finans understood: if I continued telling the story of the pump-and-dump, it would harm the advertisers, board connections, and ecosystem that keeps Finans alive. But if Finans published an attack on me that shifted the narrative to my past in Romania—allegations that Finans could present without verification—it would serve those interests perfectly.

So Finans published. Not because it was part of the conspiracy. But because its interests aligned with the conspiracy’s defense.

For detailed timeline and evidence, see “In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It” on Substack.

What “Independent Investigation” Actually Means When Finans Doesn’t Do It

Finans claims to do investigative journalism. Let’s examine what real investigation would have required:

Real Investigation Would Have Required:

1. Travel to Romania. Speak to Romanian courts directly. Read the actual legal documents. Understand Romanian legal procedure. Understand that I was a minority shareholder in a minority-controlled entity, without operational control.

Finans did none of this. It published Romanian court allegations without speaking to Romanian courts.

2. Understand the timeline. SAV Integrated became insolvent in 2015. I left the company in October 2017. The accusations were filed in 2018+. I was removed from the company before the accusations were made.

A real investigation would have presented this timeline clearly. It would have shown that I was not responsible for the insolvency of a company I no longer controlled when it became insolvent.

Finans rearranged the timeline. It presented allegations of fraud in a way that suggested I was responsible for events that occurred after I had left.

3. Present contradicting evidence. The Shape Robotics Board investigated this matter fully in 2021. The board hired independent investigators. The board concluded there was no connection between SAV Integrated and Shape Robotics. The board approved my employment based on that investigation.

I provided this evidence to Finans. I provided documentation. I provided the board’s conclusions.

Finans ignored it completely. Not because the evidence was weak. But because including it would undermine the narrative the network needed published.

4. Verify sources. A real investigation verifies claims with parties who have no financial incentive to make false statements. It speaks to parties on all sides. It corroborates allegations against court documents and institutional records.

Finans took allegations from interested parties—people who lost money when SAV Integrated failed, people who might benefit from attacking me—and published those allegations as fact. It did not verify. It did not investigate. It did not corroborate.

What Finans Actually Did:

Finans published unverified allegations in coordination with the Aerbio Network’s need for defense. Finans presented allegations as established fact. Finans ignored contradicting evidence. Finans rearranged timelines to suggest causation that didn’t exist. Finans published to serve the interests of its advertisers, not to serve the interests of its readers.

This is not investigative journalism. This is the weaponization of media. This is propaganda dressed up as news.

The Destruction of “Independent Journalism” as Concept

The myth of independent journalism serves an essential function: it allows dependent media to attack without accountability. It allows outlets to serve corrupt interests while claiming to serve the truth. It allows the powerful to weaponize media while maintaining the fiction that journalism is a neutral profession devoted to facts.

This fiction is necessary for institutional corruption to persist. If everyone understood that “journalism” is just another industry serving the highest bidder, then outlets would lose credibility. People would stop reading them. Investors would stop trusting them. The power of media to shape narrative would collapse.

So the fiction is maintained: there are serious journalists out there, doing real investigation, serving the truth. Finans claims this fiction. Finans publishes as if it investigates. Finans presents articles as if verification has occurred.

Finans is lying.

Finans is a dependent media outlet serving the financial interests that benefit from opacity. Finans published unverified allegations in coordination with the Aerbio Network’s defense. Finans shaped the market narrative to serve the network’s interests, not the market’s truth.

And it did this while claiming to be an independent news organization devoted to uncovering fraud.

The irony is perfect. The outlet that published unverified allegations about fraud was itself committing fraud: the fraud of claiming to investigate what it was actually just reporting as marketing copy for its advertisers.

What Happens Now: Defamation, Litigation, and the Cost of Weaponized Media

We have filed a defamation case in Romanian court. We have documented every factual error in the Finans articles. We have shown:

The articles published unverified allegations without source verification
The articles took events out of chronological order to suggest causation that didn’t exist
The articles were published in coordination with the Aerbio Network’s need for defense
The timing of publication coordinated with a regulatory complaint against the network
The coverage served the financial interests of the ecosystem that advertises in Finans

Under Romanian law, this is defamation. Under EU journalism standards, this is a breach of professional ethics. Under market abuse regulations, this could constitute coordinated media attack in support of market manipulation.

The case will cost Finans dearly.

Not because I’m vindictive. But because consequences are necessary. Because outlets need to understand that weaponizing journalism has a cost. Because dependent media needs to learn that serving corrupt interests has a price.

For detailed analysis of the legal grounds and the journalism violations, see the court filings referenced in “In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It.”

The Real Conclusion: What “Independent Journalism” Actually Means

Independent journalism is not a thing that exists. There is no journalism that serves truth without serving interests. There are only outlets that serve interests openly and outlets that serve interests while claiming to be independent.

Finans is the second type. Finans serves the interests of the ecosystem that profits from information asymmetry. Finans serves those interests by publishing unverified allegations, ignoring contradicting evidence, and shaping market narrative to protect corrupt actors.

Finans does this while claiming to be an independent news organization devoted to uncovering fraud.

The destruction of independent journalism as a concept is not a tragedy. It’s a clarification. It’s what happens when you look honestly at how media actually works instead of accepting the mythology we tell ourselves.

Media outlets are not neutral. They are not truth-seeking. They are not independent. They are businesses that survive by serving the interests of their customers—their advertisers and board members. When those interests align with lies, outlets publish lies. When those interests align with silence, outlets stay silent. When those interests align with attacks on competitors, outlets attack.

This is not conspiracy. This is economics.

Finans proved this in December 2025 by publishing unverified allegations to defend the Aerbio Network, which consists of three men who extracted 50 million DKK from retail investors through market manipulation.

The mythology of independent journalism is dead. What remains is the question: what replaces it?

The answer is: transparency about dependence. The answer is: outlets that clearly state who they serve and why. The answer is: readers who understand that “news” is marketing by another name.

Until that happens, outlets like Finans will continue to weaponize journalism while claiming independence. And corrupt networks like Aerbio will continue to defend themselves through media they don’t own but depend on, because the outlets’ survival depends on serving the same interests the network serves.

This is how institutional corruption persists. Not through conspiracy. But through the alignment of interests and the claim of independence that allows dependence to hide.

Mark-Robert Abraham
December 27, 2025

For the Complete Investigation

Read the Substack series for full evidence and analysis:

“In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It” — Foundational investigation
“Episode 2: The Pump and Dump” — Detailed market manipulation analysis
“The System That Protects Fraud” — How media weaponization works
Court filings and regulatory complaints referenced throughout the series

The evidence is public. The narrative is documented. The mythology of independent journalism is exposed.

In Order to Get Out of Hell, You Have to Drive Through It

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Wed, 24 Dec 2025 11:16:16 GMT

December 24, 2025 – Christmas Eve
Written from Bucharest, Romania

I’m writing this from Romania on Christmas Eve, where I live and where I’ve always lived, though most people assume I’m in Copenhagen because that’s where Shape Robotics is listed and where I work when business requires it. The distance matters. Not just geographically, but philosophically. I grew up here reading Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky as a teenager, trying to understand what it means to live in a world that lies to itself constantly. Not abstractions—survival questions. How do you stay sane when systems pretend everything is fine when it’s not? How do you build something real when the entire culture around you is optimized to avoid discomfort?

Those weren’t academic questions in Romania in the 90s and 2000s. They were the operating system you built for yourself or you didn’t make it.

I’m an existentialist because I believe the only life worth living is one lived in full confrontation with what is true, even when it costs you. I’m an objectivist because I believe reality exists independent of what we wish it to be, and that any system—personal, corporate, cultural—that refuses to see reality will eventually be corrected by it, harshly and without warning. That combination is not comfortable. It’s especially not comfortable when you spend a year watching shareholders lose hundreds of millions in market value not because the business failed, but because history repeated itself and the person at the center couldn’t see it.

This is that story. It’s also the story of watching an entire board exodus happen in real time as crisis hit—and one man, Aurel Nețin, who stayed, bought shares with his own money, and became chairman when everyone else was running.

But at the center of everything is a tragic pattern: a chairman who presided over Paralenz going insolvent owing EIFO 25+ million DKK, and then became chairman of Shape Robotics with the exact same structure—EIFO guarantee, Danske Bank facility—and genuinely believed it wouldn’t happen again.

His name is Jeppe Frandsen. And I really like him. But liking someone doesn’t mean you ignore that they’re repeating a pattern they can’t see.

This is Denmark 2025.

And this is also the story of how we’re now—finally—driving through.

The Timeline: From Growth to Crisis to Redemption

2021–2023: Building Something Real

2024: The Year of Hidden Exits

2025: The Board Exodus Begins

The Board Exodus: Who Stayed, Who Ran

Of the board members serving when crisis hit in 2024–2025, only one remained and bought in:

The pattern is clear: as crisis deepened, everyone left except Aurel Nețin.

I became CEO of Shape Robotics on May 1, 2024, one day after the previous CEO—André Fehrn—resigned. Not because I wanted the title, but because someone had to take the wheel and the company was heading toward a wall I could see clearly. André left because he saw what was coming and didn’t want to fight it. I don’t hate him for that first exit. Some people are builders. Some people are fighters. André is a builder, and what was ahead of us was a fight.shaperobotics

What I didn’t understand at the time was what André knew and didn’t say: the EIFO problem, the analyst situation with Lars Topholm and Martin Bungaard, the trading patterns, the hidden exit conditions buried in the uplisting terms. He saw the fire and stepped aside. I saw the same fire and drove toward it instead.

One year later, the share price has collapsed. We’ve paid millions more in financing costs than we needed to. The team that delivered 76% revenue growth has been dragged through a crisis that was completely avoidable. But the business never broke. What broke was the willingness of people, even good people, to tell the truth when it costs them something.

What I discovered later was much worse: the crisis wasn’t just avoidable. It was predictable. Because it had already happened once before, to the same chairman, with the same lenders, in the exact same structure.

2021–2023: Building something real

I came into Shape Robotics through the StoryKids acquisition in 2021 and found a company that existed on paper but not in reality. We changed that by doing the hard work. Not “I”—we. I drove strategy while people in Poland, Romania, and Moldova made the calls, traveled to schools, lost deals and won them, and convinced human beings to trust us with their classrooms. By 2023, we had 2,000+ schools across Europe using our robots. Real revenue. Real customers. Real growth that came from actually solving problems, not from marketing slides.

The Danish export establishment noticed. EIFO—the state export fund—backed us with guarantees. Danske Bank provided the facilities. From their perspective it was rational: export story, education tech, real European traction. Jeppe Frandsen was our chairman. He had relationships with EIFO. He had relationships with Danske. He told us this was a strong structure.

What nobody told me, and what I only discovered much later, was that Jeppe had been here before. In the exact same structure. With the exact same outcome.

October 2022: Paralenz goes bankrupt—Jeppe was chairman

Eighteen months before I became CEO of Shape Robotics, another Danish tech company called Paralenz filed for bankruptcy. Paralenz made underwater action cameras. It had raised capital, had EIFO guarantees, had Danske Bank facilities. It looked promising. It went insolvent anyway.divernet+1

When Paralenz went bankrupt in October 2022, EIFO lost north of 25 million DKK. Danske Bank recovered zero on their loan.

The chairman of Paralenz when it went insolvent was Jeppe Frandsen.

Let me say that again, because this is the center of the entire story: The man who was chairman when Paralenz went bankrupt owing EIFO 25+ million DKK and Danske Bank significant amounts, then became chairman of Shape Robotics—which had the exact same financing structure. EIFO guarantee. Danske Bank facility. Same lenders. Same chairman. Same structure.

And when I became CEO in May 2024, nobody told me this.

Why EIFO built an exit door

Now the uplisting makes perfect sense. When Shape Robotics moved from First North to Main Market in November 2023, we thought it was a promotion. What it actually was: EIFO building a technical exit condition that would allow them to withdraw their guarantee without having to publicly say “We don’t trust this chairman anymore because we lost 25 million DKK the last time he was in charge of a company with our guarantee.”

EIFO couldn’t say that publicly. It would be too direct. Too confrontational. Too Danish-uncomfortable. So instead they built a structure where the uplisting gave them a technical reason to withdraw that required no explanation and no admission that they had made a mistake by backing a company with Jeppe as chairman again.

André was CEO when we uplisted. Jeppe was chairman. I believe now that André understood what the uplisting meant, or at least suspected it. Jeppe didn’t. Or couldn’t. Because admitting what the uplisting meant would require Jeppe to admit that EIFO didn’t trust him because of Paralenz. And that would require confronting something he couldn’t confront: that he was repeating a pattern.

March 2024: The analyst and the trade

Before I became CEO, something happened that would give EIFO an additional reason to withdraw. An analyst named Lars Topholm from Carnegie published bullish research on Shape Robotics. The market reacted. The share price moved up. What the market didn’t know was that Topholm owned shares in the company when he wrote the note. EU Market Abuse Regulation requires disclosure of such interests. He didn’t disclose it. Shortly after his note drove the price up, he and related parties—including Martin Bungaard—sold into the rally.

Retail shareholders who trusted the “independent” analysis were left holding losses when the price collapsed later. Hundreds of millions in market value evaporated. André was CEO when this happened. He saw it. He understood what it meant. A month later, he resigned.

Jeppe was chairman. He saw the trading patterns too. But Jeppe believed this was a market issue, not a governance crisis. He believed that if we handled it quietly and carefully, EIFO wouldn’t see it as a reason to withdraw.

Jeppe was making the same calculation he’d made at Paralenz: that if we managed relationships carefully, the lenders would stay. He was wrong then. He was wrong now. But he genuinely believed it would work this time.

May 2024: Inheriting a pattern I couldn’t see yet

I became CEO on May 1, 2024, inheriting an analyst scandal and a chairman whose past I didn’t fully understand. By the time I took over, we were already sitting in a company that had become technically insolvent and hadn’t fully resolved its obligations with EIFO. In Danish law, that creates personal exposure for a chairman. Not criminal, but reputational and potentially financial.news.cision

For Jeppe, this wasn’t theoretical. He had already been chairman of an insolvent company that owed EIFO 25+ million DKK. Now he was chairman of another insolvent company with EIFO exposure. The board minutes from this period show discussions about personal liability, about restructuring, about whether Jeppe should step down.

The moment I learned the system’s real rules

When I first discovered that Jeppe had been chairman of Paralenz when it went bankrupt owing EIFO 25+ million DKK, I made a deliberate choice: not to hold it against him.

I was wrong to do that. Not because Jeppe is a bad person—he’s not. But because I misunderstood how Denmark actually works. I thought I was in Denmark, where experience and resilience are valued, where someone who survived a major company failure and came back to serve again would be seen as someone who had learned. I thought: “Jeppe knows what went wrong at Paralenz. That makes him better equipped to avoid it at Shape Robotics, not worse.”

I believed in redemption through experience. I believed in second chances. I believed that in a mature system, a chairman who had been through a crisis would be an asset, not a liability.

So when I found out about Paralenz, I didn’t say “We need a new chairman.” I thought: “Jeppe has been through this. He understands what EIFO looks like when they’re scared. He understands how Danske Bank behaves under pressure. He’s experienced. That’s valuable.”

I was wrong. Not because Jeppe was bad at the job, but because I fundamentally misread the system I was operating in.

I learned the real rules of Denmark much later, when journalists and analysts started attacking me for the Sav insolvency. Sav was a company I was a minority shareholder in. I didn’t control it. I wasn’t chairman. I wasn’t CEO. I had a small stake and some board involvement. When Sav ran into trouble, I was grouped with the people responsible, blamed for an insolvency I didn’t cause and couldn’t control.

That’s when it became clear to me: Denmark doesn’t actually value resilience and comeback. Denmark selectively holds failures against you depending on who you are and who’s attacking you. Journalists attacked me for Sav because it was a story. But EIFO never publicly attacked Jeppe for Paralenz. They just quietly built an exit door.

The system operates on two different standards simultaneously. You can be praised for your experience and judgment in the same breath that you’re secretly not trusted because of your past. You can be pilloried for a failure you didn’t control while the people making that judgment are making the same calculations in private.

I realized this too late. By the time I understood that EIFO didn’t trust Jeppe because of Paralenz, I had already made my calculation that his experience was valuable. I had already decided not to hold his past against him. I had already put him in a position where the system was secretly working against him while publicly accepting him.

In Romania, the system would have said: “Jeppe failed at Paralenz. EIFO lost 25 million DKK. Therefore we don’t trust him with another EIFO-backed company.” Clear. Direct. Transparent.

In Denmark, the system said: “Yes, Jeppe is chairman. That’s fine. We appreciate his experience.” And then built an exit door.

That’s the real lesson. It’s not that Jeppe was wrong to try again. It’s not that I was wrong to trust him. It’s that Denmark operates a two-track system where public acceptance and private mistrust can coexist indefinitely until they suddenly don’t.

And when they stop coexisting—when the exit door opens and EIFO withdraws—there’s no conversation about why. There’s just restructuring and crisis and everyone pretending nobody could have seen it coming.

I really like Jeppe. He’s a genuinely good person who tried to do the right thing for Shape Robotics. But he was trapped in a pattern he couldn’t see. At Paralenz, he had believed that managing relationships carefully would keep the lenders engaged. It didn’t work. At Shape Robotics, he believed the same thing. It didn’t work again.

The difference between someone who learns from failure and someone who repeats it is the willingness to look directly at what went wrong and why. Jeppe couldn’t do that. Not because he’s a bad person, but because Danish culture doesn’t teach you to do that. It teaches you to move forward gracefully, to not dwell on the past, to trust that relationships and good intentions will carry you through.

They don’t.

January 2025: When the banks asked the question—and the board exodus began

By January, the business reality was clear and undeniable. We needed EUR 29 million in financing. The standard solution was a convertible loan from banks. I sat with them and they looked at our fundamentals—real growth, real customers, 76% revenue growth in 2024—and said yes, we can do this. Then they added one condition. They explained it in banker language but the meaning was simple: we’ll give you the EUR 29 million, but you have to publicly disclose and formally address the analyst trading issue. We’re not sending capital into a governance fog. If you can see a market-abuse problem and won’t name it, that’s a credit signal to us about how you’ll handle the next crisis.

In existential terms, what they were saying was this: tell the truth, and we’ll stand with you. Hide it, and you’re on your own. I took this back to the board, where Jeppe was still chairman, expecting a difficult but necessary conversation.

At the same EGM on January 15, 2025, two board members—Moises Pacheco and Kasper Holst Hansen—resigned. The first departures.shaperobotics

Why Jeppe stayed silent—and why I initially agreed

By January 2025, we had discovered something infuriating: EIFO had never explicitly told us that the guarantee was tied to First North Market. The uplisting to Main Market had happened in November 2023—over a year earlier—and nobody at EIFO had said: “By the way, moving to Main Market voids your guarantee.”

I wanted to sue them. I had lawyers ready. The argument was simple: “You provided a guarantee, we made a material corporate decision based on that guarantee, and you never informed us that the decision would void it. That’s material non-disclosure.”

Then I discovered Paralenz.

When I learned that Jeppe had been chairman when Paralenz went bankrupt owing EIFO 25+ million DKK, something shifted in my thinking. I realized why EIFO was being so cautious with us. They weren’t being stupid. They were being scared. They had already lost massively. They didn’t want to admit it publicly. So they built an exit door instead.

Suddenly Jeppe’s strategy made sense to me. Instead of suing EIFO—which would have been public, confrontational, and would have forced them to defend their own failures—maybe we could manage this quietly. Maybe we could work with Jeppe’s relationships, preserve the Danske facility, find alternative financing, and move forward without dragging EIFO’s Paralenz disaster into public light.

I agreed with Jeppe’s approach. Not because I liked it, but because I understood it. Paralenz had cost EIFO 25+ million DKK and zero repayment from Danske Bank. If we sued EIFO, we’d be forcing them to admit publicly: “We made a terrible decision backing Paralenz. We lost 25 million DKK. Now we’re quietly retreating from Shape Robotics because we don’t trust the same chairman who was involved with Paralenz.”

So we took Jeppe’s path: discretion, relationship management, quiet problem-solving. No lawsuit. No public confrontation. Just work through it privately.

That was in late 2024 and early 2025. I thought it could work.

Then the banks said: “No. You have to disclose the analyst trading issue publicly. That’s the condition for the EUR 29 million convertible.”

And suddenly Jeppe’s entire strategy became impossible. You cannot simultaneously:

Manage EIFO quietly by not forcing them to admit their Paralenz failure
AND disclose the analyst trading issue publicly (which would trigger regulatory investigation)
AND ask for EUR 29 million in convertible financing

The moment the banks made disclosure non-negotiable, the quiet strategy died. And Jeppe couldn’t pivot. Because admitting that we needed to disclose meant admitting that his strategy of discretion had failed. It meant admitting that EIFO’s withdrawal was predictable because of Paralenz, and that we should have fought it publicly instead of managing it privately.

That’s when Jeppe’s silence became a problem. Not because he was hiding something malicious, but because he had committed to a strategy that couldn’t survive the real world.

Spring 2025: When comfort defeated truth—and more left

What happened next is the center of this story. The responses came wrapped in the language of reason and strategy. “We need to be strategic about timing.” “Let’s explore quiet solutions first.” “Think of the company’s reputation.” “We shouldn’t burn bridges with Carnegie.” “Lars is influential; we have to be careful.” Every single phrase meant the same thing: we are more afraid of one uncomfortable conversation than we are of losing millions in shareholder value.

This is where Kierkegaard’s warning becomes concrete and observable. A system designed for comfort will always choose comfort over truth, even when the cost is catastrophic. Jeppe had made this same choice at Paralenz: manage quietly, preserve relationships, hope the lenders stay. It didn’t work then. The board was making the same choice now.

The April 2025 AGM came and went. The specific authorization for the EUR 29 million convertible never appeared on the agenda. The banks’ conditions weren’t met. The truth wasn’t spoken.

But the exits continued:

Per Ikov stepped down, did not seek re-electionshaperobotics
Annette Lindgreen (Deputy Chair) did not seek re-electionshaperobotics

And then: André Fehrn returned as Chairman.shaperobotics

April 2025: André returns—temporarily

At the April 2025 AGM, André Fehrn returned as chairman of Shape Robotics. He replaced Jeppe, who stepped down to vice chairman. I was relieved. André knew the business. He understood what had happened. He had left once, but I thought—I hoped—that he had seen what his exit cost the company and the team, and was coming back to help finish what we had started. I considered him a friend. I thought he was coming back to fight.shaperobotics

For a few weeks, I believed we would drive through this together. The board minutes from that period show discussions about moving forward on disclosure, about confronting the analyst issue, about the necessity of governance cleanup. For a brief moment, it seemed possible that André’s return meant something had shifted.

It hadn’t.

On July 8, 2025, Jeppe Frandsen fully stepped down from the board. Another exit. In October 2025, Martin Kjær Hansen followed.news.cision+1

November 2025: History repeats itself exactly—and the final exits begin

In November, EIFO formally withdrew the guarantee. The Danske Bank facility lost its state backing. The bank’s risk jumped from partially insured to fully exposed. They demanded restructuring. The liquidity crisis we predicted in January arrived exactly on schedule.news.cision

This is the exact sequence that happened at Paralenz. EIFO guarantee disappears. Danske Bank is exposed. Company enters crisis. The only difference is that at Paralenz, the company went bankrupt. At Shape Robotics, we refused to.

By late November, the crisis was fully visible. The share price had collapsed. The headlines were public. And the board started its final exodus. The moment arrived that determined everything:

The Scanbox letter

I have that letter. I will attach it to this post as a PDF so anyone reading this can see it for themselves. The letter says: if you stay as chairman of Shape Robotics, we will terminate your employment. Not because of misconduct. Not because he violated any policy. Because he was serving as chairman of a company going through a governance crisis that required honesty.

This is the moment that revealed everything about Denmark in 2025. A man gets threatened with termination for serving on a board. Not for fraud. Not for misconduct. For being associated with a company that was choosing to confront truth instead of hide it. And the system that threatens him faces no consequences. No one asks: is this legal? Is this how we want Denmark to work? The man just quietly resigns, and everyone pretends it was his choice.

December 2, 2025: André quits again—and a hero steps forward

On December 2, 2025, André resigned as chairman. He had been back for seven months. His resignation statement was polite, wrapped in language about “transition phases” and “strategic adjustments.” But the board minutes show what actually happened: Scanbox threatened to fire him, and he chose his paycheck over the company.marketscreener

I don’t hate him. I feel something closer to pity. André is a good person who wanted to help. But when Scanbox—a comfortable, stable employer in the Danish establishment—told him to choose between them and us, he chose comfort. Jeppe had chosen comfort months earlier by stepping down rather than confronting what Paralenz meant. André chose it again.

On the same day, Helle Rootzén also resigned.

But on the same day André left, something remarkable happened.

Aurel Nețin, who had been Vice Chairman, was appointed Chairman.marketscreener

December 3-4, 2025: A chairman who puts his money where his mouth is

While everyone else was leaving, Aurel Nețin did something almost unheard of in Danish business: he bought shares with his own money in the middle of the storm.

December 3, 2025: Bought 106,000 shares at average price 6.05 DKK = 641,300 DKKmarketscreener
December 4, 2025: Bought 100,000 additional shares at average price 6.11 DKK = 611,000 DKKtradingview

Total: 206,000 shares, over 1.25 million DKK of his own capital, committed while the company was in public crisis.

This is not a symbolic gesture. This is a real commitment. This is what it looks like when someone chooses to drive through hell instead of stepping aside.

Aurel Nețin is the only board member who stayed. While Jeppe, André, Per Ikov, Annette Lindgreen, Moises Pacheco, Kasper Holst Hansen, Martin Kjær Hansen, and Helle Rootzén all found reasons to leave, Aurel stayed and bought in.

That’s the difference between someone who talks about commitment and someone who demonstrates it.

What I learned living between two worlds

The difference between Romania and Denmark is this: In Romania, everyone knows systems are corrupt. Everyone knows power protects itself. But at least people say it out loud. The lies are visible. In Denmark, the same mechanisms operate, but they’re wrapped in politeness, procedure, and the language of “personal choice.”

When Jeppe presides over Paralenz going bankrupt owing EIFO 25+ million DKK, then becomes chairman of Shape Robotics with the exact same structure, nobody says “This is a pattern.” They say “Let’s move forward.” When EIFO builds an exit door into the uplisting because they don’t trust Jeppe anymore, nobody says “We lost 25 million DKK last time with this chairman.” They say “It’s a technical issue related to market segments.” When Scanbox threatens André, it’s not framed as a threat. It’s framed as “concerns about reputational risk.”

Kierkegaard—Denmark’s own philosopher—spent his entire life warning against exactly this. He knew that a culture that values comfort and consensus above all else would eventually lose the ability to confront anything real. The existentialists I read as a teenager weren’t writing abstract theory. They were writing survival manuals for people in systems that had stopped telling the truth about themselves.

Most of the board was trapped in that system. They’re good people who cannot afford to confront uncomfortable truths because the system punishes anyone who does. I don’t hate them. I pity them. Because living your whole life repeating patterns you can’t name is a kind of death.

But Aurel Nețin is different. He saw the same crisis everyone else saw. He saw the same risks. And he chose to stay and buy in.

The only way out

The motto that has guided me through every crisis is the simplest statement of how reality works: In order to get out of hell, you have to drive through it. Not around it. Not by hoping someone else solves it. Through it.

Jeppe tried to manage around it at Paralenz. It didn’t work. He tried the same approach at Shape Robotics. It didn’t work again. André tried to avoid it twice—in April 2024 when he resigned as CEO, and in December 2025 when Scanbox gave him an ultimatum and he chose his salary. Seven other board members found their own reasons to leave when the crisis deepened.

After André left the second time, Aurel Nețin stepped up as chairman—and put 1.25 million DKK of his own money into the company while everyone else was running.

With the internal veto finally gone, we did what should have been done in January: filed the complaint, told the truth, engaged without euphemism. Within weeks, serious capital was ready to commit.

The team suffered. But their suffering burned away illusions about who would stand and who would run. You can see this in the board minutes. You can see the shift. You can see the moment the system changed because someone decided to stop repeating the pattern.

Now: The way forward

We are closer to exiting hell than we have ever been. The silence is broken. The truth is visible. The team has proven they can execute even when the system is crumbling around them. And we have a chairman who is willing to put his own capital where the board’s courage should have been months ago.

On January 19, 2025, Shape Robotics holds its extraordinary general meeting. At that meeting, we have the tools we need:

Proof of misconduct (board minutes, analyst trading records, EIFO communications)
New capital committed from serious investors who believe in the business
A team that delivered 76% growth and will continue to deliver
A chairman who bought in at the bottom instead of selling out
Regulatory filing complete on the analyst trading issue
A clean path forward with banks who understand the governance is finally sound

The existentialists understood this moment. Kierkegaard called it “the leap of faith”—the moment when you stop calculating and start committing. Dostoyevsky understood it as the price of authenticity: you don’t get freedom without confronting the truth that makes freedom necessary.

We have driven through the fire. We have paid the cost. We have learned the real rules of the system.

Now we rebuild Shape Robotics as a company that refuses to repeat Denmark’s pattern of comfort. We rebuild it with a team that knows what courage looks like. And we rebuild it with investors and partners who understand: in a world where most systems are failing because they chose comfort over truth, the companies that chose truth will inherit the future.

Mark-Robert Abraham
Founder and CEO, Shape Robotics A/S

Born and living in Romania.
Working in Denmark.
Learning what “history repeating itself” actually costs—and what it looks like when one person refuses to repeat it.

On behalf of the team that refused to repeat the pattern, and in gratitude to the one chairman who stayed when everyone else left.

Writing in personal capacity
December 24, 2025

The work is not finished. But we are no longer in hell. We are driving toward light.

See you at the EGM on January 19, 2026. The tools are ready. The path is clear. Now we execute.

Merry Christmas!

Why we are suing Finans.dk

Mon, 22 Dec 2025 21:43:17 GMT

A Danish investor recently asked me a question that sounds brutally reasonable:

“Why on earth are you suing a newspaper for two million euros when your company has no cash and faces insolvency?”

Seen from Copenhagen, it looks like madness. From a Nordic boardroom, it probably confirms a convenient story: the CEO has lost perspective; a proper CEO would accept the hit, work through official channels, and move on.

From Bucharest, the picture is different. Where I come from, when someone attacks your integrity in a way that threatens your company and the savings you have personally invested in it, you do not fold your hands and wait politely for a committee to rediscover fairness. You document. You speak. You fight. Not because it is good PR, but because any other response feels like collaborating in your own destruction.

That instinct did not come from nowhere. In 2017 I went through a brutal insolvency of a previous venture—long before Shape Robotics, long before Danish listing, long before Finans cared who I was. I know exactly what it means to lose everything you have built, to see value evaporate while you are still answering calls from creditors. I know it from the inside, not as a case study.

So when people suggest that I am casually gambling with the company, or with other people’s capital, they are talking about a man who has already been burned once and still decided to put his own money back on the line as a significant shareholder in Shape Robotics. When the share price fell, it was not an abstract line on a screen. It was my own savings, my family’s future, the equity stake I chose to hold because I believed in what we were building. I lost real value alongside every other shareholder.

This is the person you are telling to “just let it go”.

The year I tried to do it the Danish way

In April 2024, a market professional called me. For more than ninety minutes, he drew out specific details about our financing—the structure, timing, and expected impact. It was textbook material non‑public information being extracted on tape.

Soon after that call, 318,331 shares traded with timing so precise it might as well have been scripted. Buys at the bottom, sells at the top. Not a lucky coincidence; a trading pattern that matched the information window almost perfectly.

I did not take this to LinkedIn. I did not start shouting names. I did exactly what Nordic governance orthodoxy says I should do:

I filed complaints with the Danish FSA.
I informed Nasdaq Copenhagen.
I prepared a detailed whistleblower filing to the SEC.

Everything was done quietly, documented, “through proper channels”.

What followed was silence. Months of it. No visible enforcement, no communication to the market, no indication that the evidence I had provided was being treated with urgency.

In that vacuum, another narrative had space to grow.

Finans stepped into that space. Instead of digging into the insider‑trading evidence, they reached back into my past and dragged out a Romanian insolvency case from 2017—civil, complex, and completely unrelated to Shape Robotics today. The nuance was stripped away. The message was simple: this CEO is tainted, this company is dangerous, and investors should be afraid.

The stories landed at the worst possible moment, just as we were fighting to replace lost state‑backed financing and explaining a severe liquidity crunch to the market. Lenders read those headlines. So did analysts, journalists, and board members. Some of the very people who had sat in meetings with me, fully aware of my past and satisfied with the explanation, suddenly discovered a new courage: the courage to quit.

When the board chose the exit over the truth

One by one, board members left.Not because they suddenly discovered my 2017 insolvency—that had been disclosed from the beginning in our corporate documentation and annual reports. They left because I refused to sweep the trading evidence under the rug and move on.

I pushed for clarity. I asked them to stand with me and say publicly what had happened with the April call, what evidence existed, and what we had done about it. I wanted us to come clean with shareholders instead of pretending nothing unusual had occurred.

That would have meant admitting that someone close to the company appeared to have

abused information. It would have meant risking conflict with people who still moved comfortably through the Nordic financial ecosystem.

They chose the quieter path. Resignations instead of confrontation. Carefully worded statements instead of straightforward explanations. The boardroom emptied in exactly the moment shareholders needed it to stand its ground.

It is easier, after all, to distance yourself from a noisy Romanian CEO than from an insider network that might one day sign your next term sheet.

The Romanian operating system

At that point, the difference between “Danish” and “Romanian” responses snapped into focus.

The Danish system works beautifully when institutions are healthy and everyone plays by the rules: you route complaints into the proper channels, you keep your personal emotions out of sight, and you trust the process to sort things out. You might lose in the short term, but you will be treated fairly over time.

The Romania that raised me does not tell that story. We were ruled by empires, dictatorships, and imported reforms that treated us as material, not as citizens.[web:1378] We learned that institutions can be captured, that “proper channels” can be used to delay and smother inconvenient truths, and that if you do not speak for yourself, you will simply not be heard.

In that culture, dignity is not expressed by your ability to remain invisible. It is expressed by your willingness to stand in the square, put your name and your documents on the table, and say: this is what happened; if you disagree, meet me in court.

So when Finans’s articles froze into accepted truth and the official complaint routes continued to produce silence, my Romanian operating system overrode the Nordic script. I chose not to die quietly. I filed a lawsuit against Finans in a jurisdiction where the case would be judged on documents and law, not on who knows whom at the Friday bar. I did it publicly, because secrecy was already part of the problem.

To some investors, that looked like desperation. To me, it looked like the minimum level of self‑respect.

Professionalism, or gatekeeping in a suit?

This is where the notion of “professionalism” becomes a weapon.

In the Nordic setting, professionalism is often code for disappearing into the process. You speak in short, neutral sentences; you trust regulators and big media to define the narrative; you do not show anger; and you certainly do not drag the system itself into the spotlight. The unspoken rule is that institutions deserve deference, even when they fail you.

Where I come from, professionalism includes the ability to fight for your shareholders and for your own name when those same institutions do not do their job. A CEO who watches obvious wrongdoing, watches his own reputation being destroyed by half‑truths, and responds with a resigned shrug would not be praised for composure. He would be suspected of either weakness or guilt.

So when I write long, detailed explanations of my position, or when I insist on a court deciding whether Finans defamed me, I am not having an emotional breakdown. I am following the standards my background set for what an honest leader does in a crisis.

A Dane may read that as “too much”. A Romanian reads it as “finally someone refuses to bow.” The danger is when one culture’s reflex is allowed to define the global standard. If only a narrow Scandinavian style counts as “fit for a listed CEO,” then every leader from outside that micro‑culture is forced into an imitation.

Diversity becomes cosmetic: different names, same behaviour. I am choosing not to imitate.

The money question

Let’s talk about the two million euros.

Because the company is fighting for survival, it is easy to frame the claim as an absurd vanity project: “He wants cash from a newspaper while his own shareholders are underwater.”

That framing ignores three facts.

First, I am one of those shareholders. I have taken the same hit you have. I did not sell at the top. When the price collapsed, a large part of my own net worth collapsed with it.

Second, the Finans coverage had measurable consequences. Financing that might have been difficult became nearly impossible. Counterparties who had accepted my background when they knew the full context suddenly treated it as toxic when it was repackaged as a simple “Romanian insolvency plus indictment” headline from 2017. If a court later rules that that packaging was misleading or defamatory, the damage is not abstract. It sits in the gap between a viable refinancing and the possibility of an insolvency filing.

Third, in legal practice, serious defamation is corrected not only with small footnotes but also with damages that sting. If there is no cost to crossing the line between harsh but fair criticism and character assassination, powerful media have every incentive to keep pushing that line. A damages claim is how you translate “this did real harm” into a number the system recognises.

You may disagree on the amount. But to call the entire action “ego” is lazy. It is an attempt, once again, to turn a structural question into a personality problem.

Why I care how this looks ten years from now

Will this battle make my life harder in the Nordic ecosystem? Absolutely. Some institutions will never forgive the fact that I dared to put them under the same scrutiny they routinely apply to everyone else.

Some investors will permanently classify me as “too noisy” or “unmanageable.”

But my calculation is longer than the next mandate.

Somewhere, a future Eastern European founder is watching this unfold. He or she will have a different accent, a different story, but the same dilemma: play along with the local script, or insist on bringing their own instincts into the room. If I roll over now—if I agree that my role is to accept whatever Finans chooses to write, whatever boards choose to conceal, whatever regulators choose to delay—then I am helping to teach that person a lesson: keep your head down and your mouth shut, or the system will crush you.

If I see it through, even if I lose, the lesson is different: there is at least one example on record of someone who refused to pretend that the Danish way is the only respectable way to react.

I can live with being the wrong kind of CEO for some people. I cannot live with teaching my daughters that, when someone distorts who you are in public, the grown‑up response is to smile politely and swallow it.

The Danish way is not evil. It is just not the only way.

And my whole point, really, is that a European market mature enough for global capital should be mature enough to handle more than one way of being a serious, responsible, and—yes—professional CEO.

Thanks for reading Mark's Substack! This post is public so feel free to share it.

Episode 2: The Pump and Dump – A Four-Phase Scheme Worth DKK 35 Million

Mark Abraham | WildCEO — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 10:25:59 GMT

The Setup: One Day, One Research Note, One Hidden Fortune

On March 5, 2024 at 6 AM CET, Lars Topholm, Head of Research at Carnegie Investment Bank, published a research note on Shape Robotics, not comissioned by Shape Robotics.

Sr Analysis Carnegie 5th March 2024

182KB ∙ PDF file

The note was brutally positive: a “Back of the Envelope Analysis” projecting a theoretical share price of DKK 46.7 to DKK 131.3 — a 3-4x upside from the then-current price of DKK 36.

The timing was perfect. The company had just announced it was raising capital at DKK 35 per share.

The analysis was innocent.

The analysis was also the trigger for a scheme that would generate DKK 12-35 million in insider profits, destroy DKK 205 million in shareholder value, and leave the share price down 79% by November 2025.

There is one critical detail that makes this analysis anything but innocent:

Lars Topholm held 3,500 Shape Robotics shares. He disclosed none of it.

This is the story of what happened next — and how that money ended up in a place called Aerbio, where the same three names reappeared as chairman, CEO, and anchor shareholder.

The Evidence

Phase 1: THE PUMP (March 5-17, 2024)

The Undisclosed Conflict

On December 12, 2022, Lars Topholm purchased 3,500 Shape Robotics shares.

This is documented in VP Securities, the official Danish government shareholding registry. No dispute. No ambiguity.

He held those shares continuously through March 5, 2024 — the date he published his positive research.

Market Abuse Regulation Article 20 is explicit: persons who produce investment recommendations must disclose all personal financial interests and conflicts that could impair objectivity.

Topholm disclosed nothing.

No shareholding disclaimer. No conflict-of-interest statement. No analyst holdings notice.

This alone is a clear violation of EU market abuse rules and Danish securities law.

The Research Trigger

What did the research say?

Back of the Envelope Analysis:

Current price cited: DKK 36
Theoretical price target (12% EBITDA margin, 10x EV/EBITDA multiple): DKK 46.7
Theoretical price target (15% EBITDA margin, 20x EV/EBITDA multiple): DKK 131.3
Upside: 3-4x within 2-3 years

The language was academic, the caveats were duly noted (”this isn’t official research”, “risks may be significant”). But the headline was unmistakable: Shape Robotics could be a 3-4x from here.

The Market Impact

The research was distributed on professional networks. Share price that day:

March 4, 2024 (pre-publication): DKK 35-37
March 5, 2024 (publication day): DKK 36.3 (up 3% intraday)
March 6-7, 2024: DKK 37.5 (+3.4% cumulative)
March 10, 2024: DKK 37.4 (+3% sustained)

The pump had begun.

The Private Placement: Precision Timing

On March 10, 2024 — exactly 5 days after the research — Shape Robotics announced its intention to raise DKK 35.4 million through a directed private placement at DKK 35 per share.

This was not a coincidence of timing.

The placement was offered to a “limited number of new and existing investors, Danish and foreign.”

Later correspondence would confirm that:

Lars Topholm participated in the placement
Martin Bundgaard and Sundvænget Invest (his investment vehicle) participated, plus cronies (aka Soren Bendixen…)
They were all now long the stock, with a fresh capital raise at DKK 35 having just been announced

The stage was set.

Phase 2: THE LONG DUMP (April-May 2024)

The Perfect Exit Window

Between March 10 and March 22, 2024, when new shares from the placement were listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen, Shape’s stock went into overdrive:

March 11: DKK 38.4
March 12: DKK 39.6
March 13: DKK 40.3
March 14: DKK 44.0
March 17: DKK 52.0 (intraday high)

From DKK 35 (placement price) to DKK 52 (peak) in 7 days. A 48.6% return.

The Insider Liquidation

Starting in early April 2024, the network began to exit.

Martin Bundgaard and the Bundgaard family (via Sundvænget Invest ApS):

Holding: 318,331 shares
Entry price: DKK 35 (private placement)
Exit period: April 1 - May 31, 2024
Exit price range: DKK 38-45
Shares sold: 318,331 (complete liquidation to ZERO)
Profit realization: DKK 2.2 - 4.3 million

Lars Topholm:

Holding: 3,500 shares (held since December 2022)
Exit date: April 26, 2024 (official VP Securities record)
Exit price: DKK 40-42
Profit: DKK 35,000 - 60,000

Bendixen Family (Lars, Kasper, Jakob Bendixen - private accounts):

March 11, 2024: Lars Bendixen buys 1,129 shares (during pump phase)
March 11, 2024: Jakob Bendixen buys 1,331 shares (during pump phase)
March 19, 2024: Kasper Lannov Bendixen buys 350 shares (near peak)
Total family purchases: 2,810 shares at DKK 37-45 range
Exit period: April-May 2024 (exact dates in full VP records)
Final position: ZERO direct holdings by end of May 2024
Individual direct profit: DKK 8,000 - 22,000 (modest compared to Bundgaard/Topholm)

BUT: The Bendixen Family Office Tells a Different Story

While individual Bendixen family members made small profits on direct Shape trading, their holding company Fredericiagade Holding ApS experienced a massive wealth spike in 2024:

2023 total assets: DKK 44.8 million
2024 total assets: DKK 95.8 million
Asset increase: DKK 51 million (+113%)
2024 equity: DKK 70.9 million (doubled from DKK 35.1m in 2023)
2024 profit before tax: DKK 37.1 million
Source of increase: Almost entirely from “financial income” and investments, not operating profits
Timing: Same year Topholm and Bundgaard exit Shape and establish Aerbio
New investment position: Fredericiagade Holding becomes major shareholder in Aerbio Group A/S mid-2024

The Pattern:

Individual Bendixen family members buy during the pump phase (March 11-19), exit during the dump (April-May), then their family office:

Nearly doubles its assets in 2024
Books DKK 37m in profit (mostly financial income)
Becomes anchor shareholder in Aerbio alongside Topholm and Bundgaard

The timing is surgical. The network alignment is complete.

All three network principals exited Shape at peak prices, then immediately regrouped in Aerbio with fresh capital to deploy.

The Coordination Signal

On April 24, 2024, Shape’s former Chairman Jeppe Frandsen sent an email to Lars Topholm. Martin Bundgaard was copied.

The email read (translated):

Vs Bekymring Over Udviklingen I Selskabet Mark Abraham Outlook

325KB ∙ PDF file